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Abstract
The question raised in this thesis is “In the context of the developmental state, 
what is the explanation for Korea’s financial regulatory failure, which contributed to 
the 1997 crisis?” There have been two dominant explanations, i.e. exogenous and 
endogenous. The first one cites the exogenous breakdown of the developmental state. 
Wade (1998, 2000) argues that the Korean government was forced by the US 
government to remove capital controls. He claims that such financial regulatory 
liberalization was not consistent with the developmental state model. The second one 
focuses on endogenous forces, especially the growing influence of business over 
government (Haggard 2000).
The thesis argues that the latter explanation is the more convincing. Three 
financial liberalization issues, i.e. US pressure on the Korean foreign exchange rate. 
Financial Policy Talks between the US and Korean governments and multilateral talks 
surrounding Korea’s entry to the OECD, and key prudential regulatory measures 
before the crisis are investigated. It shows that the exogenous explanation is basically 
irrelevant in explaining regulatory outcomes. The outcomes are consistent with the 
preference of the private sector, in particular, chaebol.
This thesis differs, however, from the Haggard argument, in arguing that the 
regulatory capture was facilitated by Korea’s regulatory institutional centralization 
within the Finance Ministry. Due to the historical proximity of the Ministry to the 
business sector, regulatory centralization left the state more exposed to policy capture. 
Institutional centralization had been a principal requirement for the developmental 
state in the literature. However, the thesis argues that such centralization in the 
financial regulatory area proved to be a weakness rather than a strength in the period 
when financial liberalization was occurring. The thesis has also investigated in much 
more detail the different regulatory policies applied to different financial sectors. The 
difference resulted from different business-govemment balance of power by sector.
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Introduction
Questions
What explains the financial regulatory failure in South Korea (hereafter referred 
to as “Korea”), which contributed to the 1997 banking and foreign currency crisis? How 
should we understand the financial regulatory failure in Korea in the context of the 
developmental state?
Since the 1997 crisis, the question as to why Korea was disastrously affected has 
been addressed in the literature from a number of different perspectives. Haggard (2000) 
classified the literature on the causes of the crisis into three distinct schools: 
fundamentalists, who focused on macroeconomic and particularly exchange rate 
mismanagement (Noland et al. 1998; Kahler 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubine 1998), 
internationalists, who emphasized the volatility of international capital markets (Obstfeld 
1996; Radelet and Sachs 1998; Baig and Goldfajn 1999), and new fundamentalists, who 
focused on regulatory and structural problems, in particular in the financial sector 
(Krugman 1998; Caprio 1998; Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000).
Of the few points on which the literature has almost unanimously converged, one 
is that the country failed to adopt an adequate regulatory policy, that is, prudential 
regulation/ supervision was unable to cope with the consequences of financial sector
liberalization. Moral hazard, which is inherent in financial institutions, resulted in risky 
investments by the financial institutions (McKinnon and Pill 1998). Weak prudential 
regulatory policy allowed an accumulation of short-term external liabilities far exceeding 
the level of international reserves held at the start of the crisis. It also led to a build-up of 
problem loans to corporates in the banking and non-banking financial sector, including 
loans that were vulnerable to macroeconomic slowdown.
Even those who attribute the crisis to financial panic among international 
creditors (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998) recognise that the vulnerability was crucial in 
having induced the panic in East Asia in 1997. By all accounts, financial regulatory 
failure is indicated as crucial in causing the vulnerability of the country’s financial system 
and thus in contributing to the outbreak of the crisis, though the literature cites divergent 
immediate explanatory variables.
The role of the government in Korea’s economic development is at the centre of 
explanations of the regulatory failure. Influential policy-makers, e.g, Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the US, claim that the economic model in the 
region, in particular in relation to the financial system, was problematic. Government- 
directed investment, using the banking system to finance investment is singled out for 
blame (Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan at the US Senate, March 3 1998). Many 
economists agree (Frankel 1998; Wolf 1998). Most of Korea’s senior policymakers also 
seem convinced (e.g. Financial Supervisory Commission 1999).
The economic model on which Korea was often said to be based, i.e., the 
developmental state model, has a premise that a “strong state” has “both the capacity and 
instruments to discipline business, and the business-govemment relationship was 
stmctured to limit the opportunities for particularistic rent-seeking or for business control 
over the policy agenda” (Haggard 1998: 81; see also Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Evans 
1995).
Political economists revisited the developmental state model and give an opinion 
on the role of the model in relation to the crisis. They have tried to identify explanatory 
variables for the regulatory failure.^ There have been mixed responses to critiques of that 
model. Some (e.g., Wade 1998, 2000; Chang 1998) consider that financial regulatory 
liberalization, in particular the removal of controls in capital account, was not consistent 
with the developmental state. They argue that the Korean government was forced by US 
government pressure to do so and the developmental state lost its capacity to coordinate 
borrowings and investments, which was essential for the country’s economic well-being. 
The explanatory variable for the regulatory failure in this argument is the external factor 
surrounding the developmental state, i.e. the US government pressure, which undermined 
the developmental state model.
' Walter (2001) indicates, “political economy should focus on explanation of 
outcomes rather than optimal welfare considerations.” In fact, Asian economic growth 
has posed questions about sources, rather than consequences (Pempell 1999: 138). Also, 
Kong (2000) argues, “While economic institutionalists have focused on tracing superior 
economic outcomes to the government’s interventionary instruments (especially the 
impact of government policy on relative prices), political institutionalists have explained 
the factors that enabled the state to attain and sustain its dominant social position without
Others do not necessarily deny that financial sector liberalisation had a 
detrimental effect on the economy and that it was adopted in part because of external 
factors. They recognise, however, that “the sources of economic vulnerability were not 
limited to particular policies but were rooted in basic features of the business-govemment 
relationship” (Haggard 2000: 38; Also see Woo-Cumings 1999; Kang 2002). They 
consider that the balance of power in business-govemment relations in the developmental 
state has tilted towards business. Financial reform was “captured” in its basic design as 
well as its implementation and enforcement due to political interference, i.e. the growing 
influence of private interest on government decisions; accordingly, a significant set of 
risks were posed by weakly-regulated liberalization (Haggard 2000). In this argument, 
the explanatory variable for the regulatory failure is endogenous in the model, the close 
business-govemment relations; the state was not “strong” enough to be insulated from 
private interest, unlike what had been previously believed, in the process of regulatory 
liberalization. This argument appears to follow a classic line of liberal political economy 
i.e. Olson (1982), which indicates that over time, autonomous states are captured by 
special interests.
This research argues that the endogenous factor approach is more convincing in 
explaining the regulatory failure. What is overlooked in the approach is, however, an 
explanation of how the supposedly competent and autonomous bureaucracy of the state 
has responded and succumbed to private preference over financial regulatory outcomes.
If politicians have relied on particular firms and groups for political support at the macro
succumbing to the negative effects commonly associated with state power” (p. 1).
level, as Haggard argues (2000), thus giving the private sector growing influence, how 
did the relevant bureaucracy, i.e., the financial regulatory authorities, allow the perverse 
private sector influence over policy outcomes?^ Thus, this research focuses on the impact 
of govemment-bureaucracy-industry triangle on financial regulatory policy in Korea.
Existing explanations have been incomplete in addressing such a question. Kang 
(2002) focuses on “larger institutional environment within which actors operate” without 
looking at “microanalytical explorations of political economy” (p. 202). Haggard (2000) 
pays attention to explanatory variables for part of particular outcomes, such as entry 
liberalization to the merchant banking sector, but most of his work is concerned with 
“business-govemment relations and their effect on the policy environment” (p. 15). In 
this regard, both Haggard (2000) and Kang (2002) are similar in terms of considering the 
effects of change in the “larger institutional environment” on policy outcomes. However, 
such broader approaches toward financial regulatory failure may be vulnerable to the 
criticism that “they have not identified the right institutions or those most important to the 
outcomes at hand.”  ^ Also, Evans (1997) indicates, “Depending on the internal stmcture 
of the state, similar business-govemment networks have different implications ... for the 
constmction of joint public-private projects in pursuit of economic transformation” (p.
 ^This question is drawn from Haggard (2000: 39). While referring to cormption, 
he indicates, “What such indices do not capture is the broader political relationships 
between politicians and the private sector. These include the extent to which politicians 
rely on particular firms and groups for political support, the transparency of business- 
govemment relations, and whether institutions encourage healthy or perverse private- 
sector influence on policy.”
 ^Hall (1998) argues that “[I]t is not national-level institutions that most affect 
economic policy or performance but sectoral or regional-level institutions” (p. 183). Also 
see Campbell et al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994
66).
In short, this thesis focuses on the following questions, which are raised but left 
unanswered in the literature. How should we understand financial regulatory failure in 
Korea in the context of micro business-govemment relations, i.e, the chaebol-fmdincidl 
sector-financial regulatory authorities relations? How was the then “institutional 
configurations” of financial regulatory policy affected by private preference? Was the 
strong state bound to succumb to interest group capture as Olson (1982) argues?
Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4)  sets out an overall 
examination of the financial regulatory institutional framework and its characteristics, 
and financial regulatory outcomes in Korea, 1960 to 1997, in the context of the 
developmental state. The first chapter is a detailed literature review of the role of the 
government in economic growth and financial liberalization (and regulation). It sets out 
an analytical framework for the explanation of the financial regulatory outcomes. The 
second chapter is a description of the emergence of a financial regulatory institutional 
framework in Korea, the structural feature of the regulatory framework, and its 
unsuccessful adaptation to the new situation, formed by financial liberalization including 
capital account liberalization.
The third and fourth chapters are an investigation of financial sector 
liberalization, in particular focusing on capital account liberalization, and weak prudential
regulation over the financial sector before the crisis. If Chapter 2 focuses on the 
bureaucracy (a detining element of the developmental state), i.e., characteristics of the 
regulatory authorities. Chapters 3 and 4 look closely at the impact of close business- 
govemment relations (another defining element of the state) on regulatory outcomes. We 
investigate how international pressure and domestic private preference affected the 
regulatory institutions in producing particular regulatory outcomes.
In this regard, these two chapters are a test of dominant explanations for the 
regulatory failure, i.e., an exogenous explanation with the focus on US government 
pressure (Wade and Veneroso 1998; Wade 2000; Chang 1998) and an endogenous one 
with regulatory “capture” (Haggard 2000; Kang 2002). Three issues of capital account 
opening, i.e. the foreign exchange rate system. Financial Policy Talks, Korea’s entry to 
the OECD (in Chapter 3), and key pmdential regulatory outcomes, e.g., BIS capital 
adequacy requirements, large exposure limits and foreign currency liquidity ratios (in 
Chapter 4), are examined.
The second part of this thesis (Chapters 5 -7) consists of detailed investigations 
of different financial sectors, i.e., deposit money banks (DMBs), development banks, and 
merchant banks, and a conclusion. These chapters examine regulatory policy applied to 
different financial sectors in the domestic context of regulatory authorities-flnancial 
sector-business {chaebol) relations. Three questions in particular are addressed in those 
chapters. First, why were divergent regulatory policies applied to the different segments 
of the financial sector? Secondly, how did each sector with different forms of ownership
and political influence manoeuvre in such different regulatory environments? Thirdly, 
what was the role of each segment in creating vulnerability in the financial system? 
Chapter 8 concludes and offers a contribution of this thesis to the literature.
Brief Introduction to Each Chapter
Chapter 1 identifies relevant theoretical approaches regarding the role of the 
government in East Asian economic development and the previous debate on financial 
repression and liberalization in the context of business-govemment relations. It argues 
that recent analyses of financial regulatory outcomes do not pay sufficient attention to 
particular regulatory institutional frameworks in the state while they emphasize the 
growing influence of private business in business-govemment relations at a wider level.
It highlights the particular regulatory outcomes to be explained throughout this thesis, 
chosen on the basis of their relevance to the increased financial vulnerability of the 
financial system. This chapter is supplemented by three appendices: indicators of capital 
flows before the banking and foreign currency crisis showing the vulnerability of the 
economy to the systemic risks (Appendix 1.1 and 1.2); and major events occurring during 
the crisis period (Appendix 1.3).
Chapter 2 describes the regulatory framework in Korea. It examines the weakness 
of its financial regulatory institutions. Contrary to previous descriptions of the institutions 
(e.g.. World Bank 1993), this study argues that centralization of the authority among the 
regulatory framework tumed out to be an impediment to the introduction and 
implementation of sound pmdential regulation. It is also claimed that institutional inertia
of the regulatory institutions was serious. The inertia resulted from the bureaucratic 
interest of related authorities, i.e., the Finance Ministry (the MoF and the MoFE) and the 
Bank of Korea (BoK), in addition to the growing influence of private interest. This 
institutional inertia was a major obstacle, which prevented the country from adapting a 
new regulatory framework in accordance with the impending problem of foreign 
currency over-borrowing.
Chapter 3 examines and explains financial sector liberalization, in particular 
focusing capital account liberalization as it was before the crisis. Existing competing 
approaches to explaining economic policy are tested in the three major capital account 
opening issues, i.e. the change in the foreign exchange rate system. Financial Policy Talks 
between US and Korean governments, and Korea’s entry to the OECD. The reason why 
capital account opening, among overall financial sector liberalization issues, is examined 
in detail is twofold. First, capital account opening was the most crucial policy change 
among others in terms of rendering the then prudential regulatory framework insufficient, 
exacerbating moral hazard and foreign currency over-lending (or over-borrowing) 
problems. Second, it has also been argued that the removal of capital controls caused the 
dismantling of the developmental state, and that the removal was forced by US 
government pressure (Wade and Veneroso 1998).
Accordingly, the area of capital account liberalization policy was where 
international and domestic forces interacted with the government in order to get their 
preferable outcomes, and the policy was very relevant to the outbreak of the foreign
exchange crisis. In this regard, the policy area of capital account opening should be a 
crucial case for the testing the strong state argument. Moreover, the issue of domestic 
financial liberalization, which was by and large affected by business-govemment 
relations in the domestic context, is dealt with in detail in the second part of this thesis.
Chapter 4 examines and explains pmdential regulation/supervision put into 
practice prior to the crisis in Korea. The influence of business over pmdential regulatory 
policy outcomes was more evident than that over capital account liberalization outcomes. 
Evidence shows that the regulatory authorities in the then framework were treating 
financial institutions with regulatory forbearance.
Chapter 4 also investigates how pmdential supervision in a narrow sense, such as 
licensing and on-site examination, was distorted, due to the growing influence of business. 
Distortion of key pmdential mles, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
capital adequacy requirements, loan classification, and large exposure limits, in their 
design, implementation and enforcement are investigated. What was remarkable is that 
the influence of big business was even strengthened by the centralization of regulatory 
authority within the Finance Ministry. The Ministry’s policy frequently impeded the 
policy objective of stabilization including pmdential regulation, which was defended by 
the BoK and the Office of Bank Supervision (CBS).
Chapter 4 reveals cmcial evidence showing that government involvement in 
banking, based on the close business-govemment relations in the developmental state.
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was causing a moral hazard problem in financial institutions, rather than restraining it, 
and distorting the lender of last resort function of the country’s central bank. A significant 
amount of foreign currency deposits {de facto international reserves), over US$ 30 billion, 
with Korean financial institutions were made by the BoK on the orders of the Finance 
Ministry for reasons of macroeconomic stability and financial and corporate sector 
international competitiveness.
Chapters 5-7 address issues relating to regulatory divergence over different 
financial sectors, i.e., deposit money banks, development banks, and merchant banks, in 
the context of business-govemment relations.
Chapter 5 deals with the regulatory policy applied to the DMBs. It is argued that 
though it was frequently disturbed by the Finance Ministry, the policy objective of the 
BoK, stabilization, led to a relatively strict regulatory policy to the DMBs. It was not 
deniable however that ultimately chaebol was powerful. Chapter 6 examines the 
regulatory policy applied to the development banks, which was different from that 
applied to the DMBs. Development banks were a major source of long-term financing of 
chaebol and were wholly-owned by the government. The development banks were not 
subject to the policy objective of stabilization of the BoK. Rather, the banks, in particular 
the Korea Development Bank, often impeded the object of the BoK’s policy objective, 
stabilization, in order to increase the source of corporate finance.
Chapter 7 is the last part of the investigation into the regulatory divergence over
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different financial sectors. It considers closely the dominant argument about the causes of 
the regulatory failure in Korea, i.e., “capture of liberalization” (Haggard 2000). The 
argument is based on the experience of regulatory liberalization over the merchant 
banking sector, in particular the licensing process of new entrants. Chapter 7 argues, 
however, that such an explanation gives only part of the answer for the regulatory failure 
applied to merchant banks. It notes that the merchant banking sector has enjoyed de facto 
a regulatory-free situation since its inception in the 1970s, when the state was “strong” - 
in other words, when the government was so dominant that it was largely autonomous of 
private business interest in policy decisions. This implies that part of the reason for the 
regulatory failure can be also traced to the fimdamental limitation of financial repression 
with close business-govemment relations exerted by the strong state in the 1960s and 
1970s.
Chapter 8 is the summary of the thesis and implications for the literature. The 
thesis is distinguished from present research in terms of focusing on the micro level 
institutional configurations of financial regulation and examining key regulatory 
outcomes in detail, in the context of business-govemment relations. The major finding on 
the financial regulatory institutions in this thesis is, contrary to the commendation on 
good “institutional mechanisms” and “effective pmdential regulation” in the famous 
World Bank’s East Asian Miracle report in 1993, that the developmental state institutions 
left the state exposed to special interests. Centralization of regulatory institutions with the 
Finance Ministry tumed out to be a critical weakness in implementing pmdential 
regulatory measures. It also notes that different financial regulatory outcomes over
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financial sectors resulted from different balance of power in business-govemment 
relations.
In particular, regulatory centralization enabled private interest to affect easily the 
regulatory outcomes due to the historical proximity of the Finance Ministry to the 
business sector. As financial liberalization including capital account liberalization 
advanced, the financial system without a suitable prudential regulatory framework and 
policies became volatile to systemic risks. This may imply that the developmental state 
with such close business-govemment relations and a developmental characteristic was 
weak in establishing prudential regulatory system."^
It should be noted that it was possible to adopt relatively sound regulatory policy 
in the aftermath of the crisis by an independent regulatory authority, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission. This suggests that a major crisis was necessary for this 
fundamental institutional reform/ breaking of bureaucratic inertia to be successful, as 
Olson (1982) argues. This implies that delegation of the authority for pmdential 
regulation with independent regulatory authority is crucial. This inference again tells us 
of the importance of configurations of regulatory institutions at the micro level in having 
sound pmdential regulatory outcomes. A major crisis was eventually a necessary 
precursor of effective regulatory/bureaucratic reform in Korea and this fits well into
“Developmental characteristic” refers to the assumption that developmental 
states define their missions primarily in terms of long-term national economic 
enhancement. They actively and regularly intervene in economic activities with the goal 
of improving the international competitiveness of their domestic economies (Pempel 
1999: 139).
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Olson’s 1982 thesis, which says that states can be autonomous of interest groups in the 
wake of major crises.
Justification for a Single Country Case Study
This thesis is a single country case study. Thus, it is likely to encounter the 
criticism that “the single observation is not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or 
theories” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 211). This is because measurement error may 
yield a false negative, omitted variables may yield an unpredicted result, or social- 
scientific theories are insufficiently precise. Thus, conclusions derived from a single 
observation “is not the way social science is or should be conducted” (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994: 103).
However, as they themselves recognise elsewhere in the same book, if it is part of 
a research programme, a single-observation can be useful for evaluating causal 
explanations. If there are other single observations, perhaps gathered by other researchers, 
against which it can be compared, it is no longer a single observation (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994: 103). This research explicitly locates itself within the fi*amework of the 
existing social scientific literature regarding both the literature explaining the regulatory 
failure in Korea before the 1997 crisis and the developmental state.
Also, this single country case study, which includes a class of events of financial 
regulation in different areas, can be “heuristic”. By looking closely at the complex 
government-financial sector-business relations, we can use this case study as an
14
opportunity to understand the complexity of the questions examined, to develop further 
the existing explanatory framework, and to clarify and elaborate the theories used by 
other researchers (see George 1979: 51-52). Moreover, this single country case study 
includes three case studies of different financial segments of financial regulation (Part II). 
With certain aspects of existing explanations for financial regulation (and liberalization) 
applied to the different segments of the financial sector being selected and examined, this 
single country study can have the benefit of the “method of structured, focused 
comparison,” thus producing an opportunity for further empirical testing of alternative 
analytical models (see George 1979: 60; Cohen 1996: 274).
Arguably, investigating the case of South Korea is much more significant than 
investigating other crisis-afflicted Asian countries. Korea has been central to the debate 
over the role of the state in the success of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs) (Haggard and Lee 1993: 16). Chalmers Johnson, the forerunner among the 
developmental state theorists, also suggests that South Korea is the only developmental 
state other than Japan (Johnson 1998).  ^ Others also argue, “Even among the 
developmental states of East Asia, the Korean one stands out as a particular striking case. 
When it was in its ascendancy, it was the most dramatic, if not necessarily most effective, 
specimen of this species, while its subsequent decline was the earliest and the most 
comprehensive” (Chang and Evans 1999: 20). The crisis in Korea highlighted the Asian 
crisis in many ways and no one persuasively forecasted the crisis until just before the
 ^Chalmers Johnson argues, “In terms of the countries affected by the meltdown, 
the Asian Model really only applied to Japan and South Korea. It never existed in 
Thailand or Indonesia ...” (Johnson 1998: 653).
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event. The country had, and has, the biggest economy among the crisis-afflicted countries.
Consequently, with reference to the controversy regarding the role of the 
developmental state in relation to the Asian crisis, Korea is a key or pivotal case for 
research, which has been located at the intersection of international relations and 
comparative politics (Kang 2002: 178). In fact, the case of Korea has been at the centre of 
the controversy in the literature on the Asian crisis and the developmental state.^
 ^ See Chang 1998; Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998; Cumings 1998; Demetriades and 
Fattouh 1999; Weiss 1998; Woo-Cumings 1998, 1999; Haggard and Mo 2000; Wade 
2000; Kong 2000; Kang 2002.
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Chapter 1 Literature Review and Analytical Framework
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section starts with an 
introduction to the critiques of the developmental state model. It then examines 
conflicting views on the role of the government in East Asia regarding economic growth 
and, in particular, the developmental state argument. The developmental state is shown to 
have both bureaucratic competence and close business-govemment relations as its 
defining elements. A recent approach among developmental state theorists, focusing on 
the broader institutional milieu (Haggard 1998), is also explored as are responses of 
political economists to the critiques of the developmental state model.
The second section of this chapter explores the outcome variables to be explained 
in this thesis: a combination of financial sector liberalization including capital account 
liberalization and weak pmdential regulation/supervision, which failed to restrain the 
moral hazard problem in the financial sector. It also reviews recent dominant 
explanations, on the basis of the context of “institutional arrangements in their broader 
political milieu”, for the financial regulatory failure in Korea, and discusses what those 
explanations have overlooked; a micro-level institutional approach is suggested to 
address what was missed in the explanations. This section is supplemented by three 
appendices: indicators of capital flows showing the vulnerability of the Korean financial 
system (Appendix 1.1 and 1.2) and major events which occurred during the crisis period 
(Appendix 1.3).
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L I Literature Review on the Role o f the Governments o f East Asia
Since well before the crisis, the role of the governments of East Asia has been a 
major subject of controversy within at least three different schools: the dependency 
school, the neoclassical economists, and those with the developmental state perspective. 
The rapid economic growth in East Asia undermined the dependency school and then 
challenged the neoclassical perspective. The 1997 crisis in Asia has also undermined the 
developmental state theorists.
As Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998) indicate, “Dissatisfaction with 
existing orientations and research programs, coupled with changes in the world, has 
created openings for alternative conceptualisations” (p 647). In fact, the three different 
schools have been tested by the experience in East Asia in relation to the role of 
government. In the wake of the crisis. Summers, US deputy Treasury Secretary, stated, 
“There has been a great deal of discussion about the ‘Asian model’’’(Summers 1998).
1.1.1 Critiques o f the Developmental State Model
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the developmental state is 
now seen as one of the main villains responsible for the crisis. In particular, government 
intervention in the financial markets has been blamed as the major cause of the crisis by 
many policy-makers and commentators (e.g., Greenspan 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti & 
Roubini 1998; Krugman 1998).
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In his testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Alan 
Greenspan stated that Asian economies had endeavoured to achieve rapid growth by 
means of a much higher mix of government-directed production than had been seen in the 
market-driven economies of the West. He claimed that for years domestic savings and 
rapidly-increasing capital inflows had been directed by governments into investments that 
banks were required to finance. He argued that, lacking a true market test, much of that 
investment had been unprofitable (Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan at the US 
Senate, January 30 1998).
In other testimony, he argued that “following the breakdown, an increasing 
awareness, bordering in some cases on shock that their economic model was incomplete, 
or worse, has arguably emerged in the region.” He declared, “My sense is that one 
consequence of th’s Asian crisis is an increasing awareness in the region that market 
capitalism, as practiced in the West, especially in the United States, is the superior model; 
that is, it provides greater promise of producing rising standards of living and continuous 
growth” (Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan at the US Senate, March 3 1998).
Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1998) also argue that “Political pressures to maintain 
high rates of economic growth had led to a long tradition of public guarantees for private 
projects, some of which were effectively undertaken under government control, directly 
subsidized, or supported by policies of directed credit to favoured firms and/ or 
industries.” Where government had previously intervened, they claim, non-financial 
corporations generally underestimated the costs and risks of the underlying investment
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projects. “With financial and industrial policy enmeshed within a widespread business 
sector network of personal and political favouritism, and with governments that appeared 
willing to intervene in favour of troubled firms, markets operated under the impression 
that the return on investment was somewhat ‘insured’ against adverse shocks” (p. 21).
A journalist at the Washington Post confirms the existence of the view on the 
Asian developmental states of the US Treasury and the IMF on the eve of the crisis as 
follows;
To Rubin, Summers, and their lieutenants, Korea’s crisis was the inevitable result o f the 
country’s stubborn insularity and its slavish attempts to follow the Japanese economic model, 
with its system o f cosseting banks to pump funds into industry. The treasury’s international 
staff had long urged Seoul to open up its financial sector ... (Blustein 2001: 143)
Some blame the developmental state model directly. Charles Wolf at the Rand 
Institute, for example, maintains that the primary cause of the crisis was the legacy of the 
so-called Japanese development model with its perverse consequences. He argues that 
some proximate causes, such as short-term borrowing by Asian banks and companies, 
their long-term lending or investing, and the unrealistic assumption of foreign investors 
that pegging Asian currencies to the US dollar would be maintained, are traceable to the 
primary cause: widespread insulation from market forces. Hence, where the Asian model 
is not removed and replaced by the market-mediated allocation of resources, recovery 
from the crisis is more likely to be slow and fitful -  and ultimately far more painful 
(Charles Jr. Wolf, “Too Much Government Control” Wall Street Journal, 4 February
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1998).* Krugman (1998) also argues, “The problem began with financial intermediaries -  
institutions whose liabilities were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, 
but were essentially unregulated and therefore subject to severe moral hazard problems.”
In sum, the developmental state, in particular in relation to its financial structure, 
which had previously been admired by external commentators and policy makers, has 
been strongly criticized since the outbreak of the crisis. However, what should be noted 
in these critiques is that only one aspect of the developmental state, i.e., government 
intervention in the market, has been critically highlighted, whereas another and perhaps 
far more important aspect of the state, the impact of close business-govemment relations 
on the crisis, is not fully examined nor understood.
1.1.2 Three Perspectives on the Role o f the Government
In order to understand the developmental state model which emerged in the 1980s, 
it would be helpful to look at the brief history of ideas on the role of the government in 
economic growth. For some time during the post-World War II period, ‘Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (“ISI”)’ had been a dominant view in developmental 
economics. It originated from Raul Prebisch’s doubt about the benefit of integration into
* It is interesting to recall that Charles Wolf once found it “a striking fact that the 
few relatively successful developing economies -  Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan, China -  have greatly benefited from decisions and 
policies that limit government’s role in economic decision-making, and instead allow 
markets- notwithstanding their imperfections and shortcomings -  to exercise a decisive 
role in determining resource allocation ” (World Bank 1993: 32).
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the international economy.^ He conceived that primary producers in developing countries 
faced price volatility in the short term and deteriorating terms of trade in the long term. 
Therefore, his suggestion, using infant-industry arguments, was that industrialization 
should be achieved through ISI. This view subsequently developed into dependency 
theory (Haggard 1990).
This dependency view, however, was under attack by neoclassical economists 
during the 1960s. The economists argued that the problems of developing countries were 
due to erroneous government intervention and not to international structural forces or 
rigidities. External relations through trade with developed countries had been less 
disruptive than had previously been thought and inward foreign investment from 
developed countries had spawned benefits, such as technological adaptation. The East 
Asian experience was thus conceived as supporting the neoclassical arguments.
As a matter of fact, some governments in East Asia applied a unique economic 
policy, which could be conceived as being consistent with the neoclassical approach in 
some areas. Export-oriented trade policy and sound macroeconomic policies, 
characterized by fiscal discipline, were representative examples, among others. In
 ^Raul Prebisch is the founder of the school of ‘dependence theory.’ Dependency 
is defined as "a description of the relationship between developed and underdeveloped 
countries "(Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, Edited by Ian Mclean, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1996, p. 136). He thought, the world "was divided into 
centre (the developed, industrialized North) and the periphery (the underdeveloped 
agricultural South); the relationship between them was determined by the structure of the 
world economy. In place of classical trade theory's notion of a mutually advantageous 
relationship between centre and periphery, Presbisch argued that a model of unequal 
exchange operated, with Latin American economies facing a long-term secular decline in
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particular, the strategy of strong relationships between those economies and the 
international economy, which was embodied in export-oriented policy, was superior to 
ISI strategy adopted in Latin America. Moreover, the East Asian economies were even 
more egalitarian than developed countries, in contrast to those in Latin American 
countries (Haggard 1990). Thus, the experience in East Asia profoundly undermined the 
position of the dependency school.
There were, however, many other heterodox areas in the East Asian experience. 
Without doubt, one of those was industrial policy. Since the mid-1980s, a group of 
scholars challenged the neoclassical perception and the East Asian success story strongly 
supported that challenge.^ The major critique of those scholars concerned the role of the 
state in promoting growth. They argued that patterns of industrial-structural change in the 
East Asian countries had to be attributed to the industrial policy of developmental states 
in the region.
The World Bank’s famous 1993 report. The East Asian Miracle, mirrors a 
complex of both orthodox and heterodox policies in East Asia. “The report interpreted 
East Asian success as a challenge to Bank orthodoxy, and acknowledged a significant 
role for the state. However, it also placed emphasis on the market-consistency of the 
successful aspects of East Asian industrial policy interventionism .. .’’(Foot and Walter
their terms of trade." (in http://www.policvcvber.com/psl 01 lexicon/messages/231 .html) 
 ^As Haggard (1990) indicates, they consist of a theoretically eclectic group of 
economists, political scientists, and area specialists. Their works include Amsdenl985, 
1989, Johnson 1982, Jones and SaKong 1980, Wade 1990. Haggard (1990) is also a 
representative work, challenging the neoclassical perspective.
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1999: 256). What is remarkable is that both the World Bank’s Miracle report and the 
proponents of industrial policy share the assumption that a competent and meritocratic 
bureaucracy, which was closely connected to, but still independent of business preference, 
has been an essential institutional prerequisite for successful policy formation and 
implementation (Evans 1998: 66).
1.1.3 The Developmental State Model
Sound macroeconomic policy in East Asian countries has been a crucial 
underpinning for the neoclassical perception. From that perception, however, the question 
as to why the industrial policy of intervention by the government in the market in East 
Asia had not resulted in rent-seeking behaviour but rapid economic growth with a 
relatively egalitarian nature could not be answered.
The developmental state model with the focus on the institutional characteristics 
in the economies of the region, i.e., Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, has thus emerged to 
address that question. In the seminal work in 1982, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 
Chalmers Johnson “constructed a Weberian ideal type of an interventionist state that was 
neither socialist... nor free-market... but something different: the plan-rational capitalist 
developmental state, conjoining private ownership with state guidance” (Woo-Cumings 
1999: 1-2).
The institutional features of the developmental state were contradictory because 
the bureaucracy in the state was independent in policy decisions from the influence of
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business, but had close ties to the business community. Evans (1995, 1998) called the 
contradictory combination of close ties and independence “embedded autonomy.” 
Bureaucratic competence and close business-govemment relations are assumed to be 
defining elements of the developmental state. Most of explanations on the region’s 
economic growth, based on the developmental state perspective, have tried to articulate 
such institutional features, as shown in the examples of “discipline (by the state over 
private enterprise)” (Amsden 1989), and “governed interdependence” (Weiss and Hobson 
1995).
However, there was divergence in the literature. Initial explanations of some 
developmental state theorists, such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990), following 
Johnson’s 1982 work, appeared to suggest a state-centric argument because the dominant 
position of the government over the society/private actors was emphasized in those 
explanations. Focus on a particular bureaucracy, such as the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) in Korea coined as “pilot agency”, reinforced such a perception of the states in the 
region.
It became clear, however, that the developmental state argument is essentially an 
institutional approach with the focus on close relations between business and government. 
Though it was important for the state to maintain a competent, coherent and autonomous 
bureaucracy for economic development, the state was only effective when it was based 
on “close ties of bureaucrats to business in which the bureaucrats retain the ability to 
formulate and act on preferences autonomously” (Evans 1995; Schneider 1998: 103). The
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State was able to “discipline” the private sector in a particular institutional and political 
setting, where policy decisions were made, and the state was called “strong” or 
“autonomous” (Haggard, Cooper, and Collins 1993: 3).
The developmental state was assumed to have three characteristics: coercive 
capacity, comparative independence from particular interest groups and classes, and an 
interventionism capable of restructuring society, or substituting for other structures, such 
as the market (Woo 1991: 2). These characteristics had institutional uniqueness at macro 
and micro levels, in other words political (or constitutional) and institutional (or 
bureaucratic) levels.
At macro level, the basic constitutional organization of political authority 
circumscribed the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups. This 
relationship contributed to the decisiveness with which government could act and the 
reliability of its economic policy. For example, authoritarian rule and the concentration of 
executive power expedited the introduction of a number of comprehensive reforms, 
including those relating to previous patterns of private interaction between government 
and business. At micro level, the organization of the bureaucracy was crucial to ensure 
the quality of high-level economic decision-making, the reduction and control of rent- 
seeking and corruption, and the efficiency and coherence of policy implementation. 
Bureaucrats pursued organizational rather than political or personal goals since they had 
clear career paths within the bureaucracy (Cheng et al. 1996).
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1.1.4 Reconceptualization o f Business-Government Relations
As the importance of business grew, some of developmental state theorists paid 
more attention to the broader institutional milieu, such as the type of regime and the party 
structure, and particularly the “strength” of the state, than to the advantage of competent 
and meritocratic bureaucracies (e.g., Haggard 1998). It is emphasized that bureaucratic 
and political institutions can amplify or mute the tendency of politicians to be responsive 
to interest group pressures and short-term political constraints, which introduce 
distortions, reduce the credibility of policy, and lead to sub-optimal performance. But this 
depends “on how they structure decision-making and the representation of interests” 
(Haggard 1998).
Thus, bureaucratic and political institutions are one important element of the 
political matrix, where the policy-making process is subject to collective action, 
coordination and commitment problems. But another important element of the matrix 
should be the relationship between the government and the private sector. Even if 
politicians are not “captured” by the private sector, they are dependent on the private 
sector in several important respects - for resources, information, political support, and 
ultimately for investment and growth which are a source of legitimacy in any economy 
(Lindblom 1977; Chang 1994; Haggard 1998).
In this regard. Haggard (1998) suggests “a reconceptualization of the business- 
govemment relationship” in the developmental state model. “Rather than thinking in 
terms of insulation and autonomy, it may be more useful to see business-govemment
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relations as an ongoing negotiation.” Though the state was indicated to have both the 
capacity and instruments to discipline business, equally important is the fact that the 
business-govemment relationship was set to restrain the opportunities for particularistic 
rent-seeking or for business control over the opportunities for government decisions. 
Haggard (1998) proposes that at least three aspects of “business-govemment relations” 
will influence the outcome of this bargaining relationship. The first is the nature of 
political institutions and the extent to which they provide opportunities for business 
access to, and control over, the policy agenda. The second is that we should know not 
only about the preference of the private sector but also its political capacity. The third 
aspect is that the first and the second factors are endogenous to the broader political 
relationship between government and the private sector: the extent to which politicians 
depend on business support (Haggard 1998: 83).
Based on the perspective of such reconceptualization of business-govemment 
relations. Haggard concludes that the Korean government has been politically vulnerable 
and reliant on business support. It is also indicated that an increase in the organization 
and influence of the domestic private sector “raises the question of how a shift in the 
balance of political power between the public and private sectors will affect government 
policy in the future” (pp 84-99). This issue is important because it came to be the starting 
point of present dominant explanations, such as Haggard (2000) and Kang (2002), for the 
financial regulatory failure in Korea. It should be noted, however, that although the 
explanations are based on a new institutional perspective, the focus of the approach is 
largely on the third aspect of “the broader political relationship between the government
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and the private sector.” The first and the second aspects, regarding micro level business- 
govemment relations in particular configurations of financial regulatory institutions, are 
by and large unaddressed. We revisit this point in Section 1.2.3.
1.1.5 Response o f Developmental State Theorists to the Critiques
In response to the above critiques in Section 1.1.1, developmental state theorists 
responded with mixed views which can be classified into two groups. The first group 
tends to blame the crisis on inappropriate regulatory liberalisation, forced by external 
factors such as the US government, rather than on the developmental state itself (Chang 
1998; Wade 1998; Wade and Veneroso 1998). By contrast, the second group recognizes 
that close business-govemment relations in the developmental state had an inherent 
weakness which contributed to the onset of the crisis (Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 
2000; Kang 2002). The South Korean case is pivotal in both cases.
The first group argues that it was not the model itself but the eclipse of the model 
which contributed to the crisis. The regulatory liberalization was caused by extemal 
pressure. With reference to Korea, for example, Wade and Veneroso (1998) argue that 
extemal forces, such as US government pressure, compelled the Korean government to 
promote capital account liberalization which is not consistent with the developmental 
state model. They insist that capital controls are required to make an economy with a 
high-corporate debt-to-equity ratio less vulnerable to the whims and stampedes of 
portfolio and hedge fund managers and more generally to re-establish stable growth 
(Wade and Veneroso 1998: 31).
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It is also claimed that too much liberalization undermined the developmental 
characteristic of the state’s ability to coordinate investments in large-scale industries.
This allowed excess capacity to emerge in industries like automobiles, shipbuilding, steel, 
petrochemicals and semi-conductors, and eventually led to the fall in export prices and 
the accumulation of non-performing loans (Chang 1998).
By contrast, the second group seems to be partly in agreement with the critiques 
of neo-classical economists insofar as it recognizes that the model itself had inherent and 
characteristic weaknesses (Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 2000). Focusing on close 
business-govemment relations of the developmental state. Haggard (2000) argues that the 
relations, which were believed to be an asset during the high growth period, generated 
moral hazard, distorted the liberalization process and increased the vulnerability to 
shocks, particularly in an era of greater capital mobility. Government intervention in and 
through the financial sector inhibited the ability of banks to monitor their clients and 
politicised both lending decisions and subsequent losses.
However, Haggard underlines the fact that equal, if not greater, risks arose from 
poorly conceived and regulated liberalization and privatization. These reforms are often 
seen as antidotes to rent seeking and corruption. Nonetheless, they can also be captured 
by business and distorted in ways that shift risk back to the government and increase 
vulnerability to shocks, typically by weakening the regulatory process. These conflicting 
weaknesses resulted from some characteristics that the developmental state did not have.
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including political counterweights to private economic power, independent regulatory 
agencies and transparency in business-govemment relations (Haggard 2000).
1.2 Analytical Framework
1.2.1 Outcome Variables: Financial Sector Liberalization, Moral Hazard and Prudential 
Regulation/Supervision
Most analyses of the crisis agree that large foreign capital inflows, caused by 
domestic financial and capital account liberalization, were intermediated by domestic 
financial institutions and that those flows expanded credit, often to risky borrowers, while 
the government did not impose an appropriate framework of prudential supervision/ 
regulation."^
An IMF working paper indicated, “[T]he banking crises of the 1980s and 1990s 
have pointed out the link between financial liberalization and financial fragility and the 
existence of a possible trade-off between the benefits of liberalization and the costs of 
increasing financial fragility, especially in developing markets” (Rossi 1999: 3). Some 
prominent economists, Bhagwhati (1998) and Rodrick (1998), have raised questions 
about the benefits of capital account liberalization and have argued that in some cases 
capital controls could be appropriate, e.g. in the Asian crisis.
 ^It is argued that “Even if we acknowledge the central role of capital movements 
in triggering the crisis, any full account of its onset and depth must encompass these 
domestic conditions as well” (Haggard 2000: 15).
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The question of the relevance of financial liberalization to the crisis was originally 
raised by Diaz-Alejandro (1985), “Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial 
Crash” in Journal o f Development Economics (vol. 19, no. 1). According to Velasco 
(1988), Diaz-Alejandro indicated, “In the Southern Cone countries, ... the acquisition of 
debt was intimately connected with the liberalization of international capital movements 
and domestic financial markets” (p. 263). Why did financial reforms in the 1970s aim at 
ending “financial repression” (McKinnon 1980) and seek to free domestic financial 
markets yield by 1983 widespread bankruptcies of domestic financial sectors and massive 
government interventions or nationalization of private financial institutions? (Diaz- 
Alejandro 1988: 364) Andres Velasco (1988) summarized several crucial points made by 
Diaz-Alejandro (1988), as follows:
“Following the advice o f Northern experts, the banking system was privatized and interest rate 
ceilings abolished, but little attention was paid to possible market failures arising from moral 
hazard and asymmetric information. After a period o f very high real interest rates many firms 
began playing a Ponzi game vis-à-vis domestic banks, which continued to lend under the apparent 
belief that the government would bail them out in a crunch. As so often in economics, this became 
a self-fulfilling prophecy: widespread bank failures hit Argentina and Chile between 1980 and 
1983 and governments -  under pressure from foreign creditors -  guaranteed the loans involved” 
(Velasco 1988:263).^
In line with the argument of Diaz-Alejandro, McKinnon and Pill (1988) 
developed a simple framework on the progress of the crisis, which they call
 ^ For further information about the Ponzi game, see 
http://home.nvcap.rr.com/useless/ponzi/ which refers to a kind of pyramid scheme based
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“overborrowing syndrome” and which focuses on “the interactions between structural 
economic reform, expectations regarding its success, and institutional and market failures 
in the financial system” (p. 1268).
In many cases, according to McKinnon and Pill (1988), the interrelationship 
between these three factors has spawned catastrophes, such as Mexican-style financial 
crises, though the scale and depth of such disasters vary by country and by time. 
Therefore, the ultimate focus is on a requirement for comprehensive public controls and 
ultimately regulatory authority intervention. Because the problem of overborrowing lies 
in institutional weakness, failing to deal with the moral hazard problem caused by the 
government’s implicit guarantees to financial institutions, a first-best solution would be to 
have an appropriate institutional infrastructure of regulation and supervision (McKinnon 
and Pill 1998). ^
Barry Eichengreen also agrees with the above views. He indicated at an IMF 
conference in October 1998 that financial institutions are fragile in the context of 
liberalization in international financial transactions because their assets are relatively 
illiquid, but their liabilities are repayable on demand. Thus, those institutions are 
susceptible to self-fulfilling crises of depositor confidence. Accordingly, the focus is 
again centred on financial liberalization and appropriate prudential regulation/ 
supervision. “So it is these recognitions that prompt governments to impose a panoply of
on a story of Carlo Charles Ponzi in the 1920s.
 ^There are many works focusing on the 
moral hazard in explaining financial crises (e.g. Krugman 1998).
 role of the domestic financial sector and
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prudential regulations on the transactions and positions of financial intermediaries where 
they think those transactions and positions have implications for systemic stability.” The 
less developed the financial market, the greater is the requirement for prudential 
regulation. “Such regulations are especially strict where the techniques of risk 
management are thought to be least well developed, where auditing and accounting 
practices leave the most to be desired, and where financial disclosure is least adequate, 
weakening market discipline.”^
As for structural economic reform, there was a significant change in Korea’s 
policy regime: domestic liberalization in trade and finance, and capital account 
liberalization during the 1980s and1990s, particularly during the mid-1990s when the 
country was negotiating with OECD member countries for its entry. It is certain that 
financial sector liberalization, together with trade liberalization, led to an increase in 
capital inflows.
As for expectations regarding the success of economic reform, it is argued that 
“With further capital market opening, firms built up expectation of the Korean currency 
appreciation and the gradual decline of the domestic interest rates to converge on foreign 
interest rates thus increased their foreign borrowing and investment”(Cho 1999: 18). 
What should be noted in this process is that the flows were intermediated by domestic 
banks and thus the risk inherent in foreign capital inflows was magnified. McKinnon and
 ^See IMF Transcript: Capital Account Liberalization: What’s the Best Stance? 
([with Barry Eichengreen, Michael Mussa, Jagdish Bhagwati, Richard Cooper and
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Pill (1996) describe how foreign capital inflows affect the supervisory and regulatory 
framework as well as the solvency of deposit-taking commercial banks, apart from the 
macroeconomic consequences (McKinnon and Pill 1996: 9). They categorize a number of 
likely risks when large inflows of foreign financial capital enter a newly liberalized 
domestic banking system.*
As for institutional and market failure in the financial system, the moral hazard of 
financial institutions and the necessity for prudential regulation should be clearly 
recognized. Banking is especially important due to its function of asset transformation, 
from assets with liquidity to those without. Therefore, the government gives an implicit 
or explicit guarantee to those who deposit funds, and accordingly the banking institutions 
can easily fall into moral hazard. It is also indicated that moral hazard may arise from the 
incentive of borrowers to misrepresent their position and to over-borrow, on the
Ricardo Hausman)] October 2, 1998, 2:30 p.m. at International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C. http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/tr/1998/tr981G02a.htm
The risks are as follows; credit risk will increase as bank lending rises. A sudden 
increase in the available funds may lead to greater investment by companies in risky 
prospects; foreign exchange exposure rapidly increases when the inflows are in the form 
of lending to domestic banks by foreign investors; real exchange rate risk on the 
profitability of traded goods sector decreases due to the increase in capital inflows; 
settlement risk increases if the payment system cannot deal with the magnitude or 
direction of cross-border settlements; liquidity risk rises if the size of the capital inflows 
is large in relation to that of domestic securities markets; and, “risks arise from the 
supervisory and regulatory framework: regulators face larger and different challenges in 
assessing the risks borne by the institutions they supervise when capital inflows are 
considerable and the risks described above multiply.” (McKinnon and Pill 1996). In 
relation to the Asian crisis, the authors emphasise the risks and costs of open foreign 
exchange positions in banks. As a representative example, they suggest that “Offshore 
borrowing in foreign currency to fund domestic currency denominated credit expansion is 
the typical vehicle for this currency speculation.” (McKinnon and Pill 1998). Also, refer 
to Ariyoshi, A., K. Habermeier, et al. 2000. in particular Box 2 (Risks in Banks’ Cross- 
Border Transactions) in Page 34, Part III.
35
assumption that if they run into difficulties lenders will be forced to agree to better terms. 
Prudential regulation/supervision should thus be implemented to restrain such moral 
hazard (Lastra 1996; McKinnon and Pill 1998; Balino, T. J. T., A. J. Ubide, et al. 1999).^
In this connection, Goodhart (1998) proposes the traditional rationale for bank 
regulation and supervision by reference to the following four main considerations:
(1) the pivotal position o f banks in the financial system, especially in clearing and payments
systems;
(2) the potential systemic dangers resulting from runs on banks;
(3) the nature o f  bank contracts;
(4) the adverse selection and moral hazard associated with the lender-of-last-resort role and other
safety net arrangements that apply to banks (Goodhart 1998: 10).
In sum, financial sector liberalization, moral hazard, and weak prudential 
regulation are now seen as key outcome variables contributing to the crisis. Together with 
the existence of those variables, the Korean financial system became increasingly 
vulnerable through the 1990s as Appendices 1.1 and 1.2 show.
1.2.2 Explanatory Variables in Competing Approaches
Different theoretical orientations suggest different research ‘maps’ for 
explanations (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). The explanations in the existing
 ^The moral hazard problem does not require government intervention, though it 
may be exacerbated by assumptions of likely LLR support (Walter 2001).
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IPE (International Political Economy) literature for financial liberalization policy 
(including capital account liberalization) can be divided into four different approaches: 
structural realist and globalization approaches (international/ systemic level), and 
interest-based and institution-oriented views (domestic level). These approaches produce 
different explanatory variables (and actors behind the explanatory variables) and different 
implications for state autonomy.
Most of the existing approaches, except for the institution-oriented view, suggest 
that governments would be forced to move toward financial liberalization. The autonomy 
of the state has a low priority in those approaches (Table 1.1).
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As Table 1.1 sets out, all the competing approaches (except for the institutions- 
oriented one) suggest constraints that compel governments to move toward financial 
liberalization policy. Those constraints are hegemon (powerful states), structural forces
Classification of competing approaches in explaining economic policy 
outcomes is largely drawn from Hall (1998) and Keohane and Milner (1996).
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including international capital mobility at the systemic level, and private interest group 
preference at the domestic level.
Firstly, the structural realist approach suggests that, as a result of uneven growth 
by countries, hegemony changes its interest in an anarchical international system. It is 
argued that the US, the ‘predatory hegemon,’ coercively constrains other countries to 
liberalize their financial system (Gilpin 1987; Helleiner 1994; Loriaux 1991, 1997). In 
line with this approach, there are many works which trace the cause of financial 
liberalization in Korea to US government pressure (Haggard and Maxfield 1993, 1996; 
Wade, 1998, 2000; Woo-Cumings 1991, 1997).
Secondly, the globalization school claims that technological development is the 
source of financial liberalization. Globalised capital markets have structural power which 
constrains governments to converge toward financial liberalization (Andrews 1994; 
Cemy 1993; Strange 1996). With reference to developing countries in particular.
Haggard and Maxfield (1996) trace the reasons behind capital account liberalization in 
developing countries to the systemic pressure of global capital markets. The growing 
integration of developing countries into the world economy has constrained government 
choices with respect to international financial policy. “As the integration of financial 
market deepens, international constraints will play an increasing role in future, not only 
with regard to the capital account but with reference to economic policy more generally” 
(Haggard and Maxfield, 1996: 236).
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Thirdly, interest group-oriented views at the domestic level are not necessarily 
separated from the above systemic approaches. These views suggest that systemic 
pressures are internalized by changing prices, thus forcing changes in the policy 
preferences of domestic interest groups. Government should change their policy to reflect 
this newly-emerged private preference (Frieden 1991; Choi 1993; Frieden and Rogowski 
1996; Woo-Cumings 1997).
Although Table 1.1 classifies the corruption and “capture” of liberalization as an 
explanatory variable and pattern respectively, into the interest group approach, they may 
also be in line with the institutions-oriented approach. For example, outcomes from 
business-govemment relations where a government was autonomous from the influence 
of business interest will be different from the outcomes when the same government is 
corrupted or captured by the same business interest. In this context, corruption is a crucial 
element in business-govemment relations, and capture of liberalization is an outcome of 
changed business-govemment relations.’ *
While the above three approaches all assume that the autonomy of governments 
is constrained by various explanatory variables, such as hegemon, capital mobility or 
private preferences, the fourth view i.e., the institutional approach, still considers that 
state autonomy remains high. In regard to the interest group-oriented view, Garrett and 
Lange (1996) indicate that policy outcomes are not the direct result of political conflict 
arising from the preferences of different actors, weighted by their market power and their
This may infer that each perspective is not inconsistent with other perspectives.
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propensity for collective action. They argue that, “institutional conditions have a 
significant bearing on political processes. ... extant institutions mediate in the 
relationship between internationally induced changes in the policy preferences of 
domestic actors, on the one hand, and political outcomes (both policy and institutional 
change), on the other” (Garrett and Lange 1996: 49).
1.2.3 A Framework Adopted in this Research
Although competing approaches to financial liberalization in the IPE literature 
are helpful in understanding the overall process toward financial liberalization over 
countries, the institutionalist approach has been dominant in explaining economic 
outcomes in Korea as we have reviewed. The approach by developmental state theorists 
has contributed to showing how features of business-govemment relations influence the 
efficiency and creditability of economic policy outcomes. As indicated in Section 1.1.4, 
recent works such as Haggard (1998) raise the question as to how change in the balance 
of political power between the public and private sectors would affect government policy 
(Haggard 1998: 99).
Some of the present explanations (Chang 1998; Wade 1998) are in line with the 
stmctural realist approach, while others (Haggard 2000; Kang 2002) introduced an 
interest-based approach into the institutional one. The latter has focused on how macro­
political institutions, such as basic features of the political order like the type of regime 
and the party structure, affect business control over the policy agenda. Capture of 
liberalization in financial regulatory policy outcomes and corruption are suggested in this
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institutional approach explanation for regulatory failure. In this regard, such institutional 
explanations can be said to be in line with an interest group-oriented view.
According to this new approach with the focus on macro-political institutions, 
politicians are dependent on the private sector for resources, information, political 
support and ultimately for the investment and growth that are a source of legitimacy in 
any economy (Haggard 1998: 82). The approach requires a reconsideration of the 
benefits of close business-govemment relations in the developmental state; there may be 
an optimal level of “distance” between the public and the private sector. When 
governments lack political ties with the private sector, policy outcomes are likely to be 
inimical to growth. By contrast, if governments have too close links to the business 
community, governments can be captured by business interest, cormpted, and pursue 
rent-seeking (Haggard 1998: 99).
1.2.3.1 Effects o f Political Institutions on Policy Outcomes at Macro Level
Recent explanations for financial regulatory failure in Korea seem to be 
dominated by the regulatory capture argument, such as Haggard 2000, which is 
essentially the institutional approach but includes characteristics of an interest-based view. 
Haggard (2000) indicates that there was poorly-conceived and - regulated financial 
regulation and privatisation prior to the crisis. The problem was that these reforms were 
captured by business and distorted. It is argued that the problem originated from some 
characteristics that the developmental state did not have, including sufficient political 
counterweights to private economic power, independent regulatory agencies and
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transparency in business-govemment relations (Haggard 2000). It follows that the 
supposedly strong state in Korea was, in the process of financial liberalization, captured 
by the dominance of big business, i.e., the change in the power balance in business- 
govemment relations towards the former, as government elites had to rely on business for 
political support.
Kang (2002) also argues that the transition to democracy in the 1980s in Korea 
transformed the basic business-state (government) relationship, allowing business to exert 
a greater influence than usual over policy decisions (p. 178). This seems, so far, to be in 
line with what Haggard (1998) indicates, i.e. a change in macro-political institutions, 
reflecting regime change and the growing influence of business. However, he goes 
further. He maintains, “It is unwise to focus on individual policy choices (for example, 
export-oriented industrialization) or specific institutional arrangements (the bureaucracy) 
as isolated issues. Both institutions and policies are intervening variables, and the larger 
institutional environment, in this case the government -  business relationship, affect any 
specific issues” (Kang 2002: 179). In other words, while Haggard (1998) still indicates 
the importance of institutions at the micro level (such as bureaucracy), though they are 
influenced by institutions at the macro level, Kang (2002) insists that “larger” (or macro-) 
institutions determine policy outcomes.*^ In this regard, Kang (2002) underestimates the
In fact, this kind of ‘macro-level’ institutional approach has been common in 
institutions-based research. Garrett and Lange (1996) consider the linear effects of 
institutions on economic policies. Political institutions mediate societal preferences once 
the latter have been made. Democracy, which is certainly a macro concept, is regarded as 
important since government is more responsive to societal preferences in democracies 
than in authoritarian regimes and totalitarian systems (Garrett and Lange 1996). However,
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effects of various forms of institutional arrangements and policy choices by bureaucrats 
on policy outcomes. It is questionable, however, whether the effects over policy 
outcomes of institutions at the micro level are any less significant than those of 
institutions at the macro level.
1.23.2 Effects o f Political Institutions on Policy Outcomes at Micro Level
Not only does change in macro-political institutions have an impact on economic 
policies, but change in political institutions at the ‘micro level,’ e.g., organizational 
change within a government, and organizational characteristics of bureaucracy over time, 
also has a significant impact on policy outcomes.
A good example can be found in the literature on central bank independence. 
Delegating monetary authority to an independent central bank, for example, constitutes a 
credible commitment that will remedy the ‘time inconsistency’ problem. Hence, the 
consequence will be lower rates of inflation without raising unemployment rates (Garrett 
and Lange 1996). There is also a lot of literature on the effects of wage bargaining 
institutions on macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice 2000).
As Hall (1998) indicates, it is important to identify the right institutions with the 
policy outcomes. Evans (1997) argues, “Depending on the internal structure of the state, 
similar business-govemment networks have different implications...” (p. 66). In fact, it
Garrett and Lange (1996) do not deny the significance of institutions at the micro level on 
policy outcomes.
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has been argued that the developmental state has maintained characteristic institutional 
arrangements, in particular in its government institutions. Centralization of the state 
bureaucracy, which was almost anonymously agreed among developmental state theorists, 
is a good example. The questions of how characteristic institutional arrangements have 
been related with change in the macro level institutional environment and whether 
characteristic institutional arrangements were still effective in producing policy outcomes 
in the context of the growing influence of the private over the public sector are of interest.
We explore these questions in more detail by discussing the findings of a book by 
Haggard, Maxfield, and Lee et al. (1993) which dealt with micro-level institutional 
effects on particular policy areas of financial regulation. It focused on “the power and 
organization of relevant social groups and the extent to which institutional arrangements, 
including the integrity and cohesion of the state apparatus itself,” which “allow them to 
gain access to and control over the decision-making process” of financial regulatory 
policy (Haggard, Maxfield, and Lee et al. 1993: 5).
Haggard and Lee (1993) discussed competing views on “financial repression”. 
Advocates of intervention in financial markets perceived that a competent, informed and 
“strong” government aiming to maximize social welfare would offset and correct market 
imperfections, while proponents of the rent-seeking and regulatory capture model argued 
that government intervention should reflect pressures coming from powerful groups, such 
as manufacturing or the banking sector, or personal ties to government officials, capable
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of extracting policy favours. In this context, the latter group would argue that the 
resultant negative allocative effects and political incentives should be removed through 
liberalization (pp. 7-8). Moreover, the latter group argued that capital account 
liberalization would impose discipline needed both for the financial sector and 
macroeconomic policy. However, Haggard and Lee (1993) indicated that such a model 
for liberalization was flawed for it did not produce sufficient empirical work; there was 
no clear evidence whether financial market policy was in fact a result of such political 
pressure or whether it was due to other reasons such as economic constraints or the 
projects of government officials (p. 8).
Haggard and Lee (1993) extended the review to the issue of “financial 
liberalization”; why could the role of the state in credit allocation (intervention) be 
efficient, rather than resource distribution by financial market (liberalization)? In this 
extended review, they defined “what is commonly called financial repression is, in effect, 
a hierarchical system of credit allocation” (p. 12). They sought theoretical evidence for 
the intervention from the argument of Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985). As firms have 
developed their own internal capital markets for allocating financial resources by 
themselves in a hierarchical arrangement because financial transactions have been subject 
to moral hazard and costly contract enforcement, government can perform a similar role 
of credit allocation (pp. 11-12). In this case, of course, firms receiving credit are like 
divisional sub-units.
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Institutional features mattered in the system of financial repression, Haggard and 
Lee (1993) indicated. Two aspects, in particular, were noted. One was political power 
and the interests of the private sector receiving credit. Depending on the relative size, 
organization and financial needs of the manufacturing sector, support for such 
interventionist policies varies. The other, it was suggested, was the ability of the state to 
restrain the power of rent-seeking groups which depended on the interests of the 
politicians and the structure of the government institutions.
What we should draw from the discussion of the book (Haggard, Maxfield, and 
Lee et al. 1993) is again that not only the interests of politicians, but also the structure of 
government institutions mattered in explaining financial regulatory policy. In particular, 
the centralization of government institutions, which was indicated as a core element of 
“financial repression,” was not fully understood in the context of financial regulatory 
outcomes in the 1990s, i.e., the selective nature of financial sector liberalization 
(including capital account liberalization) and weak prudential supervision/regulation.
This research notes that the case study of Korea (Choi 1993) in the book (Haggard, 
Maxfield, and Lee et al. 1993) only dealt with some limited areas of financial sector 
liberalization (excluding capital account liberalization) from the perspective of business- 
govemment relations. Even in the limited case study, only the increase in the 
concentrated power of big business {chaebol) was focused on, whereas the nature of 
financial regulatory institutions such as the concentration of authority within the finance
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ministry was overlooked. In this regard, this research extends the discussion of the 1993 
book by Haggard, Maxfield and Lee.
In conclusion, from the perspective of close business-govemment relations, we 
pinpoint the relevance of the particular configurations of government financial regulatory 
institutions and the growing influence of the private sector to the regulatory failure in 
Korea.
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Appendix 1,1 Vulnerable Areas o f the Korean Economy
The 1997 crisis in Korea consisted of two different crises: a banking crisis, which 
started in the first half of 1997, and a foreign exchange liquidity crisis during the second 
half of 1997. The banking crisis fed the foreign exchange crisis and vice-versa. As is now 
well-known, the foreign exchange liquidity crisis was different from typical liquidity 
crises resulting from foreign investors’ attacks on a currency with an overvalued 
exchange rate. The crisis in Korea started with a banking crisis as the chaebol plunged 
into difficulties and financial institutions became nearly insolvent. As the contagious 
effects of other Asian crises spread, following the international banks’ refusal to rollover 
their short-term lending to Korean financial institutions, the banking crisis developed into 
a foreign currency liquidity crisis.W hile there is controversy as to what extent its own 
problems contributed to the breakout of the crisis, little of the literature doubts that the 
Korean economy was then vulnerable toward systemic risks. Table 1.2 shows that the 
economy was characterized as one with a high ratio of short-term external liabilities to 
international reserves. The short-term liabilities were required to be repaid during the 
crisis period. The liabilities, along with high debt/equity ratios for the chaebol, were thus 
blamed as the proximate causes of the crisis.
The contagious effect started in Hong Kong where international banks started to 
withdraw their short-term lending from the subsidiaries of Korean financial institutions. 
As of June 1997, GIO creditor banks’ lending to banks in Hong Kong (including those to 
the subsidiaries of Korean financial institutions) was US$ 222.289 billion, of which 64% 
were those having a maturity of one year or less. (BIS, 1999; p 44)
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Table 1.2 also shows that the bulk of capital inflows was intermediated by 
domestic financial institutions. Those institutions had to repay over US$ 33 billion of 
their short-term borrowings in 1997. This contrasted with short-term borrowings by 
foreign institutions operating in Korea, which increased by US$ 2.2 billion on the 
previous year’s level. The level of foreign exchange reserves against the increase in the 
short-term indebtedness dropped.
Table 1.2 Total External Liabilities by Category and International Reserves* (US$ 
billions)
1996.12 1997.9 1997.12
Long-term Liabilities 71.4 (43.4% ) 82.5 (45.8 %) 94.8 (60.0 %)
Public Sector 6.1 NA 22.3
Domestic Fin. Institutions 40.0 NA 47.2
Foreign Fin. Institutions 3.5 NA 4.4
Private Corporations 21.8 NA 25.3
Short-term (less than 1 year) 93.0 (56.6 %) 97.6 (54.2 %) 63.2 (40.0 %)
Domestic Fin. Institutions 60.0 NA 27.2
Foreign Fin. Institutions 13.0 NA 15.2
Private Corporations 20.0 NA 20.9
Total External Liabilities 164.3(100.0% ) 180.1 (100.0% ) 158.1 (100.0% )
Usable Int’l Reserves 29.4 22.1 8.9
* Includes offshore banking and overseas branches’ borrowings. 
Source: Bank o f Korea, 1999
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Appendix 1,2 A Boom in the Mid-1990s and Capital Account Opening
It is now very clear that there was a boom in Korea during the mid-1990s, caused 
by the pursuit by the Korean government of a high economic growth policy which was 
well beyond the economy’s optimum capacity/The macroeconomic management policy 
aiming at high growth, was underpinned by a capital account liberalization policy. The 
ratio of capital transactions (capital inflow plus capital outflow) against trade transactions 
(export plus import) jumped from 62.4% in 1993 to 101.9 % in 1997. In particular, the 
liberalization of certain categories of capital account transactions was material: the 
relaxation of trade credits and of foreign currency borrowing to finance the importation 
of equipment facilities and capital goods.
Table 1.3 Macroeconomic Indicators Showing a Boom
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 87-8
Real GDP growth (%) 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 11.4
Inflation per Annum (%) 8.9 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 5.0 5.5
Investment growth in equipment facility 18.8 12.1 -1.1 -O.I 23.6 15.8 8.2 16.0
(%)
Import growth in capital goods (%) 13.8 18.2 1.6 0.1 32.1 32.5 10.0 2P.6
Import growth in consumer goods (%) 10.0 19.8 6.2 2.4 24.6 27.8 21.2 26.2
Export plus Import o f Goods to GDP 53.2 52.1 51.4 49.9 52.1 57.1 57.8 63.3
Ratio
Current Account to GDP Ratio -0.7 -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -4.7
Source: Bank o f Korea, various issues on statistics
See Bank of Korea, A Report to the Speciallnvestigation Committee on the 
Foreign Currency Crisis: Circumstances and Developments o f the 1997 Foreign
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As Table 1.3 shows, the importation of capital goods and consumer goods rose 
substantially. Importation of consumer goods remained high, even up to 1996. The 
investment growth ratios during the period of 1994-95 exceeded those of 1987-89 when 
the Korean economy recorded huge current account surpluses.
Opportunities for the industrial sector to finance its foreign currency requirements 
were significantly improved and the funds financed from abroad through domestic 
financial institutions were mostly used for importing manufacturing facilities and capital 
goods. It could finance foreign funds on their own in the way of issuing securities 
denominated in foreign currencies in international capital markets. Beyond this, foreign 
direct portfolio equity investment, which started in 1992, was another resource for 
financing the industrial sector’s investment. However, the biggest source of foreign 
currency funds was to get foreign currency borrowings from the financial sector. The 
borrowings jumped in 1994-95.
Currency Crisis, January 1999, p 10.
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Appendix 1,3 Major Events and Characteristics by Time Periods in 1997
In the wake of the crisis, the Board of Audit and Inspection summarized the 
major factors which brought it about (Board of Audit and Inspection 1998).
First quarter of 1997:
• There was the collapse of two chaebol: Hanbo Steel (23 January), and Sammi 
Steel (19 March). The failure of the chaebol caused a downgrade of the credit 
ratings for the long-term liabilities of three major DMBs (Choheng, Korea 
First, and Korea Exchange Bank).
• Due to a reduction in credit lines of international banks to Korean banks, 
some DMBs had liquidity problems.
• Highest trade deficit recorded in the quarter: US$ 7.4 billion
• The BoK intervened in the foreign exchange market, thus reducing 
international reserves. Foreign funding including long-term fimding was 
liberalized and the limit for foreigners’ portfolio investment in the Korean 
stock market was increased.
Second quarter:
• When Jinro (21 April), Daenong (20 May), and Hansin Kongyoung (2 June) 
all collapsed. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded credit ratings for the 
short-term liabilities of Korea First Bank, which was the largest creditor of 
Hanbo Steel and Jinro.
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• Cap on foreigners’ portfolio investment into the Korean stock market was 
further increased (2 May) from 20% to 23 %. US$ 1.2 billion worth foreign 
funds (net value) flowed into the Korean stock market.
• After the end of April, trade deficits substantially decreased mainly due to the 
strength of the Japanese Yen.
• The Korean won was depreciated and the liquidity problem of banks appeared 
to calm down.
Third quarter:
• Foreign currency crises in Southeast Asian countries occurred: Thailand (2 
July), Indonesia (14 August).
• Kia Motors collapsed on 15 July. The situation of financial institutions’ 
foreign funding deteriorated. Due to a delay in resolving Kia Motors, the 
financial market was extremely unstable.
• Moody’s (26 July) and S&P (6 August) placed five major DMBs under the 
watch list. The sovereign rating was adjusted to negative from stable.
• Outward exceeded inward foreign portfolio investment.
• The won-dollar exchange rate appreciated above 900 on 19 August, which 
was the first time since the market average exchange rate system was 
introduced in 1988. The foreign exchange market was extremely unstable.
• On 25 August the government promised its guarantee of financial institutions’ 
external debts but, due to the lack of legal back-up, the promised guarantee 
failed to restore external credibility.
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• The credit lines of international banks to Korean financial institutions further 
reduced. The BoK had to support financial institutions to enable them to settle 
their accounts.
Fourth quarter:
• Big companies continued to collapse: Taeil Precision (24 October), Haitai (1 
November), and New Core (4 November).
• Resolution of the Kia Motors problem was delayed and eventually the 
decision to nationalize it increased the instability of the financial system.
• Hong Kong stock market crisis (23 October).
• S&P (2 October, 24 October), Moody’s (28 October, 31 October) downgraded 
Korea’s sovereign credit rating and the ratings of Korean banks.
• Despite a further increase in a cap on foreign portfolio investment in the stock 
market (from 23% to 26%), no additional funds flowed into the market.
• Due to the failure to renew matured external liabilities as well as to attract 
new foreign funds, the foreign currency situation deteriorated badly.
• The international reserves of the BoK were used to support Korean banks; 
accordingly, the level of reserves rapidly decreased.
• The band within which the foreign exchange rate could change was enlarged 
from 2.5% per day to 10% per day.
• The Korean government publicly asked for help from the IMF on 21 
November.
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Chapter 2 Regulatory Framework: Hierarchy and 
Institutional Inertia
2,1 Introduction
Although developmental state literature has produced institutional explanations 
for various important issues in East Asian countries, such as economic growth, export- 
orientation and macroeconomic stability and adjustment policy (e.g.. Haggard 1990; 
Haggard and Kim, et. al. 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, et al. 1992; Haggard et al. 1993; 
Wade 1990; Woo 1991), the literature did not pay much attention to the financial 
regulatory institutional framework, i.e., the governance structure for financial regulation, 
of the developmental state.’ The governance structure for regulation refers to the way in 
which power is exercised and allocated with regard to the supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions. Thus, governance is the issue of the allocation of power (i.e. what 
powers and to whom), as well as of the exercise of power (i.e. the question of how), the 
processes and procedures (Lastra 2001: 1).
Favourable comments by economists about East Asian economies also focused 
on the institutional strength of those economies (e.g. World Bank 1993). Both powerfiil 
technocratic bureaucracies, shielded from political pressures, which devise and 
implement well-honed interventions, and the central role of government-private sector
An exception is Haggard, Maxfield, and Lee (1993), which studies the
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cooperation were indicated as institutional characteristics of the economies (World Bank 
1993: 13). However, the literature by political economists as well as economists largely 
overlooked the institutional weakness of the developmental state in relation to the issue 
of financial supervision. For example, the World Bank’s Miracle report in 1993 
misconstrued the financial regulatory framework in Asian economies as follows:
“Central banks and departments o f finance in the HPAEs (Highly Performing Asian Economies) 
appear to have been generally more successful in supervising commercial banks, which have reported a 
relatively low proportion o f  nonperforming loans in their portfolios (p. 212).”
Also, in comparison with prudential regulation of economies in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Miracle report describes:
“The more effective prudential regulation o f  East Asian banks is apparent in the ease with which 
most o f them adopted the international capital adequacy requirements set by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) to ensure that banks do not take on inappropriate levels o f  risks. ... Most East Asian 
economies continue to rely on close contact between supervisors and banks to encourage prudence. This 
routine, often daily interaction enables regulators personally to assess the riskiness o f a bank’s portfolio (p. 
213).”
However, this chapter claims that the institutional framework of financial 
regulation was deficient in at least two aspects: the hierarchic nature of authority in the 
framework, and institutional inertia. The first aspect, which is more important, i.e., 
centralization of the regulatory authority within the Finance Ministry, have been
financial regulatory framework in developing countries, including Korea.
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perceived by the developmental state literature as an asset of the developmental state, but 
it turned out to be an impediment to the introduction and implementation of sound 
prudential regulation. It also enabled special interests to have strong influence on 
regulatory change. The second aspect, which was a result of financial repression during 
the 1960s and 1970s, has not been put under the spotlight in the explanations of the 
regulatory failure. The institutional inertia, which was caused by the bureaucratic 
interests of related institutions, prevented the regulatory framework from adapting to the 
new situation, created by the financial liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s.
This chapter is in three parts. Section 2.2 introduces the historical origin of the 
framework and its structural features. It shows that the growth-oriented regulatory 
framework, which had the structural characteristic of centralization of the authority 
within the Finance Ministry, was adopted when the developmental state emerged at the 
beginning of the 1960s. It also examines the regulatory framework just before the crisis 
and questions with the existing explanation (e.g. Stiglitz 1999a) in the literature on the 
framework, that is, fragmentation of the framework, in Korea.
Section 2.3 is concerned with the institutional inertia of the regulatory 
institutions. Institutional transformation in the developmental state was unbalanced. It is 
well-known that financial liberalization, including capital account liberalization, was 
substantially advanced, while the institutional reform for ensuring prudential regulation, 
such as an establishment of an independent prudential regulatory institution, was stalled 
by the influence of strong bureaucratic interest among the regulatory authorities. Section
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2.4 concludes with the implications for this thesis.
2.2 Evolution o f the Institutional Framework and its Structural Features
2.2.1 Formation o f Regulatory Institutional Framework and the Emergence o f the 
Developmental State, 1960s-70s: Financial Repression
The origin of the regulatory institutional framework is traced to the emergence 
of the developmental state in Korea at the beginning of the 1960s when the Park Chung- 
Hee military regime started.^ The establishment of the super-ministry, the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) with both planning and budgetary authority, and the start of the 
formulation of five-year plans have been indicated as the most significant institutional 
changes made at the beginning of the 1960s (Chang and Evans 1999: 23). Equally 
important, however, is the fact that a particular form of financial structure was set up, 
being governed by a regulatory framework with developmental characteristics.^
As Johnson’s distinction between the ‘regulatory state’ (exemplified by the post­
war American state) and the ‘developmental state’ (represented by the post-war Japanese 
or French states) illustrated, developmental objectives put an emphasis on dynamic
 ^After taking office through a military coup d ’etat in 1961, Park Chung-Hee 
remained as the President of Korea until 1979 when he was assassinated by the Chief 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Korea (KCIA).
 ^Financial structure is defined as “the mechanism guiding the flow of savings and in­
vestment, determining the options of industrial policy, and managing financial flows to 
different sectors” (Woo 1991).
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considerations in industry, such as improving productivity and achieving efficient 
structural change, for which the financial structure served as a means/ In order to 
establish such a regulatory framework, the country revised the Bank of Korea Act, the 
General Banking Act and the Korea Development Bank Act, among others.
The financial structure was characterized by three elements: subordination of the 
BoK’s power to issue currency to the will of the government (i.e. the Ministry of 
Finance), the transfer of authority for foreign exchange business and for the supervisory 
authority over financial institutions from the Bank of Korea (BoK) to the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), and an increased role for the Korea Development Bank (KDB) in the 
country’s economic development. All these elements were made possible by changes in 
the regulatory institutional framework during the 1960s and this regulatory framework 
for the Korean financial structure was largely adhered to for the following three decades.
The Bank of Korea Act of 1950 was substantially revised on 24 May 1962 in 
two ways. First, the ultimate responsibility for establishing financial policy and 
management was transferred from the BoK to the MoF. Second, the Finance Ministry was 
given supervisory authority over the business of the BoK. As a result, the BoK became 
subordinate to the government (the Finance Ministry). In addition, the Foreign Exchange 
Management Act was passed in 1962 as a result of which related regulations which had 
been included in the Bank of Korea Act were removed. Hence, the function of the BoK 
for establishing foreign exchange policy and as the principal body for foreign currency
 ^On the distinction of objectives between the developmental and regulatory 
state, see Chang (1997).
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management was transferred to the government.
Kim (1965) described the leaders of the military coup as follows:
“The leaders ... had a tendency o f regarding the central bank as a convenient vehicle for 
financing economic development. Such a view promoted the amendment o f  the Bank o f Korea Act 
as a prerequisite to the ambitious Five Year Economic Development Plan. Attainment o f monetary 
stability and international equilibrium are relevant, according to new viewpoints, only when they 
may be a prerequisite for the attainment o f economic development, or at least when they are not 
conflicting with the latter objective. According to this view, gains from the attainment o f higher 
levels o f income and production outweigh the risks o f price instability” (Kim 1965: 16).
The Korea Development Bank Act was revised at the end of 1961 to enlarge its 
paid-up capital by five hundred times from 40 million won to 20 billion won and its 
sphere of business, from electricity and coal industries to export and import substitution 
industries, such as shipbuilding and steel industries.^ In addition, the Korean government 
established specialized banks in the years 1965 -67, such as the Industrial Bank of Korea 
(for small- and medium-sized enterprises), the Kookmin Bank (for households), and the 
Housing Bank (for construction companies and housing financing), in order to provide 
policy loans in those special areas.
In addition, the ‘Provisional Act on Financial Institutions’ was approved in 1961. 
It entrusted the Governor of the Office of Bank Supervision (CBS) in the BoK with the 
power to select directors of financial institutions. Under that Act, the government
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controlled, through the OBS, the management appointments for all financial institutions. 
The voting rights of the shareholders of the then private deposit money banks, which had 
been exercised by a small number of individuals, were suspended by the government. 
After nationalization of the commercial banks, all shareholder rights were transferred to 
the Government.
Moreover, deposit money banks (DMBs) had to deposit their ftinds with the 
KDB in 1967, and were asked to buy Industrial Financing Bonds, a major funding source 
of the KDB. DMBs also had to fund some projects, which were guaranteed by the KDB. 
In other words, DMBs were asked to support development projects in addition to carrying 
on their own commercial banking function.^
After setting up the financial institutional structure during the 1960s, the Korean 
government rationed credits to particular industries. There were a series of measures to 
support favoured areas. By the August 3 1973 Decree, the government froze the private 
debts of companies. It also asked banks to swap short-term loans, which they had already 
made, for long-term loans at low interest rates.^ Some strategic areas, such as the 
exporting sector, were favoured by the Decree (Woo 1991: 129). In December 1973, the 
National Investment Fund Act was approved. Financial institutions supplied the resources 
of the Fund, which were then injected into the heavy and chemical industries. These
 ^See Chapter 6, Table 6.1.
 ^The OBS indicates, “The reason why commercial banks in Korea had to deal 
with long-term financing was due to the weakness of the corporate financial structure as 
well as the inexistence of direct capital markets. Thus, commercial banks directly 
involved themselves in development financing” (Office of Bank Supervision 1995).
 ^Chapter 7 will address this issue in greater detail.
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accounted for over 60% of long-term investments of the financial institutions 
(Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997d: 8).  ^ In 1974, the government 
asked the BoK to increase the amount of rediscounting for Korean banks to enable them 
to fund the demand from the heavy and chemical industries. As a consequence, during the 
period between 1966 and 1981, banks supplied 70% of all export financing, which was 
funding by means of the rediscount facilities of the BoK (Cho, Kim, and World Bank 
1995).
The regime’s determination to achieve economic development was underlined 
by the formation of a new regulatory institutional framework. The scope of the 
government measures went beyond mobilizing direct/indirect funding for target 
industries. Bank facilities for consumers and for housing were also tightly restricted.
Only specialized banks, wholly-owned by the government, could provide such facilities, 
but in a restricted way. In return, the government limited the number of new entrants to 
the banking business and protected financial institutions from bankruptcy. During the 
1960s and 1970s, specialized banks and DMBs were de facto government financial 
institutions. The financial institutions allocated financial credits in accordance with 
government policy (Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997d: pp. 9-10). ^
When the Fund started, banks had to contribute to the Fund 10-30% of the 
increase in deposits with the banks. Insurance companies had to contribute 40 -50 % of 
insurance premiums and various public funds had to contribute 90% of their cash 
reserves.
 ^This section focuses mainly on the regulatory framework rather than financial 
regulatory policy. As regards the policy, see “Financial Reform without Tears: Korea, 
1964-70” and “Misaligned Interest Rate and Capital Inflows: Korea Again.” Both articles 
were included in McKinnon (1973).
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2.2.2 Hierarchic Authority among the Regulatory Institutions
The de jure regulatory authority for prudential regulation over banking was the 
Monetary Management Board of the Bank of Korea. In accordance with the BoK Act and 
the General Banking Act the Board of the BoK had supervisory authority over banking 
business. In reality, however, the Finance Ministry had a strong influence on the Board 
and thus subjected monetary as well as banking regulatory policy to the policy objective 
of the Ministry, i.e., growth.
2.2.2.1 Subordination o f the BoK to the Finance Ministry
The relationship between the Monetary Board and the BoK has been 
conflictual. The BoK considered that the Monetary Board was part of its internal 
organization and thus the government should not intervene in the business of the Board, 
while the Finance Ministry’s view was that the Board was an administrative council 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, established by Article 4-2 of the Government 
Organization Act.* ’ Thus, the Ministry argued it had power to supervise the Board
*** Article 7-1 in the Bank of Korea Act stipulated that “the Monetary 
Management Board is located in the BoK.” In this regard, the Board appeared to be an 
internal organization of the BoK. However, by saying that “The Monetary Management 
Board supervises the BoK over its business, management, and administration” (Article 7- 
2 in the BoK Act), the Board appeared to be independent from the BoK. Moreover, the 
Act prescribed that “The Minister for Finance concurrently holds the post of the 
Chairperson of the Monetary Management Board.” This strengthens the latter view.
* ' The article stated that “An administrative council can be located in an 
administrative organization, when the latter needs to separate part of its function, which 
was under its jurisdiction, from the administrative organization.” (See Bank of Korea
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comprehensively. ’ ^
In addition to the conflict regarding the de jure status of the Monetary 
Management Board, BoK Governors had often been forced out of office before 
completing their term and the majority of the Board members was government officials 
or proposed by the government. Before the 1997 crisis, only 4 out of 20 Governors had 
completed their term of office.
Thus, it should be said that the Monetary Management Board was controlled, de 
facto, by the Finance Ministry. In addition to the Finance Minister automatically being a 
member of the Board as Chairperson, the Ministry could recommend another member of 
the Board. Then, the Minister for Agriculture and Forests and Minister for Commerce, 
Industry and Resources (the successor ministry of the MCI) each proposed two members 
of the Board. The other two members of the Board were to be recommended by the 
Korea Federation of Banks (KFB). In reality, however, after the candidates for these two 
appointments had been named by the Finance Minister, the staff of the Board used to
2000: 17).
The view of the BoK on this is summarized as follows: (i) the Board was 
established by the Act of the BoK; (ii) the budget for managing the Board was included 
within the BoK’s budget; (iii) names and addresses of members of the Board were 
registered in the register of the BoK. The BoK, therefore, maintained that the Board was 
part of the BoK. In contrast, the Finance Ministry claimed that (i) the relationship 
between the Board and the BoK was like supervisor and its supervisee; (ii) if the Board 
was assumed to be an internal organization, it meant that the minister for finance as the 
Chairperson of the Board was inferior to the governor of the BoK; (iii) members of the 
Board were public servants while the staff of the BoK were not. Thus, the Board could 
not be an internal organization of the BoK. There was a confrontation among the 
regulatory authorities but also among Board members and the members of the Committee 
for Finance and Economy in the National Assembly (Bank of Korea 2000: 17-8).
The term of the BoK governor was (and still is) 4 years, but none remained in
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obtain signatures on the nomination forms from the members of the KFB, i.e., Presidents 
of DMBs and specialized banks. Accordingly, the Finance Minister could choose the 
majority of the Monetary Management Board.
In addition, the Finance Ministry had both ‘supervisory authority over BoK 
business’ and ‘the power to sanction the BoK’s budget and to approve the Bank’s 
accounts’. Though ‘its power to sanction ...’ was revoked in 1982, the Finance Ministry 
held its prominent position over the BoK by maintaining its supervisory authority over 
BoK business in accordance with Article 7-6 of the BoK Act.
2.2.2.2 Origin o f the Ambiguous Provisions in the BoK Act
The origin of the ambiguous provisions in the BoK Act on the relationship 
between the Monetary Board and the BoK, i.e. the monetary authority, which had become 
a major source of conflict between the Finance Ministry and the BoK, is related to the 
emergence of the developmental state. It goes back to the latter part of the1940s when the 
Korean government was re-established after World War II. With help from Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB) officials in the US, the original BoK Act, which was enacted in 
1950, clearly stated that its primary concern was with monetary stability. The Act was 
also unique in terms of clearly endowing the BoK with authority for monetary, foreign 
currency and financial supervisory policy. However, because of the Korean War and the
office when the president changed.
An anonymous BoK officer indicated that the Finance Ministry frequently 
threatened to use its power of on-site examination over BoK business, whenever there 
occurred conflicts between the Finance Ministry and the BoK. However, there had hardly
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military coup d ’etat in 1961, it could not carry out its role as stipulated in the Act. When 
the military government started to pursue govemment-led economic development at the 
beginning of the 1960s, however, the BoK was forced to transform itself in order to 
support the economy’s development. Thereafter, the Finance Ministry legitimately 
intervened in the business of the Bank.
When the Republic of Korea government was established in 1948 after thirty-six 
years’ occupation by Japan and three years’ occupation by the US military administration, 
there were three reasons to establish a central bank. First, the legal basis for existing 
institutions and regulations, which had remained in force since the Japanese occupation, 
had to be re-enacted. Second, the accumulated government budget deficits had to be 
corrected in order to achieve a stable balance of payments. Inflationary pressure had to be 
eased by restraining monetary growth. Third, these requirements were underlined by 
strong political and external considerations. In regard to its economic policy, the newly- 
established government had to gain the confidence of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration of the US (EGA) and international financial institutions (Bank of Korea 
2000: 389-91).
The Korean government sought the advice of the US Federal Reserve Board 
(FRB) in June 1949. The FRB dispatched two staff members: Dr. A. I. Bloomfield, then 
Director for Balance of Payments in the New York FRB, and Mr J.P. Jensen, then Deputy 
Director for Banking Supervision in the New York FRB. A significant change made after 
consultation with them was that the Monetary Board of the BoK came to exert authority
been any such on-site examinations.
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over monetary and foreign exchange business which had previously been under the 
jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance and the financial supervisory authority in 
accordance with the Government Organization Act. After having discussed the legitimacy 
of the proposal, the government finally approved it and sent the bill to the National 
Assembly. The bill was approved on April 1950 and became effective on 5 May 1950.^  ^
With respect to authority over banking supervision, the bill stated that the BoK would 
have authority over monetary and foreign exchange policy which had previously been 
held by the Finance Ministry.
The BoK Act may look unusual because it focused on monetary stability. 
However, this is understandable not just because the FRB officials were responsible for 
the final draft but also because inflation had been a major concern of the government. 
Since the government budget relied mainly on monetary growth, with the BoK as the 
monetary authority and no appropriate regulations having been established, monetary 
growth by financial institutions was enormous.
However, after the 1961 military coup, the military regime started to promote 
govemment-led economic development. The BoK Act had to be revised significantly in 
accordance with the regime’s policy priority, i.e., economic growth. As the military 
regime sought resources for investment not only from foreigners but also from domestic 
investors, the BoK had no option but to approve the revision. The role of the government
Under Article 109 of the then BoK Act, the authority of the Finance Ministry 
over monetary policy was transferred to the BoK. Article 111 of that Act stipulated that 
other legislation which conflicted with the BoK Act was repealed. Under this act, the 
Bank of Korea became independent of any government intervention over monetary
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in mobilizing resources strengthened and the institutional structure had to be transformed 
in order to suppon government domestic financial and foreign exchange policy.
The Finance Ministry drafted the new bill revising the BoK Act and this was 
approved in May 1962 by the National Assembly. The major change was that the ultimate 
responsibility for deciding and managing monetary policy was transferred to the 
government. The new bill also made it clear that the Finance Ministry had supervisory 
power over BoK’s business. The legal and operational independence of the central bank 
which had been made clear in the original BoK Act was annulled. “In order to clearly 
establish that the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy was with the government, 
the Monetary Board was even renamed the Monetary Management Board'iemphasis 
added) (Bank of Korea 2000: 394-8). This meant that the Board of the BoK would simply 
manage monetary policy in accordance with government policy. This was to establish an 
institutional framework relying on the note-issuing power of the BoK to fund economic 
development (Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997d: 9).
As indicated, the Finance Minister could ask for decisions made by the Board to 
be reconsidered and the accounts of the BoK had to be approved by the Finance Ministry. 
Moreover, a new act called the Act for Foreign Exchange Management was passed in 
1962; most of the BoK’s previous authority over foreign exchange business was removed 
and transferred to the government.
With respect to banking supervision, the Department of Bank Supervision in the
policy (Bank of Korea 2000: 393).
69
BoK was enlarged and renamed the Office of Bank Supervision (CBS). The CBS was 
given more powers than the equivalent department of the BoK had previously had, and 
the new BoK Act enabled the CBS to establish multiple deputy head positions (Bank of 
Korea 2000). Table 2.1 below shows how the functions of the BoK were reduced by the 
1962 revision of the BoK Act.
Table 2.1 Objectives o f the BoK in accordance with the BoK Act
Original Act (1950-62) Revised Act 
(1962-97)*
Present Act (1998- 
now)__________
Article 3. the principal objectives of the 
Bank should be:
1. To promote the achievement and 
maintenance of domestic monetary stability 
and national economic development
2. To further orderly economic progress 
and development and the fullest and most 
efficient utilization of the nation’s 
resources by promoting the liquidity, 
solvency and efficient functioning of the 
nation’s banking system
3. To administer the nation’s international 
reserves in the interests of achieving and 
maintaining an orderly pattern of 
international trade and exchange 
relationships._________________________
Article 3.
1. Same as in the 
original act
2. Same as in the 
original act
3. (revoked)
Article 1 (Objective) 
This act is to 
establish the Bank 
of Korea, to pursue 




policy and thus help 




Source: Derived from Bank of Korea (2000) and Kim, B-K. (1965: 14)
* There had been a further four revisions to the Act during that period. The main features 
of the Act remained unchanged until the 1998 Act was passed.
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2.2.3 The Regulatory Institutional Framework, 1980s-1990s: Contending with Existing 
Explanation
The regulatory institutional framework in Korea prior to the crisis maintained its 
original form, which reflected the growth-first policy objective of the developmental state. 
Above all, a major difference in its regulatory structure from that of many other countries 
was that all the responsibility for financial regulation/supervision was concentrated with 
the Finance Ministry.'® Moreover, the degree of centrality of the authority was very high. 
As mentioned earlier, such centralization facilitated regulatory capture by private 
interests.
Regulators of financial institutions in many other countries are either the central 
bank/monetary agency or specialist regulators. It was said that Korea’s central bank/ 
monetary agency had authority over banking, along with special regulators over securities 
and insurance (Goodhart 1998: 183-185). This is interpreted to have referred to the Bank 
of Korea and the Monetary Management Board in the BoK. In reality, however, the 
Finance Ministry was responsible for all the crucial areas of financial regulation/ 
supervision over financial institutions, though there were complex variations in respect of 
banking, securities and insurance.
On the surface, Korea appeared to have had a multiple regulatory institutional
A similar feature can be found in Germany and Japan.
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structure (see Table 4.2)/^ Focussing on banks only, the regulatory authority over 
banking accounts in banks was the Monetary Management Board of the Bank of Korea 
and thus the banking accounts were supervised by the OBS, an arm of the BoK, while 
trust accounts in banks were exclusively regulated by the Finance Ministry in accordance 
with the Trust Business Act. Because the size of assets in the trust accounts of the DMBs 
almost reached the same level as the deposits in bank accounts in the 1990s (see Table 
4.3), the Monetary Management Board and the OBS were responsible for the supervision 
of only half of the operations of the DMBs.'^
Noting this complex and multiple regulatory agency structure, existing literature 
tends to suggest the “fragmentation of regulatory structure” (Stiglitz 1999a). It is argued 
that the fragmented regulatory structure caused regulatory arbitrage by financial 
institutions. At a conference held in Korea in the wake of the crisis, Joseph Stiglitz 
claims:
“The unlevel regulatory playing field in the past has given NBFIs {non-bankfinancial institutions) 
an advantage, reducing the franchise value o f  the banks {deposit money banks) that try to compete 
with them. ... Korea has taken a step in the right direction by consolidating supervisory functions 
in one agency (the FSS), which makes it harder for financial institutions to evade supervision by 
choosing to submit themselves to the weakest supervisory regime {emphasis added)" (Stiglitz 
1999a).
The regulatory arrangement may be categorized in three different ways, i.e., 
by institution, by function or by objectives.
The DMBs were allowed to do trust business in the 1980s. Before that, only 
Trust Bank was authorized and this Bank was subsequently merged with Seoul Bank.
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The IMF also shares that view. The DMBs were under the direct authority of the 
Monetary Board (the governing body of the BoK) and the OBS, while specialized banks 
and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) were under the authority of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MoFE), although the MoFE delegated on-site examination of the 
NBFIs to the OBS. Hence, it is argued that a persuasive explanation for the deficiencies 
in prudential regulation in Korea before the crisis is that the lack of a unified system 
created the conditions for regulatory arbitrage and the development of risky practices, 
especially in the commercial banks’ trust business and in the merchant banks that were 
crucial in the build-up of the crisis (Balino et al. 1999: 16). This view is consistent with 
the argument in the literature on financial regulation.
“A multiple regime ... creates a potential for regulatory arbitrage and inconsistent regulation
between different institutions conducting the same type o f business” (Goodhart et.al 1998; 146-7).
In fact, due to the complexity of the regulatory structure, the trust account 
business of the DMBs, which, before the crisis, was as big as the banking business, was 
left without any serious regulation. This is also confirmed by the fact that some of the 
DMBs had non-bank financial subsidiaries, such as merchant banks and leasing 
companies. Through promoting trust business and connected lending to their subsidiaries, 
some of the DMBs may have circumvented regulatory authority and thus made it difficult 
for the authority to judge the viability of the banks it supervised.
However, another aspect of the structure, which caused more serious problems, 
was that most of the regulatory authority was concentrated within the Finance Ministry.
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Specialist regulators, such as the OBS, did not have any substantial authority over 
regulation in general but only over some limited areas of supervision stricto sensu}^ In 
fact, the Presidential Committee for Financial Reform in 1997 recognized that “though 
the regulatory regime appeared to be a plural one, in reality govemment-led decision­
making was still dominant.” Accordingly, the committee argued, “The autonomy and 
independence of intermediated regulatory institutions lacked self-development and 
originality. This is because prudential regulation is assumed as enforcement of 
govemment-led financial policy” (Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997b: 
223).
This refers to supervision over banking in a narrow sense, i.e. licensing, on-site 
supervision, reporting and sanctioning.
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KDB, Industry Bank MOFE BAI, Die*') OBS






NBFIs Credit Unions MOFE MOFE OBS
Mutual Savings and 
Finance Companies
MOFE MOFE OBS, FCM
Trust Accounts of 
Banking Institutions
MOFE MOFE
Merchant Banking MOFE MOFE OBS












Others FCM MOFE MOFE OBS




Credit card companies MOFE MOFE OBS
Leasing companies MOFE MOFE OBS
Limited regulatory authority was given.
Inspection over investment trust corporations only was authorized.
BAI (Board of Audit and Inspection), MoFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy), OBS (Office of 
Bank Supervision, OSS (Office of Securities Supervision), OIS (Office of Insurance Supervision), 
Die (Deposit Insurance Co.), FCM (Fund for Credit Management), FCG (Fund for Credit 
Guarantees)
Source: Presidential Committee for Financial Reform (1997a: 221)
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Table 2.3 Deposits held in Banking Accounts and Trust Accounts
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996.6
Banking 92,540.2 111,105.3 122,090.5 135,265.6 161,391.8 188,107.1 195,487.4
accounts* (76.2) (69.6) (63.7) (60.1) (56.2) (54.0)
Trust accounts 29,174.6 36,628.1 53,256.3 77,184.2 107,299.5 146,696.8 166,744.5
(24.0) (24.8) (30.4) (36.3) (39.9) (43.8) (46.0)
Total 121,714.8 147,733.4 175,346.8 212,449.8 268,691.3 334,803.9 362,231.9
""Banking accounts include deposits in Korean currency, foreign currency accounts, CD net issues, papers 
sold, RP sold and net issues o f financial bonds.
Source: Bank o f Korea (1995). Present Conditions o f  Foreign Currency Funding











DMBs Banking business Monetary Board OBS
Trust business MOFE MOFE
KDB, EXIM MOFE MOFE, BAI OBS
Merchant banks MOFE MOFE OBS
* Derived from Table 2.2
Intermediate regulatory authorities with special expertise did not have 
operational independence from the government (in the case of the BoK) or were directly 
controlled by the Finance Ministry (in the case of the OBS). The soundness of financial 
institutions, which should have been the major concern of the specialist regulators 
(intermediate regulatory institutions), i.e., the OBS, OSS, and OIS, was thus subordinated
to the objective of the Finance Ministry, i.e. growth.20
The dominance of the Finance Ministry in exerting regulatory authority over 
financial institutions caused serious regulatory problems. Above all, the authority for 
regulation was separate from the intermediate regulatory institutions that could make on-
The OSS and the OIS represent the Office of Securities Supervision, and the 
Office of Insurance Supervision respectively. These two regulatory institutions, along 
with the OBS, were called intermediate regulatory institutions, which meant that the
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site examinations. This made the intermediate regulatory institutions difficult in 
implementing and enforcing strict supervision. Moreover, the Finance Ministry was the 
subject of regulatory capture by private interest; the Ministry interfered with sound 
regulatory implementation by intermediate regulatory authorities as shown in the case of 
the BoK’s foreign currency deposits with domestic banks in Chapter 4, Section 4.6.
As for the BoK, it lost interest in prudential regulation. It tended to pay attention 
to the area of monetary stability rather than the area of financial stability. Moreover, 
although the OBS was part of the BoK, both institutions behaved as separate institutions, 
due to the characteristic hierarchy of the regulatory institutional structure. Consequently, 
the soundness of banks was not a major concern either of the BoK or of the Monetary 
Management Board.
A document entitled ‘The Early Necessity to Deal with Parliamentary Bills for 
Financial Reform,’ which was written by the President’s senior advisor for economic 
affairs and was submitted to the President, Kim Young-Sam, on November 21 1997, 
shows that overall financial administration was under the jurisdiction of the MoFE. This 
document aimed to enable the President to explain the government’s position regarding 
proposing the bills, which were then brought up for discussion in the National Assembly. 
The document included the chart shown below.
ultimate authority for regulation was somewhere else, i.e., the Finance Ministry.
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Chart 2.1 Major Flame o f the Legislation for Financial Reform (As at Nov. 21, 1997) 
<Present> Overall financial administration under jurisdiction of the MoFE





on-site examination, super 
-vision, sanction etc.
Establishment and correction 
of acts and decrees, Licensing 
of financial institutions
Ministry of Finance and Economy
(Finance Minister - concurrently 
Chairperson of the 
Monetary Management Board)
<After approval of financial reform bills >
MoFE Bank of Korea FSC (FSS)**
*To be effective on April 1, 1998
** FSC and FSS represent Financial Supervisory Commission and Financial 
Supervisory Service.
Source: Presidential Secretariats, The Early Necessity to Deal with Parliamentary Bills 
for Financial Reform, 21 November 1997.
In sum, regulatory authority for supervision over banks, the most crucial areas of 
the financial supervision, appeared to be complicated, but in fact the Finance Ministry 
maintained its comprehensive responsibility for all related areas. It was true that there
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was some delegation of administration to the intermediate regulatory agencies. However, 
that delegation was not significant. This kind of insufficient delegation bore a close 
resemblance to the spirit of Japanese administrative law.^'
2.3 Institutional Inertia o f  the Regulatory Authorities
Since the 1980s there were institutional changes in the Finance Ministry in 
response to economic and political constraints. What was remarkable is that the changes 
were aimed at facilitating liberalization and deregulation, while institutional reform for 
strengthening prudential regulation was stalled by institutional inertia which originated 
from the bureaucratic interests of the relevant institutions, i.e., the Finance Ministry (MoF 
and MoFE) and the BoK.
2.3.1 Financial Repression and Bureaucratic Interest o f the Finance Ministry
In a “repressed” financial system, the government maintains artificially-low 
interest rates, thus inducing an excess demand for credit, and accordingly leading to 
preferential credit schemes with government-directed programmes that supply lending to 
“targeted” sectors, activities and individual firms in quantities and at interest rates that 
would not be extended by existing financial institutions acting independently of
Bureaucrats in Korea had a view that every phenomenon should be subject to 
their administration. Accordingly, delegation had to be strictly limited and supervised by 
them. In Korea, Acts, which are passed by the National Assembly, are usually loosely- 
worded and delegate the details and rules for their implementation to Decrees and 
Ordinances, which are made by ministries. The strength of the bureaucracy may be due to
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government guidance (McKinnon 1973; Haggard and Lee 1993: pp 5-6). Though 
proponents of intervention in financial markets assumed a competent and “strong” 
government would maximize social welfare by offsetting and correcting financial market 
imperfections, models of rent seeking and regulatory capture posed an argument that 
government intervention was likely to reflect the preference of powerful interest groups, 
such as rising manufacturing groups, the banking sector or personal networks tied to top 
executive officials (Bhagwati 1982; Haggard and Lee 1993: pp. 7-8).
Also, the “government failure” arguments (e.g., Mueller 1979; Cullis and Jones 
1987) suggested, “the government is not the benevolent, all-knowing, and all-powerful 
agent... the government is an organization which is run by groups of self-seeking 
individuals (politicians seeking re-election and bureaucrats seeking higher salaries and 
more power) and is influenced by interest groups, with the result that it implements 
policies that serve these groups rather than the public interest” (Chang 1997: 709). In 
Korea, the period of financial repression during the 1960s and 1970s gave birth to a 
group of “self-seeking individuals” centring around the Finance Ministry, known in 
Korean press as the “Mofia.”
“Mofla” is a compound word of “MoF (Ministry of Finance)” and “Mafia.”^^  
Lee Hwan-Kyun, then Minister for Construction and Transportation in 1997, told 
journalists about personnel affairs regarding the “Mofia”. He, who had previously been 
the deputy minister of the Finance Ministry, mentioned that there was a “principle of 3-3”
these legislative practices.
The Mafia is a criminal organization in the USA, consisting of immigrants
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in the Finance Ministry, which meant that those who retired from the ministry as high- 
level officials would take positions for three years at ‘A level’ related institutions 
controlled by the Finance Ministry, e.g., as members of the Monetary Management Board 
in the BoK, Presidents of DMBs. After that time those people would work for another 
three years in a similar capacity at ‘B level’ institutions in the financial sector, such as 
auditors of regional banks or presidents of merchant banks (Kim, H-K 2000).
Having maintained their personal ties and organizational power, members of the 
Mofia have taken positions in the financial sector as much as possible. In 1995, there 
were 95-100 former MoF members who were taking positions at director level or above 
in the financial sector (Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the 1997 
Foreign Exchange Crisis at the National Assembly, January 1999). Among the Mafia, 
core members had graduated from the best high school, Kyung-gi, and passed with 
almost the best marks the national examination for selecting administrative officials.
They usually worked in the department of financial policy, which is responsible for 
financial regulation/supervision of the financial sector, ''Lee-Jae Kook”^  ^Even in the 
aftermath of the crisis, fifty-five former MoF officials took positions at director level or 
above in the financial sector (Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the 
Crisis, January 1999). The reason for such a surprisingly high figure was, needless to say, 
due to the fact that the Finance Ministry exerted absolute power in financial regulation 
and supervision, including investigation and sanctions, over the financial sector. Former
from Italy.
 ^This department changed its name into the Department of Financial Policy 
after 1995, as a result of integration with the EPB. “Lee-Jae” and “Kook” mean 
management of financial affairs and department, respectively.
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staff of the BoK and the OBS also took positions in the financial sector but the number 
from those institutions was much smaller than that from the Finance M inistry.W here 
the authority for financial supervision should be located was a burning issue among the 
Finance Ministry and the BoK for it was directly related to the interest of those 
institutions.^^
23.2 Failure to Set Up a New Regulatory Framework
The bureaucratic interests of the Finance Ministry, symbolized by the “Mofia”, 
has been a major impediment to setting-up a new regulatory framework since July 1987, 
when junior BoK staff announced that the Bank should be independent of the government. 
As the major point of the announcement was that the Chairperson of the Monetary 
Management Board, which is responsible for monetary and financial supervisory policy, 
should be occupied by the BoK Governor, the issue of the BoK’s independence was 
directly related to the issue of the financial regulatory framework. The MoF responded to 
the announcement by proposing an amendment to the BoK Act which was summarized 
by two points. The first was that the Chairperson of the Monetary Management Board 
should occupy the position of the BoK Governor and the second was that the OBS should 
be separated from the BoK. In this regard, the issue of who would be responsible for 
supervision of the financial sector was the major difference between those two
As at 20 January 1999, 27 people at director level and above were former staff 
of the OBS, OSS (Office of Securities Supervision), and OIS (Office of Insurance 
Supervision) (Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Crisis, January 
1999).
See section 2.2.2.3 above.
82
institutions.
Such a conflict between the Finance Ministry and the BoK also occurred in 1995. 
Table 2.5 is a comparison of the proposals from the BoK and the Finance Ministry in 
1995.
Table 2.5 Different Proposals on the BoK Act in 1995 Compared
Classification Then BoK Act Position of the MoF Position of the BoK
Chairperson of the 
Monetary
Management Board
Minister of Finance Chairperson would 
be the BoK Governor
The BoK Governor 
would be the 
Chairperson
Selection Process of 
the Chairperson
Recommended by the 
minister of finance, 
appointed by the 
President
Recommended, 
among members of 
the Monetary 
Management Board, 
by the Finance 
Minister, appointed 
by the President
The BoK Governor 
(the Chairperson of 
the committee) 
should be
recommended by the 
premier, appointed 
by the President
Supervision of the 
BoK by external 
auditor
By the Finance 
Minister, and BAI*
BAI only BAI only
Financial supervisory 
authority
BoK (the OBS) over 
DMBs
Separated from the 
BoK and integrated 
with the OSS and the 
OIS into the FSS. 
The new FSS is 
controlled by the 
MoF. **
BoK
*BAI refers to Board of Audit and Inspection.
** The new regulatory authority (Financial Supervisory Service) in the 1995 bill was 
different from that of present one (Financial Supervisory Service) in that the former was 
going to be directly controlled by the Finance Ministry. However, the present one is 
controlled by a government council (Financial Supervisory Authority), which is located 
under the premier. Thus, the present one is not controlled by the Finance Ministry.
Finance Ministry that Wanted to Maintain its Regulatory Authority
When junior BoK staff announced that the BoK should be independent of the
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influence of the government on 28 July 1987, it was perceived as a symbolic incident for 
economic democratization. It was at a time when political parties were negotiating to 
revise the then Constitution to change the indirect presidential election system into a 
direct one. The Finance Minister responded to the announcement by saying that the 
impartiality of monetary policy and the central bank could be secured by amending 
subordinate legislation to the constitution rather than by revising the constitution itself.
During the presidential election in December 1987, candidates from the then 
opposition parties committed themselves to a policy of the central bank’s independence 
from the government, but the election result was a victory for Roh Tae-Woo from the 
ruling party, who did not clearly express his position on this issue. As a general election 
in April 1988 following the presidential election resulted in opposition parties 
commending the majority of the National Assembly (parliament) in Korea, the issues of 
the central bank’s independence and the location of the financial regulatory authority 
were finally addressed by the National Assembly in 1988 and 1989. Opposition parties 
prepared a unitary amendment bill to the BoK Act. The gist of the amendment was, firstly, 
that the Chairperson of the Monetary Management Board held the additional post of the 
BoK Governor, and secondly, that regulatory authority over the DMBs should be placed 
in the BoK while the Finance Minister should have the right to ask the Board to 
investigate certain DMBs. The Finance Ministry concurred that the BoK Governor should 
hold the addition position of the Chairperson of the Monetary Management Board, but 
announced that regulatory authority should be located within the Ministry. The core 
contentious issue was not the neutrality of the BoK and monetary policy, but who would
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have supervisory authority over financial institutions.
The position of the Finance Ministry changed over three occasions in 1988,
1995 and 1997. On the first two occasions, the MoF (and MoFE) wanted to have direct 
authority of financial regulation by controlling the OBS in 1988 (and a new intermediated 
authority, FSS, in 1995). In 1997, however, the MoFE suggested the installation of a new 
regulatory authority. Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”), an administrative 
council under the jurisdiction of the premier. Thus, the FSC controls the Financial 
Supervisory Service (“FSS”), which is independent of the influence of the Finance 
Ministry.
Proposals from the Presidential Committee and the MoFE Compared
However, bureaucratic interests in the Finance Ministry continued even in the 
1997 proposal to revise the BoK Act. This is well-expressed when we compare the 1997 
proposal of the Ministry with a proposal from the Presidential Committee for Financial 
Reform. The Committee, started in January 1997, presented four reports on financial 
reform throughout 1997 and its suggestion on the financial regulatory framework came 
out in its second report in June 1997. Although it was eclectic in terms of trying to 
compromise the bureaucratic interests of both the MoFE and the BoK, the MoFE did not 
accept the proposal from the Committee and revised it.
The main points of the proposal by the Presidential Committee was that the BoK 
should focus on monetary policy to ensure price stabilization but, in order to stabilize the
85
country’s payment system, it thought that part of the authority of the BoK over prudential 
regulation should be recognized. Thus, the FSC would be absolutely responsible for the 
regulatory authority of various aspects such as licensing, prompt corrective action, 
disclosure, governance structure, and exception to prohibited matters.
However, in relation to some issues, i.e., management guidance, limits on single 
persons and groups and large exposure, and limits on guarantees against the equity capital 
of DMBs, the Monetary Management Board of the BoK should possess regulatory 
authority with a condition that the Monetary Management Board should consult with the 
FSC if it wanted to change such regulations. As regards some other issues such as on-site 
examinations and sanctions, regulatory authority should be with the FSC, but the BoK 
itself can exert such examinations to maintain its regulatory authority of sound 
management guidance and ask the FSC to impose sanctions on certain financial 
institutions (The Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997b: 181-250).
However, the proposal from the Presidential Committee was not accepted by the 
Finance Ministry. While the proposal from the Committee allowed the BoK to maintain a 
considerable amount of financial regulatory authority over the financial sector, the bill 
from the government (the MoFE) aimed at depriving the BoK of most regulatory 
authority, although it ensured the BoK’s independence from the government in monetary 
policy. All supervisory authority would be delegated to a new financial regulatory body, 
the Financial Supervisory Commission, which would be located under the Premier. The 
argument of the government was that the authority, since it belonged to the government
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function, could not be delegated to non-govemmental institutions such as the BoK 
(Monthly Chosun, 1997).
The MoFE bill faced fierce opposition from BoK staff, who sabotaged most 
BoK business, including foreign exchange market management, lobbied the political 
parties and demonstrated in the street. This episode shows that not only bureaucrats in the 
Finance Ministry but also BoK staff were embedded with vested interests in relation to 
regulatory authority.^^ After all, the bill was unable to gain approval in the National 
Assembly, although the government tried very hard to achieve this between July and 
November 1997. The bill, however, was finally legislated after the country asked for help 
from the IMF.
What should be noted is that the transfer of the regulatory authority from the 
MoFE to the FSC does not mean that the bureaucratic interests of the Finance Ministry 
(represented by the Mofia) have not been protected. The Finance Ministry changed its 
original position, which was going to entrust all the regulatory authority, i.e. the right to 
propose bills regarding regulatory policy and supervision, with the FSC. Rather, it 
maintained the first two areas within the Finance Ministry itself. Moreover, almost all 
members of the very department that is responsible from regulatory authority in the 
Finance Ministry moved to the FSC. Also, the FSC has been trying very hard to extend its 
role and number of officials since 1998. Whenever the number of officials increased or 
some of them retired, the gap has been filled with officials from the MoFE. Those who
An unnamed BoK staff member also confirmed this in an interview in March
2002.
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retired from the FSC have been taking cmcial positions in the financial sector. In sum, the 
bureaucratic interests of those responsible for regulatory authority have remained intact.
Limited Institutional Change in the 1980s-1990s: Financial Liberalization
Haggard and Maxfield (1993) argued in their study on developing economies in 
Asia and Latin America, “[Ejxtemal economic and political constraints have influenced 
major changes in financial market policy, including the current trend toward 
liberalization” (p. 20). In fact, Korea experienced external economic and political 
constraints on at least three occasions: the political and economic crisis at the end of 
1970s and the beginning of 1980s, US government pressure for financial liberalization in 
the latter half of the 1980s, and the strong influence of business in government decisions 
during the mid 1990s.
As we have examined, the regulatory institutions were embedded with vested 
interests, thus preventing the framework from adapting to a new situation. However, it 
cannot be argued that the government did not at all respond to political and economic 
constraints. Kong (2000) indicates that the authoritarian industrialization pattern of the 
1960s and 1970s was giving way to economic liberalization and democratization in the 
1980s due to the following three factors:
First, international economic and political trends exerted positive and negative inducements for 
greater economic openness. Second, the high interventionism o f the 1970s had accomplished its 
aim o f giving Korea the productive capacity required for her future export and defense plans. The 
economic agenda shifted from the creation o f  capacity to making that capacity efficient, meaning
that markets would inevitably have to play a bigger role. Third, authoritarian industrialization 
unleashed popular expectations that undermined its foundations o f political stability. The 
combination o f  these three factors helps to explain why Korea’s authoritarian industrialization 
pattern (or Korea Inc.) had become unsustainable by the end o f the 1970s (Kong 2000: 14).
2,4 Conclusion
This chapter has set out two crucial aspects of the financial regulatory 
institutional framework in Korea prior to the crisis: its hierarchic order with centralization 
of the authority in the Finance Ministry and institutional inertia based on the bureaucratic 
interests of the Finance Ministry and the BoK.
With regard to the first aspect, which is more important, the framework was set 
up at a time when the developmental state was emerging in the 1960s, and it remained by 
and large unchanged until the outbreak of the crisis. This study has argued that the 
regulatory institutional framework has always been hierarchic, with the Finance Ministry 
being at the zenith of the related authorities. The Finance Ministry facilitated its 
developmental objectives, which were consistent with business interest, without proper 
emphasis on prudential regulation. Although there had been three key financial regulatory 
institutions, among which two of them (the BoK and the OBS) had policy objectives of 
stabilization and prudential regulation, those objectives hardly worked as the principal 
policy of the regulatory framework. The precept that institutional centralization was a 
principal requirement for the developmental state also applied to the financial regulatory 
framework, but the structural feature turned out to be weakness rather than strength as far
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as prudential regulatory issues are concerned.
As for the second aspect, financial repression gave birth to strong vested 
interests in the Finance Ministry with regard to financial regulation. A group of “self- 
seeking individuals” called the “Mofia” was formed and resisted any institutional change 
which could weaken the Ministry’s power in financial regulation. Such bureaucratic 
interests were also observed in the BoK, thus obstructing regulatory institutional reform 
during the 1980s and 1990s.
The fact that the government responded to external economic and political 
constraints with institutional change in the Finance Ministry and the EPB may suggest its 
vulnerability to external events and the flexibility of the institutions in the developmental 
state in light of the changing situation at the same time. However, the rigidity of the 
regulatory institutional framework on the basis of bureaucratic interests, which prevented 
the country from introducing a new regulatory framework means that such flexibility was 
limited and its direction was constrained in the domestic context of close business- 
govemment relations. As a result, liberalization and deregulation could be accelerated (by 
changes in the Finance Ministry) but prudential regulation could not, as was seen in the 
failure to introduce a new regulatory framework.
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Chapter 3 Explaining the Seiective Financiai 
Liberaiization in Korea, 1980s and 1990s
3.1 Introduction
What was the source of financial sector liberalization in Korea during the 
1980s and 1990s? This is an important question because financial liberalization, 
including capital account liberalization, was central to the undermining of the Korean 
developmental state model because financial repression had previously substituted for 
effective prudential regulation. Moreover, Corsetti et al. (1998) argued that moral 
hazard problem led to the financial crisis when financial liberalization was occurring.
As Honohan (1999) indicates, financial repression such as interest rate ceilings 
had the effect of helping avoid excessive competition between banks and of handing a 
good profit margin to banks as long as entry was limited, whereas financial 
liberalization had resulted in, for example, increased competition in the financial 
services industry and increased volatility of asset prices. Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz 
(1999) argue that “All this has meant greatly altered incentives for risk-taking, risk 
management and corporate governance of financial intermediaries.” (p.l)
Competing approaches in IPE (International Political Economy) literature 
have suggested various explanatory variables for financial liberalization.^ In relation 
to the issue of regulatory failure in Korea, existing explanations are classified into two 
groups: the exogenous explanation focussing on US government pressure (e.g. Wade
’ For competing approaches to explaining financial liberalisation, see Chapter 
1, pp. 36-41.
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and Veneroso 1998) and the endogenous explanation considering regulatory capture 
by private interest or corruption (e.g. Haggard 2000; Kang 2002). According to the 
exogenous factor explanation in particular, the removal of capital controls, which was 
forced by US government pressure, caused the dismantling of the developmental state. 
It is claimed that the economy had high corporate debt-to-equity ratios, thus capital 
controls were more necessary in Korea than in any other countries (Wade and 
Veneroso 1998: 31).^
In order to evaluate these two explanations, the issue of capital account 
opening, among the various issues regarding financial sector deregulation, can be a 
good case study. ^  Capital account opening was the very area where external and 
internal forces interacted with each other, influencing the government in order to get 
favourable policy outcomes. To what extent did such external pressure coerce the 
Korean government to introduce capital account liberalization prematurely? How did 
the preference of domestic interest groups affect the government in policy outcomes?
There were some important events regarding capital account liberalization in 
Korea. From the latter half of the 1980s, the US started to press the Korean 
government on the issues of the foreign exchange rate system and overall financial 
liberalization, including capital account opening throughout the 1990s. In 1988, the 
US Congress approved the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, of which
 ^Also see Chang, Park, and Yoo (1998), Wade (1998, 2000) and Chang, 
Palma, and Whittaker (2001).
 ^ In fact, the Asian crisis has sparked controversy on the effects and causes of 
capital account liberalization on an economy. Eichengreen (2001) argues, “Capital 
account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial and least 
understood policies of our day.” See also Cooper (1999), Dooley (1996), Edwards 
(1998), Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993), Quirk and Evans (1993), Rodrik (1998).
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Section 3004 required the US President to negotiate with other countries on exchange 
rate and economic policies to reduce the then increased US trade deficits. Korea, 
along with Taiwan, was particularly targeted by the Act. In 1989, the Korean 
government announced its plan to introduce a Market Average Exchange Rate System 
from the following year (1990), instead of the then Basket System."  ^It also adopted a 
negative-list system for the management of foreign exchange in September 1992.
From 1990, the Korean government started bilateral talks with the US 
government, i.e. the Financial Policy Talks, required by the 1988 Trade Act in the US. 
The Korean government announced a blueprint for financial deregulation and market 
opening in March and June 1992, respectively. In addition, the third schedule for 
financial liberalization and market opening was finalized as part of the Five-Year Plan 
for the New Economy in early July 1993 (BoK 1994: 38). After the Korean 
government applied for the country’s entry to the OECD in March 1993, multilateral 
negotiations with the OECD member countries on financial liberalization issues, 
focusing on capital account liberalization, was under way. Korea succeeded in joining 
the club at the end of 1996, exactly a year before the 1997 crisis.
This chapter focuses on particular regulatory outcomes regarding financial 
liberalization, examining the policy choices of the developmental state in the context 
of external and internal pressures, by period, i.e. in the latter half of the 1980s, the 
beginning of the 1990s and the mid-1990s, and the negotiation period for OECD entry. 
Section 3.2 introduces the main points of the exogenous and endogenous explanations 
on financial liberalization in Korea. Section 3.3 focuses on the outcomes regarding the
On the Basket System, see section 3.3.1.
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foreign exchange rate, ignited by US pressure in the late 1980s, and the bilateral 
Financial Policy Talks between the US and Korean governments in the 1990s. Section 
3.4 is concerned with the multilateral talks surrounding Korea’s entry to the OECD. 
Section 3.5 provides a conclusion and implications for the thesis.
3,2 Present Explanations for Financial Sector Deregulation in Korea
Exogenous Factor Explanation
In his 1998 article in World Development, Robert Wade claims the existence
of “alliance” with “the interests driving capital account liberalization without a
framework of regulation.” The alliance consisted of US and UK financial firms,
cooperating with their country’s treasuries and with the IMF, the WTO and the OECD.
It is claimed that the US and UK governments believed their financial firms to be “at
a chronic disadvantage in the Asian system of long-term relationships and patient
capital. This alliance, supported by segments of Asian political and financial elites,
achieved dramatic domestic financial sector liberalization and capital account opening
in Asia over the 1990s, setting up the condition for crisis.’’(Wade 1998: 1535)
Wade argues that, “Korea provides a case study of the wider US campaign.” 
US pressure started at the end of the 1980s, “when Korea lost some of the economic 
grace it had enjoyed from US geopolitical interests.”  ^ He suggests the US
 ^More vaguely, Woo-Cumings argues that “financial liberalization in Korea 
was triggered by a much larger global forces -  and that this is not surprising since the 
course of the Korean political economy is critically influenced by events that occur in 
New York and Washington, the epicentres of world capitalism and politics. The story 
of the 1980s and the early 1990s, then, is less a story of Korea “reforming” after 
behaving badly in the past than of adjusting to new realities in Washington” (Woo- 
Cumings 1997: 91).
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government pressured the Korean government in direct and indirect ways (Wade 
2000: 15).
As regards direct pressure, the US Treasury complained, through the 
Financial Policy Talks from 1990, of restrictions of access to the Korean market for 
US banks and securities firms, i.e. restrictions on access to local funding sources. 
Above all, controls on foreign exchange and capital flows preventing foreign banks 
from competing with Korean banks was unsatisfactory to the US Treasury. Wade 
argues that the results of these talks were embodied in the Korean government’s 
Blueprint for Financial Liberalization in 1992. This Blueprint became the basis for the 
incoming Kim Young Sam government’s Five Years Plan for Financial Liberalization 
of 1993. By 1994 the US Treasury had achieved some of its agenda: higher ceilings 
on foreign participation in the Korean stock market, and “the Korean government had 
taken two steps, specifically wanted by the Treasury, that were to lead directly to the 
crisis: the conglomerates {chaebol) were free to borrow internationally; and new 
merchant banks were free to set up and borrow abroad” (Wade 2000:15). Dissatisfied 
with the results of financial liberalization, however, the US Treasury set out a detailed 
list of further suggested changes, including interest rate liberalization and the removal 
of limits on lending to the 30 largest conglomerates.
As regards indirect pressure, Wade argues that that pressure occurred at the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings as well as OECD entry 
negotiations. Wade (2000) argues that the US Treasury began to take a strong interest 
in pushing financial liberalization through APEC. After becoming unhappy with the 
APEC process, however, the US Treasury “resumed its arm-twisting of the Korean
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government to remove capital controls faster than the Korean government had 
planned, dangling the bait of US support for Korea’s entry into the OECD -  an all- 
important objective of the Korean government, the very symbol of its arrival in the 
ranks of the developed nations.” (p. 16)
The US Treasury set out its negotiating position with the Korean government 
which was shown in an internal Treasury memorandum, in which it required as a 
condition of US support that “the Korean government let foreigners buy Korean 
bonds; also that the Korean government let Korean companies borrow abroad; and let 
foreigners buy Korean stocks more easily.” Wade suspects that “these changes would 
make for a major change in the close relations between Korean companies and Korean 
banks -  away from an organization relationship towards an arms-length market 
relationship -  and hence further dismantling of the basic structure of the 
developmental state” (Wade 2000: 16).
However, Wade does not appear to be fully confident that US pressure 
determined the regulatory outcomes on capital account liberalization in Korea as some 
questions were left open. Notably:
“[Tjhis account does not pin down the importance o f  this external pressure relative to the 
wishes o f  segments o f  the Korean policy-making elite; nor does it say where the Korean 
government gets its policy ‘preference’ from. To what extern did the Korean government 
move less fast than the US wanted? Does the fact that the Korean government moved  
much faster to let Korean firms borrow abroad than to let foreign financial firms operate in 




Some of the developmental state literature argued that a developmental state 
ensured a policy commitment to economic growth and cooperation with the private 
sector that avoided an emphasis either on private profit or the state’s socialization of 
wealth (e.g. Johnson 1999: 57-58). Others emphasized how “strong” governments 
enjoyed political independence from the private sector (e.g., Haggard 2000: 20). In 
this regard, state autonomy was indicated as one of most crucial factors, which 
enabled governments to control the policy agenda and rendered them able to “govern 
(or discipline)” private firms (Amsden 1989, Haggard 2000).
However, as previously mentioned, some of the recent explanations for the 
regulatory outcomes in Korea indicate that either there was an exchange between 
government and business of ‘favours’ (the corruption argument, e.g. in Kang 2002) or 
political interference in the design or implementation of regulatory reform, including 
financial liberalization, undermining its stated objectives (the capture of liberalization 
argument, e.g. in Haggard 2002).
While Kang’s corruption argument is based on the effects of macro-level 
institutional arrangements, i.e. politicians-business relations, on the policy 
environment, thus overlooking the effects of micro-level institutional arrangements, 
i.e. particular financial regulatory institutions-financial sector and business relations, 
on particular policy outcomes, Haggard’s “capture” argument suggests some evidence 
on how particular regulatory outcomes were distorted by the growing influence of 
private interest.
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For example, Haggard (2000) argues, “The creation of new merchant banks 
and the liberalization of the CP market was a major factor in the expansion of short­
term financing; it is also a case study in how financial reforms can be captured not 
only in their implementation but in their basic design. ... In the 1990s, the IFCs 
expressed a strong interest in transforming themselves into merchant banks because of 
a number of privileges those institutions enjoyed.” These domestic developments, 
along with growth-oriented macroeconomic policy, “took place against the backdrop 
of a gradual opening of the capital account”, thus leading to the situation where “the 
government was unduly lax with respect to bank borrowing, particularly with the 
merchant banks.” (Haggard 2000: 37-38)
In sum, both exogenous and endogenous factor explanations are similar in 
terms of arguing that the original features of the Korean developmental state such as 
strong state autonomy and macroeconomic stability were twisted by either exogenous 
or endogenous pressures. Which one is more convincing?
3,3 Pressure from the US: Exchange Rate and Financial Liberalization
3.3.1 Background and First Stage in the Late 1980s
Contrary to the arguments of Wade (2000) and Woo-Cumings (1997), US 
pressure started in the latter part of 1986, that is, it did not reflect any decrease in US 
geopolitical interests. Mr Mulford, US Treasury Undersecretary designate, indicated 
in a hearing before the US Senate in 1989:
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“the U.S. began discussions with Korea on the matter o f  currency in the latter part o f  1986 
when it became obvious after the Plaza agreement that the currency adjustments that were 
taking place among the major currencies were not being followed by certain other countries, 
including Korea” (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary 
Policy o f  the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, US Senate lOT* Congress, 
First Session on the Second Annual Report Submitted to Congress by the Treasury Pursuant to 
the Requirement contained in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill, Novem ber 16, 1989).^
The pressure resulted from the view of the second Reagan administration that 
the chronic US current account deficit was due to the strength of the US currency. In 
January 1985, with James Baker at its head, the US Treasury believed that the 
appreciation of the US dollar had been a major cause of the US deficit and that both 
the exchange rate and the deficit were problems that needed to be addressed. The sale 
of US dollars, which was co-ordinated with other industrialised countries most visibly 
at the Plaza in September 1985, helped reverse almost the entire 1981-1984 
appreciation over the two years after Baker took office.
While the US exchange rate depreciated, notably against the Japanese and 
German currencies, some other countries like the newly-industrialized countries 
(“NICs”) were favoured by the newly-arranged exchange rate system, and were thus 
able to record huge surpluses in their current accounts. This was unacceptable both to 
the US government and Congress. Korea, along with Taiwan, was thus particularly 
targeted by the US from the latter part of 1986.
 ^This was the purpose of the provision in that legislation was to 
institutionalize an ongoing reporting and consultation process between the 
administration and the congress.
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In 1988, the US Congress approved a new Trade Act, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (H.R. 3) (Refer to Appendix 3.1)7 SEC. 3004 of the Act 
requested the US President to negotiate with other countries on exchange rate and 
economic policies to achieve “more appropriate and sustainable levels of trade and 
current account balances, and exchange rates of the dollar and other currencies 
consistent with such balances.” The negotiations were both bilateral and multilateral.
Regarding the bilateral negotiations, the Secretary of US Treasury was 
required to consider “whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their 
currency and US dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments 
adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” At the 
same time, “if such manipulation had been occurring with respect to countries that 
have significant bilateral trade surpluses with the US, the Secretary of the Treasury 
had to take action to initiate negotiations with such foreign countries on an expedited 
basis, in the international Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the purpose of ensuring 
that such countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between their 
currencies and to eliminate the unfair advantage.”^
This new policy of bilateralism originated from efforts to forestall 
protectionist legislation emanating from Capitol Hill. Cheng and Haggard (1996) 
defined this as a more aggressive use of market power to achieve economic goals. 
They argued that the new bilateralism was distinctive in three areas.
 ^This is the Act which is widely known as ‘Super 301/ 
 ^See US Trade Act of 1988 Sec. 3004 (Appendix 3.1).
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First, the US played the role of demandeur in widening the trade policy 
agenda to include new issues such as services, the protection of intellectual property 
and trade-distorting investment measures. These issues provided the core of the new 
round of trade talks but these were also the issues of bilateral negotiations with Korea, 
Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
Second, the US became more aggressive in retaliating against the perceived 
violation of existing international commercial law. The banner of “reciprocity” and 
“fair trade” provided the rationale for increased pressure on the NICs to open their 
markets, and even to balance their trade with the US on a bilateral basis. In order to 
fend off legislative measures, the Reagan administration launched a comprehensive 
attack on unfair trade practices in 1985. The NICs were major targets of this attack. 
Protectionist pressures were strongest precisely in the sectors in which the East Asian 
NICs were most competitive, such as footwear, textiles and apparel, and steel.
The third issue is concerned with alternative means for managing trade 
imbalances. The US was to address trade problems through multilateral action on 
exchange rates and macroeconomic policy. This strategy was pursued by the US, 
Japan, Germany, France and Britain, the so-called Group of Five, as a result of the 
Plaza and Louvre accords on exchange rates and macroeconomic policy was the 
incident in the early and mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, the US pursued the same policy 
in dealing with the NICs and this time it resorted to bilateral pressure (Cheng and 
Haggard 1996: 306-307).
In looking at the details of US pressure on the Korean government, one
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should note that the focal point of US pressure changed. At first, the US focused 
directly on the appreciation of the value of the Korean currency, the won, and on 
pressure to change the then exchange rate system (See Table 3.2). In 1988, Korea had 
been identified as a country which manipulated exchange rates in two consecutive 
Treasury reports requested by the Sec. 3004 of the 1988 Act. Later, during the latter 
part of 1989, the US changed the direction of its pressure towards financial services 
and comprehensive financial market liberalisation. Its interest at this stage was largely 
the operation of US financial institution branches in Korea, represented by the so- 
called “national treatment”. The method of bringing pressure to bear also changed.
The method initially was extensive bilateral negotiations, while later multilateral and 
regional negotiations as well as bilateral ones were employed.
The first stage lasted until 1989 when the Korean government stated that it 
would change its exchange rate system into the ‘Market Average System (“MAR”)’ 
from the following year, i.e. Mar. 1990. Until 1990, the system in Korea was the 
Managed Basket System (hereafter, the Basket system). The Korean government 
could directly intervene to affect the level of the exchange rate under the Basket 
system. The Bank of Korea announced every day’s exchange rate. The formula for the 
change rate (R), i.e. change (%) on previous exchange rate, was
R = 6 • (SDR basket) + (1 -  3) • (Korea’s own basket) + a
The Korean government did not inform the public about either the size of 3 or 
Korea’s own basket and currency weights but the basket was presumed to include five 
major currencies: those of the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and Canada. Currency 
weight was supposed to be based on trade amounts but the weight attached to the US
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dollar was likely to be greater than the trade volume between the US and Korea would 
imply because the dollar served as the payment currency for more than 90 per cent of 
external transactions in Korea. In short, the won/dollar exchange rate was determined 
mainly by two factors: the weighted average change in major trading partners’ 
exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar and an adjustment factor (a) based on policy 
considerations (Wang 1993: 153-170). The adjustment factor was estimated to be as 
big as between 20 and 40 per cent during the period of 1982-86 (Kwack 1990: 90).
Table 3.1 below is a summary of the US Treasury’s demands regarding the 
Korean exchange rate against the US dollar. It shows that US pressure was direct and 
concrete and it was effective in raising the value of the Korean currency, the Won, 
against the US dollar.
Table 3.1 The US Treasury s Demand for Appreciation o f the Won
Period o f  negotiation
April 1987 (Conference at 
AD B)
US demand (as o f  end o f  month,
Won/US$, %)___________________
March to June: 846.9 to 780 
( 7.9% appreciation demanded)
Realised foreign exchange rates (as 
o f  end o f  month, W on/US$, %
June: 808.9 (4.5% appreciation)
April 1988 (Baker and 
Dallara in Seoul)
March to June: 746.2 to 700 
( 6.2 % appreciation demanded)
June: 728.3 (2.4 % appreciation)
December 1988 (Talk 
between Assistant 
Secretaries)




February 1989 (Talk 
between Secretaries)
Did not specify target; 
“appreciation up to the 
appropriate level” demanded
N/A
March 1989 (Talk between 
Assistant Secretaries)
March to May: 671.9 to 650 
(3.3% appreciation demanded)
May: 666.7 (0.8% appreciation)
April 1989 (Talk between 
Assistant Secretaries)
March to June: 671.9 to 657 
(2.2% appreciation demanded)
June: 667.2 (0.7% appreciation)
August 1989 (Letter from 
Secretary Brady)
“Continuous appreciation and 
proposal o f  regular meeting on 
financial markets, exchange rate 
policy, and capital markets”
N/A
Source: Ministry of Finance in Korea, Data fo r  Members o f  the Committee fo r  
Finance at the National Assembly, September 1989.
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3.3.2 Second Stage in the 1990s
As Korea changed its exchange rate system into a more market-oriented one, 
MAR, and Korea’s global trade and current accounts were in deficit (which was after 
1990 except for the year 1993), US pressure changed. The situation is clearly set out 
in the statement of Brady, Secretary of the US Treasury, in the US Senate First Annual 
Hearing on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy in May 5, 1989 as 
follows:
“Our negotiations with Korea in the coming months w ill be aimed at obtaining assurance o f  
continued appropriate appreciation. Moreover, we w ill seek to engage the Korean authorities 
in a broad dialog on their capital markets, including exchange controls and the banking and 
securities markets. Such discussions would be aimed at improving the efficiency and 
openness o f  these markets. In addition, we will seek to obtain an understanding that 
comprehensive capital and exchange controls used to manipulate the exchange rate would be 
dismantled over the medium term and that market forces instead would be allowed to 
determine the rate.”^
In his prepared statement for the US Senate Hearing in November 1989, Mr 
Mulford said:
“I would like to note that Korea’s Ministry o f  Finance has recently agreed to commence talks 
with Treasury on financial policies and markets. We hope to make progress in those talks on 
the fundamental issue o f  Korea’s exchange rate determination system ”'®
 ^Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
US Senate lOU* Congress, First Session on The Treasury Report to Congress on 
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy, May 5, 1989: 27 
ibid.
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As Brady mentioned, the Financial Policy Talks between the US and Korean 
governments in February and November 1990 did not explicitly focus on the level of 
the won/dollar exchange rate. The US Treasury sought to “encourage the liberalisation 
of Korea’s exchange rate system and of the capital and interest rate controls that 
impede the full operation of market forces.”
US pressure at this time was not as strong as it had been in the 1980s. This 
was due to the fact that US government “discerned no activity {of the Korean 
government) in the foreign exchange market which would signify intervention to 
influence the exchange rate” (emphasis added). However, the US government 
maintained its pressure on the Korean government because “Korea maintains a system 
of foreign exchange and capital controls that limit trade and investment flows and 
thereby dampen the influence of market forces in the foreign exchange market.” ’^
Lawrence Summers argued before the US Senate on 25 May 1992 that, since 
these controls limited US ability to export to and invest in Korea, and particularly 
limited the scope of US financial institutions’ activities in Korea, the US maintained 
its efforts to promote market opening.
' ’ Statement of Lawrence H. Summers, Under Secretary of the Treasury 
before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, US Senate lOS'^  ^Congress. First 
Session on Countries that Manipulate Their Exchange Rates to Gain Unfair Trade 
Advantages with the United States, May 25, 1993.
US pressure moved on to China at this time from Korea and Taiwan in 
previous years. Summers stated in his statement before the US Senate in 1992 that 
“At the present time, only China is found to be manipulating its foreign exchange 
system”(US Senate hearing, 1994).
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Access by US financial institutions to the Korean market was one of main 
issues in the talks between the US and Korea at this time. This shows that though the 
1988 Trade Act resulted from protectionist attitudes of certain industries such as 
footwear, textiles, and steel, the US Treasury defended the interests of US financial 
institutions in implementing what the Act required.
M r. M ulford. Well, the first thing we w ill do is attempt to engage them (Korea and Taiwan) 
again on the question o f  currency, on the question o f  access to their financial market, and on 
the question o f  the openness o f  their financial markets. We w ill also engage them in 
discussions about broad macroeconomic policies, structural changes in their economies and 
so on. If  these talks are relatively successful...
Senator Pressler. These talks would last 18 months?
Mr. M ulford. No. These are talks that have been going on. We have engaged them in the past 
and we w ill continue to do so in the future. And in particular, so fa r  as the Treasury is 
concerned, we are interested in access to their financial markets and the development o f  
capital markets within Korea, including the liberalisation o f their internal banking and 
securities markets and so on. These things, if  we can make some progress, w ill have an effect 
on the exchange rate. It is not just a question o f  asking the Korean authorities to move the 
exchange rate. Obviously that’s part o f  it and we w ill continue on that front as well because 
they do control the exchange rate today. But we will seek to have them alter their exchange 
rate mechanism toward greater freedom and make the other changes that I have mentioned in 
an effort to transform their economy to some extent so that the exchange rate can more freely 
reflect the economic fundamental, (emphasis added).
3.3.3 Influence o f Special Interests in Korea
As described, the US applied pressure in two different ways. The first way
The Treasury also preferred a floating exchange rate system because it 
thought it reflected market fundamentals.
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was to do with financial issues, including foreign exchange rate appreciation, access 
of US financial institutions to the Korean market, and liberalisation of Korean 
financial and capital markets. The second was to do with non-financial issues, 
including a reduction in import restrictions, improvement of domestic demand growth, 
and restructuring of the Korean economy to reduce dependence on exports. It is 
interesting to note that Korea was more willing to accept the second type of demands 
than the first. The underlying reason for this attitude lay in the country’s domestic 
politics.
On the Exchange Rate Issue
Exports were a crucial factor for growth, being very much affected by the 
foreign exchange rate. Surpluses during 1986-1988 resulted from the real depreciation 
of the exchange rate against the US dollar. During the first two years after the Plaza 
Accord in 1985, Korea kept the won close to the dollar which meant substantial 
depreciation against the yen and other currencies and it basked in the resultant 
stimulus to its exports. In this respect, Korea was vulnerable to any fresh realignment 
of major world exchange rates which would make its price-sensitive exports of 
textiles, electronics and footwear less cost-competitive.
In September 1989, The Korean Foreign Trade Association (KFTA) 
distributed a report, entitled “Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy”, to the US government, 
the US Congress, the media, research institutions, various US political groups in the 
US, and many Korean organizations (Wang 1993: 166). It was published just one 
month before the report of the US Treasury to the US Senate was released in October 
1989.
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In the report, the association stated that the US Treasury’s designation of 
Korea as a “currency manipulator” was unjustified and could damage trade relations. 
Its arguments consisted of the following three points. First, Korea did not manipulate 
its currency to a greater extent than other countries. Its trading system alone could not 
be used as evidence of intent to gain an unfair trade advantage. Second, Korea has not 
had ‘significant’ or ‘sustained’ surpluses. Its surpluses of 1986-1988 were the first 
after four decades of chronic, massive trade deficits. Third, Korea’s surpluses lasted 
only for a short period and were necessary to correct the huge imbalances created by 
years of massive trade deficits. Even those short-term surpluses rapidly disappeared.
The KFTA report also pointed out that since the Plaza Accord (September 22,
1985), the won had appreciated in real terms to the same extent as the new Taiwanese 
dollar and only slightly less than the Japanese yen (See Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Appreciation o f Three Countries ’Currencies since Plaza Accord*
Korea Japan Taiwan
Nominal 32.4% 72.8% 53.3%
Real 18.6% 21.2% 18.4%
* Between 22 September 1985 and end of August 1989 
Source: Y-K Wang (1993: 165)
From the viewpoint of chaebol, trade liberalisation was much more attractive 
than exchange rate appreciation because they owned general trading companies 
bringing in imported goods. The companies, which were the flagship firms of the 
chaebol, were trading not only goods for affiliated companies but also those for most 
SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises) which did not belong to the chaebol. 
They obtained high profits from the margins they charged on items which were
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reasonably priced abroad. They were pleased with the improving domestic growth 
policy, including that of constructing 2 million houses. With their own construction 
subsidiaries, the chaebol led speculative investment in property, which drove up 
housing costs as well as the value of real properties they owned.
On the Financial Liberalization Issue
Since the late 1980s, a strong voice in favour of financial liberalization, in
particular in relation to corporate financing, emerged fi’om the private sector. In
September 1991, the Korean government approved by a cabinet meeting a
Presidential decree for the establishment of the Private-Sector Consulting Committee
for the Relaxation of Administrative Regulations.^"^ The establishment of the
Committee implies in many aspects that influence of private business on government
decisions had grown.
Its five members came from the private sector and the committee was under 
the jurisdiction of the Premier. The Chair was occupied by Yoo Chang-soon, the Chair 
of the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), which was the association of big 
business in Korea. Two members were the Chairs of the Korean Business 
Association (KB A) and the Association of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises. The
remaining two were university professors, who specialized in administrative reform
16issues.
In accordance with the Presidential decree, the committee lasted for a 
limited period of six months.
Mr Yoo was former BoK Governor (1961-62), Minister of Commerce and 
Industry (1962-63), Minister of the EPB (1963), and Premier (1982). He was also 
Deputy Chairperson of the FKI (1981), Chairperson of the KFTA (1981-82), Special 
Advisor to the FKI (1983-89).
The Committee had six general secretaries, who were all the research
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The Private-Sector Consulting Committee for the Relaxation of 
Administrative Regulations aimed not only to examine and ask for the repeal of 
useless administrative regulations, but also to propose ideas of the delegation of 
government functions to the private sector/^ The establishment of the Committee was 
based on the premise that in order to promote the international competitiveness of 
Korean corporates, the deregulation of excessive administrative regulations had to 
proceed (Private-Sector Consulting Committee for the Relaxation of Administrative 
Regulations 1992).
The Committee argued that the government would find it difficult to recognize 
the negative effects associated with the regulations. It was also argued that even 
though the government might recognize some such problems, the bureaucrats could 
not repeal such regulations because doing so would lead to a reduction in the business 
areas of the bureaucrats. Thus, the Committee argued proposals were better initiated 
by the private sector.*^
Amongst other things, the Committee drafted proposals for relaxing 
regulations regarding corporate financing and financial sector liberalization. Trade- 
related credits, foreign currency loans, overseas financing including the issue of
fellows of Korea Economic Institute, which was the research body of the FKI. The 
secretaries led all the meetings, held by areas.
It also included the issue of the delegation of central governmental 
functions with regard to local government.
See Private-Sector Consulting Committee for the Relaxation of 
Administrative Regulations (1992) p.4.
There were three other sections of the Committee, i.e. two sections on 
people’s life (such as education and environment) and another section on corportate 
business (such as business entry and employment).
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securities abroad by corporates and outward foreign direct investment were the 
subject of deregulation/relaxation. The regulations in the areas, the committee claimed, 
caused damage to the competitiveness of domestic firms in relation to foreign firms 
which enjoyed fewer restrictions (Private-Sector Consulting Committee for the 
Relaxation of Administrative Regulations 1992: 276-291).
As regards financial sector liberalization, the Committee considered 
adjustment of the regulatory framework, and regulations over deposit money banks 
(DMBs), including entry qualifications, interest rates, and governance, and business 
over short-term financial companies such as investment and finance companies (IFCs) 
and merchant banks.
In relation to the regulatory framework and regulations over the DMBs, the 
Committee claimed that, as the financial sector’s public role for economic 
development (in particular the segment of the DMBs) had been emphasized, 
regulation over the financial sector had had various conflicting objectives over time. 
Moreover, some areas were regulated by more than one authority which caused 
inefficiency. It also maintained that overemphasis on the public role of the sector 
delayed innovation of the sector, thus becoming a factor which obstructed its 
international competitiveness. Regarding short-term finance companies, it suggested 
that the function of the companies should be reconsidered from the perspective of 
development of the overall financial sector.^^
20 Ibid. pp. 292-309
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3.3.4 Domestic Politics and Policy Choice
At first glance, US government pressure appears to have been successful in 
achieving favourable regulatory policy outcomes for financial liberalization from the 
late 1980s up until the mid-1990s. However, it should be noticed that the pressure was 
successful in some areas, but not in others. Such pressure was only successful when it 
coincided with the preferences of the domestic corporate sector such as the chaebol.
In addition, it was the financial sector which enjoyed large profits by intermediating 
international capital flows, as a result of capital account opening.
First, regarding the issue of the exchange rate, the Korean government 
changed its exchange rate system, i.e., from the Basket to MAR system in 1989 
(effective from March 1990). However, it was clear that the Korean government 
favoured trade liberalization to the continuous appreciation of the Korean currency 
against the US Dollar as demanded by the US government.
The Presidential Commission for Economic Restructuring, established in 
April 1988, submitted a report to President Roh in October 1988. The report called for 
the internationalisation of the Korean economy, including a reduction in the country’s 
surplus on its current accounts by means of liberalisation of import restrictions rather 
than by rapid appreciation of the currency. For example, the Korean government used 
ad hoc measures to satisfy Washington and to avoid US pressure for exchange rate 
appreciation. Notably, the government made a US$ 2.6 billion fund from its foreign 
exchange reserves available for corporates to finance the import of capital goods from 
the US. It announced a long ‘shopping list’ (US$ 2.6bn worth of extra US goods) that 
Korea was expecting to buy from the US in 1987 (Financial Times, 14 May 1987).
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Most of the goods were substitutes for imports that would otherwise have come from 
Japan. One hope of such purchases was that by increasing imports from the US, the 
strength of US pressure for an appreciation of the exchange rate would decline.^ ^
The MAR system, adopted by the Korean government, while appearing to be 
market-oriented, was still far from being a free-floating exchange rate system. The 
MAR was based on the weighted average of the previous day’s inter-bank rates for 
Korean won-US dollar spot transactions. BoK announced the foreign exchange rate 
every day and then allowed the rate to fluctuate within a certain band (See Table 3.3). 
The Korean government finally decided to change its Basket system to the MAR 
system at the end of 1989, while the exchange rate levels and the system to determine 
them was still highly controversial in both countries.
During the 1986-89 period, it was very clear that the Korean government tried 
to keep the value of its currency down against the US dollar. The Korean government 
argued that, in order to pay off its high level of foreign debt, trade surpluses must 
continue. Emphasis on exports had been the first preference for both the government 
and the private sector in Korea during that period. Devaluation of the currency was 
not a controversial issue.
Thus, it gave birth to a reduction in Korea’s imports from Japan (with 
whom it ran a deficit of US$ 5.3bn in 1986). Also, Korea was moving towards a faster 
removal of import barriers. According to Mr Park Un Seo, a senior official in the 
MoTI (Ministry of Trade and Industry), 40% of import items were on the restricted 
list in 1980. By July 1987 the proportion was supposed to be down to 6.5% and it 
would drop below 5% in 1988. Similarly Korea was moving to reduce its very high 
tariff structure on items that could be imported. The average tariff rate was 19% in 
1987 but would be reduced to 17% by 1988.
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Table 3.3 Change in Korean Exchange Rate Regime
Period Regime Characteristics
1955-1972 Bretton Woods Era Inflation/Devaluation
1973-1979 Pegged to US dollar Inflation/Devaluation
1980-1989 Managed Basket Peg Current Balance Target
1990-1997 Market Average Rate 
System*
Stable Real Exchange Rate
1997-
present
Free Floating Rate System Market Oriented, but still with Strong 
Government Intervention
was widened to + 0.6% in Sep. 1991 and was extended up until + 2.25% at the end 
of 1995.
Source: Based on Black (1996)
US Pressure was not the only reason for adopting the MAR system. The 
government objective of a low inflation rate as well as an increase in the size of the 
domestic economy against exports and imports meant that it would not have to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market too much.^^ However, even after the change 
in the exchange rate arrangement, the Korean government still had various policy 
measures that could be used to affect the foreign exchange rate, e.g., by coordinating 
the size of foreign exchange demand by financial institutions and industrial sectors in 
at least the following two ways. The MoF let the Bank of Korea lend some of its 
foreign reserves to Korean financial institutions, which had a big appetite for lending 
such foreign currency to non-bank corporates. Moreover, the Finance Ministry 
imposed a quota on certain industrial sectors and certain chaebol within which that 
sector and the chaebol could borrow foreign exchange.
As the Korean government had announced the introduction of the MAR
During the period of 1986-89 when the country recorded huge trade 
surpluses, the Korean government must have intervened in its foreign exchange 
market to keep its exchange rate low.
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system, and Korea’s trade surplus disappeared, the focus moved from the exchange 
rate to comprehensive financial liberalisation policy. In sum, the policy choice of the 
Korean state, in response to US pressure on the exchange rate, largely reflected 
domestic business preferences, i.e. in relation to overall price competitiveness for 
export, and the interests of trading companies and the banking industry.
Second, the Financial Policy Talks between the US and the Korean 
government at the beginning of 1990 resulted in Blueprints in March and July 1992 
and a plan for financial deregulation under the Five-Year Plan for the New Economy 
in 1993. However, this does not mean that US preferences were wholly reflected in 
the Korean government’s decisions. Strong domestic pressure from corporates and the 
banking sector as well as government concern on macroeconomic stability were 
operating, thus overriding certain outcomes of the plans.
All in all, the strong emergence of a voice for financial liberalization from 
domestic business coincided with US government pressure in the same direction 
(Private-Sector Consulting Committee for the Relaxation of Administrative 
Regulations 1991). Korean business strongly wanted (a) an increase in opportunities 
to use international capital at a cheaper price than domestic interest rates, and (b) 
domestic financial sector deregulation. In its document submitted to the National 
Assembly, the Ministry of Finance in Korea indicated in relation to the Blueprint and 
reform of the foreign exchange system that “capital account opening were needed in 
the interest of Korean business.” (MoF 1995)
Also, the authorities did not want the national ownership of Korean
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corporates threatened by capital market opening. In order to protect national 
ownership of Korean corporates, the authorities put certain limits on the amount of 
equities within which foreigners could buy and limited the amount which a single 
foreigner could own. As Table 3.4 shows, it was only 5% up until the end ofl996. In 
the wake of the crisis, the IMF demanded to extend the limit substantially, thus the 
Korean government had to increase it by 50%. Originally, the government was going 
to extend the limit for foreign individuals to 10% by 2000 according to an agreement 
with the OECD, though aggregated limits were going to be completely liberalised 
(BoK 1997). As a result of consultation with the IMF, foreign direct investment was 
de facto liberalized in K orea.P reference in favour of national ownership by the 
government was paralleled by the interest of Korean corporates.
Table 2.4 R e fla tio n  on the Limit o f Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment
1992 93 94 95 96 97.1-10













Ratio o f  foreigners'^^ ownership (%) 4.13 8.74 9.22 10.02 11.51 10.43
Number o f  equities being reached to 
limits*^^
147 165 125 115 55 36
Ratio o f  aggregate equity ownership 
limits*^^
10 10 12 15 20 23
Ceiling o f  individual companies 
within which single foreigner were 
permitted to own




*1) End o f  period, US$ Billion, Ratio against GDP
*2) End o f  period, equities owned by foreigners/ aggregate equities in the stock market 
*3) and *4) End o f  period
Source: Extracted from Bank o f  Korea, Development o f  Capital Account Liberalization and Change in 
the Structure o f  Balance o f  Capital Accounts, Monthly Statistics Review, Decem ber 1997
Moreover, the authorities were worried about the performance of domestic 
financial institutions, especially the DMBs, because they were neither efficient nor 
competitive enough to survive against their foreign counterparts (Frankel 1993; Oum 
1991).
23 As a result, the amount of foreign direct investment to Korea has
116
Korea initially welcomed foreign banks as providers of foreign capital. 
Foreign banks earned easy profits while helping to finance Korea’s clironic current 
account deficits in the 1970s and early 1980s. Until 1986, they had a large and 
profitable niche in bringing much needed foreign loan funds into the country. Under 
the so-called swap scheme, the BoK gave each foreign bank the right to bring in a 
given amount of foreign currency. The central bank swapped the currency for won for 
periods of up to a year, and guaranteed to repurchase the won at the same rate at 
which it was sold. The central bank paid the market rate of interest for the foreign 
currency and allowed the banks to put a 1 per cent spread on loans they made with the 
won. It was a sweet deal while it lasted. Insofar as they enjoyed this positive 
discrimination, there was no serious reason for opening up the market.
However, from 1986, when the Korean economy started to record huge trade 
surpluses, foreign banks suddenly found themselves without a clear role to play, 
locked on the periphery of mainstream banking in Korea while struggling to build a 
way in. The Korean economy did not need foreign loans and so, in the face of howls 
of protest from the foreign banks, the central bank reduced the swap quotas and the 
spread allowed on the won loans. The BoK had continuously reduced the limit of 
swap with foreign banks, which had been the main source of local currency funding, 
by 10% every year between 1987 and 1989. In view of the appreciation of the Korean 
currency, the practical effect of the reduction in local currency funding from the stand­
point of the foreign banks, was estimated to be 47%, according to a report of the US 
Treasury (US Treasury 1990). Even after 1989, when the current account went back
substantially increased since 1998.
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into deficit, Korea had another method of foreign exchange. Financial and non-bank 
corporates could finance foreign funds on their own initiative. Its net foreign debts 
were just 4% of GNP as of October 1991 compared with 39% in 1985.
The result was a lot of dissatisfied foreign banks, sitting on the edge of a 
potentially greater market yet unable to expand their business rapidly. Some 
concessions had been offered to meet the foreign banks’ complaints that they could 
not have adequate access to win funds through normal channels, but the government 
seemed unwilling to let them have any further special privileges. The issues between 
the US government (and foreign institutions in Korea) and the Korean government 
were about non-discrimination towards foreign institutions.
The right-hand column of Table 3.5 shows that there was abolition of some of 
the remaining restrictions imposed on foreign bank branches. However, it does not 
appear that interests in US bank branches in Korea were preferentially dealt with by 
the Korean government. In fact, the Korean authorities liberalized the restricted 
business areas of domestic financial institutions in advance before liberalizing foreign 
financial institutions. Accordingly, the business profits of foreign institutions rapidly 
decreased.
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Table 3.5 National Treatment o f  Foreign Bank Branches
Reducing Preferential Treatment Lifting Discriminatory Restrictions
Gradual reduction of the ceiling on 
foreign bank branches’ swap facilities 
since November 1987 (4 times)
Lowering the guaranteed yield on swap 
facilities from February 1985 (1.0% -
0.75% - 0.5% - 0.3%)
Imposition of compulsory lending ratio to 
small enterprises (25%) on foreign bank 
branches (March 1985)
Raising this mandatory ratio (35%) for 
those foreign banks branches that make 
use of the central bank’s rediscount 
facilities for commercial bills (August
1986)
Abolition of exemption from corporation 
tax on interest income from foreign 
currency loans (January 1989)
Lifting preferential treatment on foreign 
exchange overbought positions of foreign 
bank branches (September 1989)
Permitted access to rediscount facilities at 
the Bank of Korea for export financing 
(March 1985)
- Expansion of the scope of rediscounts to 
general commercial bills (August 1986).
- Also allowed to borrow funds from BoK 
as a means of financing possible 
shortages of reserve requirements 
(August 1988)
Allowed to handle non-specific money- 
in-trust (September 1985), and 
additionally permitted to handle specific 
money-in-trust (May 1991)
Allowed to sell negotiable certificates of 
deposit (September 1986) and expansion 
of the ceiling on their issuance (7 times)
- As of Feb. 1994, the ceiling on CDs 
issuance is the larger of 250% of not 
worth or 20 billion Won 
Removal of the ceiling on in-country 
capital (hitherto 12 billion Won) (May 
1991
Scrapping the guidelines on foreign 
banks’ establishment of additional 
branches (June 1991)
Multiple branches of foreign banks 
regarded as a single entity under the 
revised General Banking Act of 
December 1991
Clarification and simplification of the 
banking supervision regulations (April -  
September 1992)____________________
Source: Bank of Korea (1994: 17)
In sum, financial liberalization plans at the beginning of the 1990s were 
ignited by US pressure which started in the late 1980s. However, domestic politics 
rather than such external pressure can largely explain the regulatory liberalization 
outcomes.
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3.4 OECD Entry Negotiations
If the preferences of governments in advanced countries reflect the interests 
of their financial sector, those preferences would have been clearly shown during the 
negotiation for Korean entry into the OECD in 1996. In this regard, Korea’s 
negotiation with the OECD member countries is a good case study in testing the 
exogenous factor argument.
However, as at the end of 1996, when Korea at last joined the OECD, there 
were still substantial restrictions in many areas. While some areas such as overseas 
financing and trade credits were substantially liberalized as business had long wished, 
others such as foreign investment in the Korean bond market, and friendly M&As of 
Korean corporates including financial institutions by foreigners, were severely 
restricted. During the same period, short-term interest rates intermediated by non­
bank financial institutions, were almost completely liberalised, while interest rates on 
deposits, which were largely intermediated by the DMBs, were still restricted by the 
regulatory authorities.
By the standard of the OECD Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements 
(hereafter the OECD codes), capital controls in Korea were more restrictive than in 
any other OECD member. The number of reservations (41) in the codes of capital 
movements (91 in total) was much higher than the average of all OECD countries (7). 
It was far behind any OECD member country, for example, Turkey or Mexico.
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Table 3.6 Ratio o f  Reservation in the Codes o f  Liberalization on Capital Movements 1)
Country No. o f  
reservations
Ratio o f  
reservation (%)
Country No. o f  
reservations
Ratio o f  
reservation
Luxemburg 0 0.0 Sweden 5 5.5
Netherlands 3 3.3 Switzerland 5 5.5
U.K. 3 3.3 Italia 7 7.7
Austria 4 4.4 Germany 8 8.8
Denmark 4 4.4 Japan 8 8.8
Ireland 4 4.4 France 9 9.9
Canada 5 5.5 U.S.A. 10 11.0
Finland 5 5.5 Belgium 11 12.1
Greece 5 5.5 Portugal 13 14.3
Iceland 5 5.5 Australia 14 15.4
New  Zealand 5 5.5 Turkey 16 17.6
Norway 5 5.5 Mexico 27 29.7
Spain 5 5.5 OECD average 7.4 8.2
............................-  . . .
Korea 41 45.1
1 ) Number o f  reservations in Korea is as 
as at the end o f  1995.
2 )  Ratio is calculated as (the number of  
91).
Source: Kim (1997)
o f  January 1997, while that in other OECD countries is 
reservations/ aggregate number o f  the Codes, which is
3.4.1 US Leverage Behind the Negotiations?
With regard to the US policy on financial liberalization towards the Far East, 
Lawrence Summers described in the US Senate in 1994 the need for multilateral and 
regional negotiations with Asian countries, including Korea, as follows:
From the beginning o f  its term o f  office, this Administration saw the need for more vigorous 
economic engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. President Clinton took the bold step o f  
hosting the first ever meeting o f  APEC economic leaders in Seattle in November o f  last year 
to initiate important consultations at the highest lev e l... Within the APEC group, certain East 
Asian econom ies like China, Korea, and Taiwan are not only growing rapidly; they have 
become important players in the global economy. Their external policies matter to the global 
system  as well as to the United States economy. We must therefore engage them regularly 
and consistently to promote trade and exchange liberalization. That means using all available 
and appropriate multilateral, regional, and bilateral means -  the GATT, APEC, the OECD,
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and the international financial institutions -  as well as bilateral negotiations.^'*
In particular in relation to the issue of Korean financial liberalization:
It remains Treasury’s judgement that neither Korea nor Taiwan is manipulating its exchange 
rate within the meaning o f  Section 3004. Nevertheless, Treasury remains concerned about 
certain financial and foreign exchange policies in both countries, particularly capital controls, 
which discourage investment and impede the operation o f  market forces in exchange rate 
determination. Treasury will continue to work closely with Korea on these issues as it 
implements its 5-year financial sector liberalization plan and with Taiwan in the context o f  
GATT access process. Regarding Korea’s financial liberalization, I would like to welcom e 
Korean Finance Minister H ong’s recent statement that Korea will implement the financial 
sector liberalization plan 1 or 2 years ahead o f  schedule to facilitate OECD entry.^^
The US government concentrated its pressure in particular on the financial 
liberalization issue in the multilateral negotiations surrounding Korea’s entry to the 
OECD rather than the Financial Policy Talks with Korea which started in 1990 on a 
bilateral basis.
For example, Financial Policy Talks in April 1994 and March 1995 were held 
at the US Treasury, not in Korea. The issues in the talks were not restricted to what the 
US demanded. In addition to the issue of financial liberalization in Korea, the 
business circums tances of the branches of Korean banks in the US were dealt with. 
Korea explained the liberalization measures which it had implemented, such as 
interest rate liberalization (the 1994 talks), the blueprint of 1992 and the reform of the 
foreign exchange system (1995 talks), and the US government regarded these
24 Ibid.
“  Ibid.; 34
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measures favourably. Regarding the business activities of Korean banks in the US, 
Korea asked the US to resolve some ‘bottlenecks’ that the banks were experiencing 
and the US promised to do its best to resolve the problems. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom (such as Wade 1988, 2000), the US government was reported to 
have expressed its determined support for gradual liberalization in Korea when in the 
1995 talks Korean representatives pointed out the cost of big-bang style liberalization, 
as shown by the Mexican crisis (MoF, 1995).^^
When both parties met again in May 1995 in New Zealand, the situation was 
not very different. The main issue at that time was financial services negotiations at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Korean representatives explained that the 
extent of their liberalization plan was the most that could be adopted under the 
circumstances (such as the gap between international and domestic interest rates), and 
the US supported the Korean position, a MoF document stated (MoF, 1995).
In the OECD entry negotiations, however, the US position was relatively 
aggressive. It was the strongest voice, among the member countries, for speedy 
financial liberalization including capital account liberalization in Korea. According to 
a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MoFAT), Non-European 
countries, such as the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, expressed their 
pleasure because Korea’s entry would add momentum to OECD efforts to overcome 
its Europe-centric activities. However, “the US opposes a particularly lax level of 
conditions is applied to Korea. In the areas of capital movements, insurance, and 
financial sector, additional liberalization measures of Korea are required, the US
The US representatives at these talks were Mr Shafer, Under Secretary for
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believed.”^^
Kim Choong-Soo, chief negotiator for the country’s OECD entry, stated in a 
meeting of overseas ambassadors, “The US supports Korean entry, but its position is 
that technical requirement should be in advanced fulfilled. It hopes to talk about this 
issue in bilateral talks between both countries’ representatives in the OECD. In 
relation to the entry of PIT (Partners in Transition), Clinton, the US President, 
promised its support for the entry of the PIT. But, concerning the area of foreign direct 
investment, the PIT countries are more liberalized than Korea and Mexico.” (MoFAT 
1999: 12) In fact, the chief negotiator revealed that “I discussed on various issues 
regarding capital account opening with the US and UK representatives. In addition to 
official meetings, I met those representatives informally, for example, during 
lunchtime. People from the US in particular knew very well the situation of financial 
regulations in Korea, sometimes more than me.” (Interview with Dr Kim Choong-Soo 
in August 1999) The UK position was that it supported Korea’s entry but that Korea 
embark on further liberalization (MoFAT 1999: 13).
Leading European countries expressed their hope that the terms and 
conditions of entry should be strict, in particular with reference to financial issues as 
did the US. The UK focused on the financial sector, i.e. insurance and investment, 
while France was concerned with finance. Germany considered particularly 
investment and tax and the Netherlands focussed on finance and liberalisation on
International Affairs of the US Treasury, and four other officials.
This draws on a document (MoFAT 1999) of an overseas ambassadors’ 
meeting, which was held in Seoul, February 5-9 in 1996. The document was 
summarized by the Department of International Economy in the MoFAT, and was 
submitted to the National Assembly in 1999. The title of the relevant section is
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capital movements. Other countries, which were not so influential in the OECD, 
supported the Korean position, but indicated that they would follow the opinion of the 
majority at the same time. In sum, powerful governments, such as those in the US and 
UK, had a certain level of leverage on the Korean government’s decisions on capital 
account opening through having an influence on Korea’s entry to the OECD.
3.4.2 Restrictions over Capital Movements o f Foreign Non-Residents
Restrictions against the standard of the OECD codes of liberalization of 
capital movements were concentrated on capital inflows, while those on capital 
outflows were relatively liberalized. Restrictions were applied to most types of capital 
inflows, i.e., investment in domestic securities by “non-residents”; the issue of 
securities abroad by “residents”; and financial credits and loans granted by “non­
residents” to “residents”. By contrast, the regulatory authorities relaxed controls over 
investment in overseas securities and deposits, though some controls over financial 
credits and loans granted by “residents” to “non-residents” in the domestic currency 
remained.
A letter to the Korean government dated 17^  ^July 1996 from Christian 
Schricke of the OECD secretariat, who was then Chairman of the joint meeting with 
Korea of the CMIT (Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transaction) / 
CIME (Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises), is 
probably the most informative document setting out the nature of undesirable
“Responses of the OECD member countries.”
Reflecting the twin elements associated with liberalisation, a common 
vision is made between a) actions initiated by non-residents in the country concerned, 
and b) actions abroad initiated by residents. Refer to OECD (1995).
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restrictions on capital flows from the perspective of international standards. It also 
shows very well what the controversial issues were between Korea and the OECD 
countries. It was entitled “Chairman’s conclusions on the joint CMIT/ CIME meeting 
with Korea held on 4-5 July 1996”. In response to the letter, the Korean government 
put forward its position to the joint meeting in a letter called “Confidential: Korea’s 
Response to the Chairman’s Conclusions on the Joint CMIT/CIME Meeting with 
Korea, July 1996”.^ ’
Before looking into particular issues of capital account opening, which were at 
issue between the OECD and Korea, it should be noted that the overall position of the 
two sides throughout the negotiations in 1996 were different in respect of the pace and 
eventual complete abolition of the remaining capital controls. This issue was raised in 
the letter from the OECD saying that “Delegates requested the Korean authorities to 
adopt as an objective the completion of the abolition of remaining capital controls 
progressively over the next five years.” (Paragraph 9 of the Chairman’s conclusions)
Kwon (1996) describes the then situation in terms of the pace of capital 
account opening, and the fact that the OECD countries argued that in order to reduce 
the international-domestic interest rates differential, which was the very concern of 
the Korean government, opportunities for international financing should be extended. 
Regarding the issue of completion of capital account opening, the OECD asked the
Both documents (letters) were submitted to the National Assembly in 
Korea by the Foreign Ministry of Korea in 1998. The joint meeting to which the 
letters refer is the second meeting of the Joint Committee: the first one was held on 
11-12 April 1996. After the first one, the Chairman produced recommendations to the 
Korean government on the then disputed issues between Korea and existing OECD 
members. The Korean government had again put forward its position to the 
Committee and the second joint meeting discussed that position. The letter came after
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Korean government to suggest the time schedule for complete liberalization of capital 
flows (Kwon 1996: 152-153)/^
In “Korea’s Response to the Chairman’s Conclusions,” the Korean 
government stated its position, which was expressed in paragraphs 5-9. As these 
paragraphs clearly show the overall position of the Korean authorities in response to 
such external pressure, they are cited in full below:
5. As for the delegates’ request, identified in paragraph 9 o f  the Conclusions, for the Korean 
authorities to adopt as an objective the completion o f  the abolition o f  the remaining capital 
controls progressively over the next five years, we would like to emphasize, first o f  all, that 
this is the basic policy direction to which the Korean government is strongly committed. We 
believe that the Korean government’s credible track record o f  financial liberalization clearly 
provides evidence for the fact that Korea shares the same views concerning the market 
economy and economic policies with the OECD Member countries. On the other hand, we 
also believe that Korea’s progressive liberalization approach to some parts o f  financial 
services sectors should be understood in the light o f  Korea’s current macroeconomic 
conditions.
6. Korea is determined to remove the remaining capital controls, once the domestic- 
international interest rates differential reaches a level such that excessively large capital 
inflows would not induced. Given the current interest rate levels, the Korean government 
believes that the differential should narrow down to within two percentage points. The 
government’s constant efforts through various policy decisions has set in motion a significant 
downward trend in domestic interest rates and price levels toward stability. On the basis o f  
this trend, the closing o f  the domestic-international interest rates differential to within two
that second meeting.
Kwon Jae-Joong, who was then Research Fellow in the Institute of 
International Economic Relations, was involved in the OECD negotiations.
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percent is expected to be achieved within five years.
7. Furthermore, even if  the interest rate differential does not narrow to the expected levels, as 
long as the macroeconomic conditions continue to stabilize according to the government’s 
expectations -  e.g., inflation stabilizes within 3% -  removal o f  remaining capital controls 
could be completed within five years (MoFAT 1996).
The Korean government then describes its view on the sequence of different 
areas of capital account liberalization and concludes as follows:
8. Such liberalization w ill start with the removal o f  the remaining restrictions on loans with 
FDI character, trade credits, and friendly M&As. The next liberalization step w ill be to fi-ee 
the issuance o f  domestic securities in foreign capital markets by residents, non-resident 
purchase o f  debt securities, and financial credits and loans by non-residents to residents.
9 . The Korean government pledges that it will strengthen to the furthest possible extent its 
efforts through its policy decisions to foster an environment conducive for maintaining stable 
macroeconomic conditions and narrowing the interest rate differential, which would enable 
the abovementioned liberalization to take place within the next five years” (MoFAT 1996).
As the above paragraphs show, the Korean government presented its position 
that removal of the remaining capital controls should not interfere with “stable 
macroeconomic conditions”. In Korea, unstable macroeconomic conditions appeared 
to be defined as monetary growth and appreciation of the exchange rate resulting from 
excessive inward foreign capital flows. To what extent was the stated policy objective 
of macroeconomic stability maintained?
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Four Major Issues o f  Inward Capital Flows
The “Chairman’s conclusions on the joint CMIT/CIME meeting with Korea
held on 4-5 July 1996”, was a five-page (A4 size) letter, consisting of 10 paragraphs. 
Among others, paragraph 6 was important in that it identified four problem areas, 
namely, (1) M&As of Korean firms and banks by foreign investors; (2) ceiling on 
individual foreign portfolio equity investment; (3) the issue abroad of Korean capital 
market securities and the use of the proceeds; and (4) long-term borrowing from 
abroad, financial credits and loans with a maturity of five years or more trade-related 
credits.^*
The areas were, according to the “Chairman’s conclusions” letter, those which 
most delegates of OECD countries considered “should he improved by narrowing 
further the scope of certain reservations and/or by providing legally binding dates by 
which these reservations would cease to apply after Korea’s accession” . In the light 
of its importance, we set out paragraph 6 in full and examine the response of the 
Korean government to the identified areas.
First, as regards M&As by foreign investors, the letter states:
“the threshold concerning the size o f  Korean enterprises beyond which friendly M &As by 
foreign investors require prior approval should be raised and eventually eliminated within a
As a matter of fact, the Chairman put forward five issues, not four. The fifth 
area identified by the OECD Chairman’s letter was to do with restrictions on outward 
direct investment by small Korean investors with respect to investment in OECD 
countries. The Korean government clarified that investment by companies had already 
been fully liberalized by 1 June 1996. Although remaining restrictions applied to 
individuals, such as the then ceiling of US$ 1 million per individual not requiring 
government approval, the limit was well above any actual investments made, the 
government replied (in the “Confidential: Korea’s Response”).
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reasonably short timeframe, and Korean banks meeting the threshold condition for friendly 
M&As should be included in the list o f  enterprises eligible for friendly M &A (item I/A). In 
addition, foreign investors should be able to contact the targeted enterprises directly without 
government intervention, and there should be no restrictions on the organization form which 
friendly M&A might take” (in the "Chairman’s conclusions on the joint CMIT/ CIME 
meeting").
‘The threshold’ in the letter refers to the original proposal by the Korean 
government before the second joint meeting. The proposal was that companies with 
paid-up capital of 100 billion won or more (approximately US$ 125 million), or total 
assets of 1 trillion won or more (approximately US$ 1.25 billion) were required to 
obtain prior approval of the government for a friendly M&A by foreign investors. In 
response to the Chairman’s request, the Korean government responded that it would 
increase the threshold to total assets of 2 trillion won (approximately US$ 2.5 billion) 
or more and revoke another regulatory standard based on paid-up capital. As a result, 
the number of Korean enterprises requiring prior approval of the Korean government 
for friendly M&As fell from around 150 to approximately 70.
However, the Korean government stuck to its original position over M&As of 
banks, which were subject to the General Banking Act, requiring prior approval and 
the limitation of the ratio of shares held by a single shareholder in accordance with the 
Act being 4 %. The Korean government argued that this limitation applied equally to 
domestic investors and the government could not discriminate in this regard in favour 
of foreign in v es to rs .T h e  chief negotiator on the country’s entry to the OECD, Dr 
Kim Choong-Soo, recalled that “This was the hottest issue in the negotiations. The
32 “Confidential: Korea’s Response to the Chairman’s Conclusions on the
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position of the Korean government was strong. The basis of such a position was that it 
would not allow any commercial bank to be controlled by foreign investors.” 
(Interview with Kim Choong-Soo) As already indicated, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) was the very concern of the US government. It can be said that the US had 
leverage over Korea’s entry and wanted to get more relaxed regulation on FDI by 
foreigners but the outcome did not reflect this US preference.
Second, as regards foreign portfolio equity investments, the letter from the 
OECD suggests:
“Any remaining ceiling on individual investments should be at least 10 per cent by the year 
2000. Should a ceiling remain in the year 2000, individual investments exceeding this ceiling  
should be permitted, subject to Korean regulations on foreign direct investment’’(in the 
"Chairman’s conclusions ").
In response to the issue of the ceiling on foreigners’ individual investments on 
listed firms, the Korean government affirmed its commitment that, by the year 2000, 
the ceiling would be increased to 10%, and individual investments exceeding that 
ceiling would be permitted, subject to Korean regulations on foreign direct investment 
As at the end of June 1996, the ceiling on foreign portfolio equity investment in 
listed firms in the Korean stock market was 4% for individuals and 18% in aggregate 
(see section 3.3.4 above on Korean government concerns regarding national 
ownership).
Third, as regards issues of Korean securities abroad and the use of the 
Joint CMIT/CIME Meeting with Korea, July 1996.
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proceeds, the letter from the OECD indicates:
“the provision which allows the Ministry o f  Finance and Economy to block otherwise 
permitted issues abroad o f  domestic capital market securities should not be applied to issues 
on OECD capital markets, without prejudice to Korea’s right to invoke the derogation 
provisions o f  Article 7 o f  the Code (item IV /A l). Remaining limitations on the use o f  the 
proceeds from issues o f  domestic capital market securities abroad and the qualifications to be 
met by resident enterprises wishing to issue such securities abroad should be gradually 
eliminated”( in the "Chairman’s conclusions ").
Regarding the issue of securities in OECD countries, the Korean government 
promised that it would amend the regulations by the end of 1996 so that otherwise 
permitted issues in OECD capital markets of domestic capital market securities would 
not be blocked. With respect to the ability of resident enterprises to be able to issue 
securities abroad, the government promised that it would change the then positive list 
system to a negative list system by the end of 1999. Under the negative list system, all 
conditions for the issuer except item d) of Korea’s proposed reservations, which 
requires the issuers to be a firm which has no negative effect on the international 
creditworthiness of the country, would be eliminated.^"^
However, in relation to the use of proceeds, the government clearly declined 
the demand of the Chairman. It made clear its position that in addition to the then 
allowed usage of the proceeds, it would only allow the issuance of securities up to the 
end of 1997 in order to finance major infrastructure projects, in which the 
participation of the private sector would be promoted (in the “Confidential: Korea’s




In other words, the government stated its intention that thorough 
liberalization of the use of the proceeds would not be allowed. For reference, the then 
allowed usage of the proceeds was for importing capital goods, overseas investment, 
early repayment of foreign debt etc., which was approved by the Finance Minister.
Fourth, as regards long-term borrowing from abroad, the Chairman of the 
joint meeting argued in the letter as follows:
“Remaining restrictions on long-term borrowing from abroad should be gradually eliminated 
over a reasonably short timeframe, starting with loans o f  five years or more having a FDI 
character and financial credits and loans with a maturity o f  five years or more (without 
prejudice to Korea’s right under the Code to prevent contracting parties from later shortening 
the maturity o f  the credits and loans concerned), inward trade credits through the full 
liberalisation o f  deferred payments and advanced receipts, and foreign purchases o f  domestic 
debt securities.”
The request by the Chairman in respect of long-term loans was only partially 
accepted by the Korean government. The government replied that it held the view that 
such loans should be liberalized but in a progressive manner. Thus, the government 
affirmed that loans made by a foreign-invested enterprise from its parent enterprise or 
affiliates abroad, for the importation of capital goods within specified ceilings (in the 
words of the government, ‘FDI-character loans’) would be liberalized from January 
1997. From the end of 1999, ‘FDI character loans’ made by a foreign-invested
35 Long-term credits mean credits with maturity of one year and more.
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enterprise in the manufacturing sector would not be restricted on their usage within 
specified ceilings from the end of 1999. However, the Korean government did not 
specify the date for full liberalization of FDI character loans and financial loans, due 
to the then differential between domestic and international interest rates and the need 
to ensure macroeconomic stability.
Concerning trade-related credits, the government stated that it would 
gradually extend the permitted period, but initially only for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs); trade-related credits for other companies (i.e. chaebol) would be 
considered later. With regard to foreign purchases of domestic debt securities, the 
government stuck to its original position, which was that the government will allow 
foreign purchases of long-term non-guaranteed bonds issued by SMEs by the end of 
1997 and on those issued by other enterprises {chaebol) by the end of 1999. Full 
liberalization in this area would take place when Korea’s “macroeconomic 
conditions” allowed, the government stated.
3.4.3 Restrictions over Capital Movements o f Korean Entities
The Chairman’s letter and the response of the Korean government clearly 
reveal the nature of the then implemented capital account liberalization and the 
different views over the issue between OECD countries (underpinned by US and UK 
views) and the Korean government. However, a crucial aspect of the then capital 
account liberalization was overlooked in both documents: liberalization over capital
“Confidential: Korea’s Response to the Chairman’s Conclusions on the 
Joint CMIT/CIME Meeting with Korea, July 1996.
Ibid.
134
outflows for residents, i.e. Korean entities. This was due to the fact that the Codes 
only related to capital flows and operations between residents and non-residents.
However, as OECD countries had their preference for the way that capital 
account liberalization was effected, so too did Korean entities (i.e. domestic residents 
and non-residents of Korean firms such as overseas affiliates of Korean firms) in 
Korea, in particular the chaebol, the strongest interest group. Controversy between the 
Korean government and the chaebol was centred on the extent to which enterprises in 
the industrial sectors (dominated by chaebol) could finance themselves in 
international capital markets.
The controversy between the Korean government and Korean entities was 
subtle but can be viewed in two ways, i.e. direct and indirect funding/financing. First, 
as far as direct financing/funding was concerned, the opportunities for the industrial 
sector, including the chaebol, were mixed. ‘Domestic residents’, located in Seoul, 
such as the main offices of the chaebol, were not allowed financial credits. The 
amount of securities in the forms of convertible bonds (CB) or depositary receipts 
(DR) which could be issued in international capital markets (long-term) by domestic 
residents were annually allocated (at the beginning of each year) by the Securities 
Exchange Commission in accordance with the Finance Ministry’s policy. Moreover, 
the proceeds of the financing had to be deposited with a Korean bank and 20% of the 
proceeds had to be used to buy bonds called ‘bonds for small and medium-sized firm 
development.’^^  Furthermore, the rest of the proceeds were regulated to be used for
38 Foreign Exchange Management Regulation, Article 10-85
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six purposes only. 39
In relation to this, Dr Oum Bong-Sung, senior advisor to Deputy Premier for 
Economic Affairs in 1988-1992 and to the Minister of Finance in 1992-1994, 
indicated that the issue of equity was also considered. He argued, “If controls over 
capital flows were all lifted, the chaebol would be the main subject able to attract 
foreign funds in the end. The benefit would be concentrated with the chaebol, rather 
than with SMEs, who would have difficulty in attracting foreign funds by themselves. 
Thus, we thought it would be better for financial institutions to intermediate foreign 
funds in the forms of foreign currency loans to corporate firms. The size and the use 
of the loans should be restricted by regulations.” (Interview with Oum Bong-Sung).
However, overseas affiliates of the chaebol, in particular affiliates of general 
trading companies of the chaebol located abroad, could raise short-term as well as 
long-term funding without any significant restriction. As a result, the debts of 
overseas financing by Korean firms significantly increased during the mid-1990s. 
This was particularly important in causing the 1997 crisis because it was not 
calculated as part of external liabilities by the World Bank’s criterion, but, in fact, 
most of the liabilities were guaranteed by the main offices of the chaebol, thus being 
regarded as part of the external liabilities of Korea by foreign investors. The amount 
of debt raised abroad by overseas affiliates of Korea’s thirty biggest chaebol was
Foreign Exchange Management Regulation, Article 10-80, regulated the 
funds to be used in the following six ways: for importing capital equipment; for FDI 
or overseas projects; for importing parts for producing finished goods having the 
condition of over 3 years’ deferred-payment export; for introducing the latest 
technology and paying for the service fees; for early repayment of foreign currency 
debts; and for opening up new overseas markets.
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almost US$ 40 billion as at the end of 1996 (MoFE 1996)/^
As regards such substantial liberalization of overseas financing, the position 
of the Korean government was that such financing would not affect the monetary 
aggregate in Korea. In order to justify that position, the Korean government tried to 
prevent any proceeds of overseas financing from flowing into Korea in the guise of 
trade-related credits. In accordance with the Foreign Exchange Management 
Regulation (Article 11-7), the Finance Ministry limited the use of the proceeds of 
overseas financing to twelve purposes, including funds required for export or import, 
for purchasing goods overseas (mainly for affiliates of general trading companies), for 
funds required for construction and services (mainly for affiliates of construction 
companies), for deep-sea fishery business, for operational costs for marine transport 
business, for distribution and administration expenses for firms, etc.
Among the number of methods by which firms could raise foreign currency 
funds, restriction over how to use the proceeds of overseas affiliates of Korean firms 
was relatively more liberalized. The major beneficiaries of this regulation were 
definitely the overseas affiliates of the general trading companies, which were the 
flagships of the chaebol, general trading companies comprising not only a unit for 
exporting and importing goods but also for construction."^*
Chapter 4 deals with the details.
For example, Daewoo Corporation was a general trading company, which 
included a construction unit, and it was the major flagship company among the 
Daewoo group. Overseas affiliates of Daewoo Corporation, such as Daewoo U.K. Ltd. 
and Daewoo Hong Kong Ltd, had actively attracted foreign currency funds, over 
US$7 billion in outstanding value when Daewoo Corporation was liquidated in mid- 
1999. This did not include the foreign liabilities of the main office of Daewoo
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Second, while direct financing of firms was relatively restricted by the 
Korean regulatory authorities, opportunities for indirect financing, i.e., through 
domestic financial institutions, were greatly extended. Foreign funds, which were 
mainly intermediated by financial institutions, flowed into the ultimate beneficiaries,
i.e., the chaebol. The holding of overseas portfolio investments by financial 
institutions and the lending to SMEs of foreign funds were relatively small. Two 
major indirect ways for funding were ‘foreign currency loans’ (long-term) and trade- 
related credits (short-term).
Foreign currency loans were denominated in foreign currency and therefore 
the exchange rate risk of the loan was borne by the borrower. The Ministry allowed 
foreign currency loans for the following purposes. For the DMBs they were allowed 
for the import of equipment, machinery for planning shipbuilding, payments for high 
technology and service for SMBs, and funding for foreign direct investment (FDI) of 
the industrial sector. The Export-Import Bank of Korea (Ko-exim Bank) was allowed 
to lend for projects which were co-fmanced with a DMB and leasing companies were 
allowed to extend foreign currency loans for firms to import equipment."^^ The 
Ministry of Finance regulated the ratio of how much the financial institutions could 
lend against the project value. Big companies, such as the affiliates of chaebol, could 
usually borrow 70% against a project’s value while SMEs could borrow 100%.
By setting a ceiling on the interest rates payable on ‘foreign currency loans’ 
made to the industrial sector by financial institutions, Korea’s regulatory authorities
Corporation (Kim, 1999).
See Kim (1996). This book is an analysis of the preferences of the most 
influential interest groups, including the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and
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guaranteed lower interest rates for ‘foreign currency loans’ than those for ordinary 
won currency loans from Korean banks. Moreover, in order to extend the 
opportunities for such indirect financing by Korean firms, the BoK deposited part of 
its international reserves with Korean banks as the source of the foreign currency 
loans."^  ^Therefore, the loans became the most popular and in fact the main funding 
method for enterprises."^"  ^ Foreign currency loans had not previously been used to 
finance payment for importing machinery from abroad. However, during the 1990s 
the permitted use of foreign currency loans had been liberalized and in 1995 included 
such payments.
Regulations regarding trade-related credits (such as export advances and 
deferred payments), another way of indirect financing, were considerably relaxed 
during the mid-1990s. Because the BoK re-lent to the banks providing the trade- 
related credits a proportion of the value of those credits which allowed the companies 
to finance their exports at low interest rates, the credits being in the nature of loans 
furthered government policy.
3.5 Conclusion: Constraints and Policy Choice
The exogenous factor argument for financial liberalization, identified by 
Wade (1998, 2000), argues that US pressure compelled the Korean government to
the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB).
Chapter 4 deals with details.
Foreign currency loans refers to loans which were denominated in foreign 
currency. Thus, borrowers had to repay the loans in foreign currency to the domestic 
banks/non-bank financial institutions. Foreign currency loans were the main means of 
asset management of financial institutions: the source of the loans was of course 
financial institutions’ foreign currency funding.
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move toward what the US preferred. However, evidence of capital account opening 
during this period shows that domestic preference was more favoured than 
international preference. The Korean government during this period appeared to keep 
to its original position of maintaining a macroeconomic stability-first policy in the 
negotiations, thus maintaining relatively strict regulation over capital flows of foreign 
non-residents.
However, in fact, this position was disingenuous for domestic entities. After 
all, the Korean government was at the time allowing excessive capital flows by 
increasing opportunities of overseas financing and foreign currency loans for 
corporates and the financial sector. This suggests the regulatory outcomes and the 
policy objective of the government were strongly affected by domestic private 
preferences.
Also, it should be noted that the OECD (including the US and UK) had a 
reasonable argument, in particular with regard to the sequencing of capital account 
liberalization. As it turned out, Korea liberalized short-term capital inflows such as 
trade-related credits more than long-term ones such as inward FDI, which was 
arguably perverse. In conclusion, contrary to Wade’s argument, increases in short­
term capital flows should be traced to the inherent institutional characteristics of the 
developmental state, such as the goal of national ownership and close govemment- 
business relations, rather than US pressure. Close business-govemment relations in 
the developmental state and the strong influence of the private sector on government 
decisions, more than any other factors, can largely explain regulatory outcomes in 
capital account opening.
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Appendix 3.1 -  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness A ct o f 1988 (H.R. 3)
Sec. 3004. International Negotiations on Exchange Rate and Economic Policies
(a) Multilateral Negotiations. -  The President shall seek to confer and negotiate 
with other countries -
(1) to achieve -
(A) better coordination of macroeconomic policies of the major 
industrialized nations; and
(B) more appropriate and sustainable levels of trade and current 
account balances, and exchange rates of the dollar and
other currencies consistent with such balances; and
(2) to develop a program for improving existing mechanisms for 
coordination and improving the functioning of the exchange rate 
system to provide for long-term exchange rate stability consistent with 
more appropriate and sustainable current account balances.
(b) Bilateral Negotiations. -  The Secretary of the Treasury shall analyze on an 
annual basis the exchange rate policies of foreign currencies, in consultation 
with the International Monetary Fund, and consider whether countries 
manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States 
dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or 
gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade. If the Secretary 
considers that such manipulation is occurring with respect to countries that (1) 
have material global current account surpluses; and (2) have significant 
bilateral trade surpluses with negotiations with such foreign countries on an 
expedited basis, in the International Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the 
purpose of ensuring that such countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate 
of exchange between their currencies and the United States dollar to permit 
effective balance of payments adjustments and to eliminate the unfair 
advantage. The Secretary shall not be required to initiate negotiations in cases 
where such negotiations would have a serious detrimental impact on vital 
national economic and security interests; in such cases, the Secretary shall 
inform the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and of the Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives of his 
determination.
Sec. 3005. Reporting Requirements
(a) Report Required. -  In furtherance of the purpose of this title, the
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Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board, shall 
submit to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate, on or before October 15 of each year, a 
written report on international economic policy, including exchange rate 
policy. The Secretary shall provide a written update of developments six 
months after the initial report. In addition, the Secretary shall appear, if 
requested, before both committees to provide testimony on these reports,
(b) Contents of Report. -  Each reports submitted under subsections (a) shall 
contain -
(1) an analysis of currency market developments and the relationship 
between the United States dollar and the currencies of our major trade 
competitors;
(2) an evaluation of the factors in the United States and other economies 
that underlie conditions in the currency markets, including 
developments in bilateral trade and capital flows;
(3) a description of currency intervention or other actions undertaken to 
adjust the actual exchange rate of the dollar;
(4) an assessment of the impact of the exchange rate of the United States 
dollar on -
(A) the ability of the United States to maintain a more 
appropriate and sustainable balance in its currency account 
and merchandise trade account;
(B) production, employment, and non-inflationary growth in 
the United States;
(C) the international competitive performance of United States 
industries and the external indebtedness of the United 
States;
(5) recommendations for any changes necessary in United States 
economic policy to attain a more appropriate and sustainable balance 
in the current account;
(6) the results of negotiations conducted pursuant to section 3004;
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Appendix 3,2 Blueprint fo r  Financial Sector and Market Liberalization
1. Plan for Deregulation of Interest Rates





- Bank overdrafts and 
discounts on 
commercial bills, 
apart from loans 
assisted by BoK 
rediscount
- Discounts on 
commercial paper and 






instruments such as 
CDs, trade bill, 
commercial papers and 
RPs
-Long-term time 
deposits with a 
maturity of at least 3 
years
- Corporate bonds 







- All loans of banks 
and non-bank 
financial institutions, 
apart from those 
provided through 
government or BoK 
rediscounts
- Long-term deposit 
with a maturity of over 
2 years of banks and 
non-banks
-Corporate bonds 
with a maturity of 







- Loans financed by 
BoK rediscounts such 
as discount bills
<1996>
- Loans with banking 
funds compensated for 
interest rate gap by 
government funds 





- Phasing out 
regulations on issues 
and maturities
- Deposits excluding 
demand deposits
- Introduction of 
financial product linked 






- Setting up plan for 
gradual deregulation of 
demand deposits
- Reviewing an 




2. Plan for Foreign Exchange Liberalization
Stage I (1993) Stage II (1994-95) Stage III (1996-97)
<Foreign exchange rate> 
-Expand the range of daily 
interbank foreign 
exchange rate fluctuations 
from 0.8% to 1.0%
- Gradually expand range 
of daily interbank foreign 
exchange
- Pursue the settlement fo a 




-Raise the ceiling on 
overall foreign exchange 
oversold position: from 
US$ 10 to 20 million
-Improve foreign exchange 
position management 
systems by simultaneously 
considering bills bought 
and net worth 
- Adjust the oversold 
position limit of spot 
transactions considering 
the situation of the foreign 
exchange market
- Change the main object 
of foreign exchange 
position control toward the 
promotion of the 




-Raise the ceiling on 
foreign currency deposits 
without need to present 
underlying documents: 
from US$ 200 to 300 
million
- Extend the time limit for 
submitting underlying 
documents: from 30 to 45 
days
-Exempt forward 
transactions among foreign 
currencies from underlying 
documentation requirement 
-Abolish ceiling on foreign 
currency deposits 
exempted from underlying 
documentation 
-Expand ceiling on forward 
transactions between 
foreign exchange and 
Korean won
- Completely exempt 
normal transactions from 
underlying documentation 
requirements, but maintain 




-Permit visible export or 
import settlement in 
Korean won up to US$ 
100,000
-Allow non-residents to 
open won accounts freely 
without restrictions
-Raise ceiling on 
settlement in won for 
visible transactions
- Progressively permit full 
settlement in Korean won 
for visible and also 
invisible transaction
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3. Plan for Capital Market Opening
Stock market Bond market Others
Stage I 
(1993)
-Eliminate ceiling on 
foreigners’ stock 
investment in 
companies with over 
50% of equities owned 
by foreigners
-Allow foreign 
investment trusts and 
investment consulting 
companies to 
participate in the equity 
of domestic investment 
trust firms (up to 10% 
for all foreign firms, 




-Raise stock market 
investment ceiling for 
foreigners 
-Accord national 
treatment in stock 
market investment to 
those residents who are 
defined as foreigners 
under the Securities 
Exchange Act 
-Relax requirements 
for opening branches 
by foreign securities 
companies
-Allow international 
organizations to issue 
won-denominated 
bonds in the domestic 
market
-Allow direct purchase 
of equity-linked 
securities such as 
convertible bonds 
issued by small and 
medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
-Allow underwriting of 
government and public 
bonds at international 
interest rate in the 
primary market 
-Allow foreigners to 
invest in bond-type 
beneficiary certificates, 
as a way of indirectly 





of foreign credit rating 
firms
-Expand the ceiling on 
capital participation by 
foreign investment 






-Continue to raise the 
direct stock investment 
ceiling for foreigners 
-Lower capital 
requirements for 
branches of foreign 
securities
-Allow direct 
investment in SMEs’ 
long-term and non­
guaranteed bond
-Raise the ceiling on 
equity participation in 
domestic credit rating 
company by foreign 
credit rating agencies
Source; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999: 118-126)
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Chapter 4 Regulatory Institutions and Regulatory 
Failures
4,1 Introduction
Appropriate prudential regulation/ supervision is essential to restrain moral hazard, 
which is inherent in banks, regardless of the existence of government deposit insurance. 
Thus, financial supervision aims to prevent banks from risky behaviour in an economy 
and it is particularly important when foreign capital flows into the economy. Most 
analysts of the crisis, even those who focus on the central role of capital movements in 
triggering the crisis, agree that Korea did not impose appropriate prudential regulation/ 
supervision. What is required in the analyses is a political economy explanation for the 
inappropriate prudential policy, in particular with reference to the close business- 
govemment relations in the developmental state.
It is now very clear that in Korea, both foreign investors and domestic financial 
intermediaries assumed that the Korean authorities would protect Korean financial 
institutions, in particular deposit-taking banks, from insolvency. No bank had failed until 
1998, when six banks (most of them regional) were obliged to be taken over by Korean 
nationwide banks. In “Korea Inc.”, however, pmdential regulation/supervision had been 
underdeveloped. This is understandable because a prudential framework may consist of 
three different factors, which ensure sound behaviour of financial institutions: public 
regulation and supervision, internal controls, and market discipline (Ariyoshi et al. 2000).
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Among those three factors, Korean financial institutions lacked internal controls and 
market discipline. Lastra (1996) also indicates that some elements of supervision stricto 
sensu (in narrow terms) are essentially market-oriented ones, such as ratings made by 
private rating agencies, and reporting by independent external auditors. *
With regard to the point that the banks lacked market discipline, some 
developmental state theorists agree that the state inherently promoted moral hazard in the 
banking sector.^ The Korean state had such a close business-govemment relationship that 
this gave rise to a number of political dangers, including the socialization of private risk- 
taking: continued government involvement in the financial system reduced incentives to 
banks to monitor their lending (Haggard and Mo 2000).
Also, in the words of Woo-Cumings, “State interventionism in the market” is 
“Janus-faced.”
The state can achieve its goal by manipulating the financial structure, but once it does so, it has to 
socialize risk, either through inflationary refinancing (monetary means) o f the nonperforming 
loans to bail the firms out, or through expansion o f the state equity share o f  the banks (essentially 
fiscal means) so as to write o ff the bad loans. ... This sort o f  financial system was what enabled 
industrial policy in South Korea and in Japan; the downside was the problem o f  moral hazard 
(that is, bailing out firms in trouble) and socialization o f the risk (Woo-Cumings 1999: 13).
* On the classification of prudential regulation supervision, see Lastra (1996).
 ^Since less reliance can be placed on internal mechanisms, externally-imposed 
regulations should be relatively more important in emerging countries (Goodhart 1998: 
104).
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In addition, Haggard indicates that close business-govemment relations in the 
developmental state had, in spite of its potential benefits, a number of significant risks. 
First is an increasingly concentrated industrial stmcture, which could lead to the “too big 
to fail” problem. Second, continued government involvement in the banking sector, 
which had pumped credit into the chaebol, weakened banks’ incentives to monitor their 
corporate clients aggressively. Third, financial reforms were captured not only in their 
implementation but also in their basic design, as a result of intense lobbying from 
chaebol (Haggard 2000).
What is missing in these explanations, however, is a detailed investigation of 
institutional features at micro level, i.e. the effects of the characteristics of the financial 
regulatory framework and of private influence on particular regulatory outcomes in the 
context of close business-govemment relations. This chapter aims to fill the gap.
This chapter consists of seven sections including this introductory one. The 
following section 4.2 examines the state of regulatory legislation which was characterized 
by centralization of regulatory authority within the Finance Ministry. Section 4.3 focuses 
on private pressure for deregulation during the mid-1990s, which resulted in relaxation of 
key pmdential regulations and reorganization of the government. Section 4.4 examines 
prudential regulation/supervision outcomes before the crisis. It shows how pmdential 
supervision in a narrow sense, i.e. licensing, on-site supervision, reporting and 
sanctioning was systematically distorted in the developmental state. It also assesses the 
crisis management function of the Korean govemment and whether it was effective in
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restraining the moral hazard problem in financial institutions. In section 4.5, the 
enforcement of key prudential rules, such as capital adequacy requirements, large 
exposure limits and regulations regarding foreign currency exposures, are investigated in 
detail.
Section 4.6 reveals an important aspect of the bureaucracy-BoK-financial sector 
relationship, which was determined by the govemment-bureaucracy-industry triangle. 
This aspect has been largely overlooked in the literature. The Bank of Korea (BoK) in 
accordance with the order of the Finance Ministry deposited its foreign currency assets 
{de facto international reserves) with domestic banks.^ In other words, de facto 
international reserves, which could normally be used to finance lender-of-last-resort 
operations in emerging economies, were used to promote the developmental objective of 
the state in favour of the private sector.
Section 4.7 draws conclusions and sets out implications for the thesis. It argues 
that prudential regulation was strongly influenced by private interest and complicated as 
Olson’s classical work in 1982 predicted. Strong private pressure constrained the Korean 
govemment and bureaucracy to repeal key pmdential regulations and interferred with the 
introduction of necessary pmdential measures during the 1990s. Governmental
 ^Generally, the foreign currency assets of a central bank should be the same as 
the international reserves of the bank. In Korea, however, there was a big gap between 
these two categories. The BoK divided its foreign currency assets into two different 
accounts; internal and external. Only foreign currency assets in the BoK’s external 
account, such as the bank’s deposits with Citibank in New York were the international 
reserves of the bank. Assets in internal accounts, such as the BoK’s foreign currency 
deposits with the main office of Korea First Bank, were not calculated as part of its
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institutional features facilitated such perverse pressure. The centralization of the 
regulatory framework facilitated private preference for the sacrifice of prudential 
objectives of intermediate regulatory institutions, such as the BoK and the OBS.
4.2 State o f Regulatory Legislation
Prior to the crisis, there were three Acts regarding banking regulation. The 
General Banking Act stipulated a comprehensive basis of regulation. Although an outline 
of the regulations was prescribed in the General Banking Act and its Ordinance, the 
formulation of detailed rules was entrusted to the Monetary Management Board of the 
BoK in accordance with the BoK Act. In addition, authority for inspection of foreign 
exchange business was a requirement of the Foreign Exchange Management Act. Due to 
the scarcity of foreign exchange, foreign exchange flows had traditionally been under the 
strict control of authorities. In relation to regulations applied to non-banking financial 
institutions (NBFIs), there were various acts for individual groups of NBFIs such as the 
Merchant Banking Act for merchant hanks.
Rather than promoting sound banking, that legislation was originally aimed at 
regulating banks in such a manner as to achieve the policy objective of the Finance 
Ministry (and the govemment), i.e. growth. It is difficult to find in those statutes any 
clear policy objective to encourage sound banking. For the first time in its sixth revision 
in December 1982, the General Banking Act included, as one of its objectives, the phrase 
“sound management of banks”. This was at the time that deposit money banks were
international reserves.
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privatised. However, until December 1991, on its seventh revision, there was still no 
specific prescription in the Act, which can be regarded as prudential regulation. Even 
after the seventh revision, prudential regulations which were introduced were not strongly 
implemented. By contrast, key regulations were repealed during the mid-1990s, reflecting 
the interests of the private sector.
The Foreign Exchange Management Act was also not concerned with prudential 
regulation. The objective of the Act was threefold: to smooth international transactions, 
to achieve a stability on the balance of payments; and to ensure the stability of the value 
of the currency. It was established at the end of 1961 to promote the efficient use of 
foreign exchange, which had been scarce. The Act therefore focussed on foreign 
exchange controls, enhancing exports and restraining imports. Although the details had 
changed, for example, imports were no longer discriminated against, these three 
objectives of the Act were unchanged until the crisis. Although some controls had an 
indirect effect on prudential regulation e.g. on the foreign exchange exposure limits of the 
DMBs, the Foreign Exchange Management Act did not include any specific clauses 
aimed at ensuring sound banking practice. For example, regulatory authorities set limits 
on 0/B (over-bought) and 0/S (over-sold) positions. When assets and debts were the 
same, it was called “square”. However, it did not prescribe crucial elements of prudential 
regulation, such as rules on liquidity mismatches, as emerged in the context of the Korean
• • 4cnsis.
When foreign currency assets exceed foreign currency debts, the bank is over-
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Changes in the General Banking Act
After its enactment in 1950 and enforcement in 1954, the General Banking Act
had been revised nine times up to the time of the crisis. When technical revisions 
resulting from changes in govemment organization are excluded, there were five 
revisions. The first three, i.e., first, fourth, and sixth revisions in 1962, 1977, and 1982 
respectively, were made in order to support the govemment-led economic development. 
The Bank of Korea Act was also revised at exactly the same time. The latter two rounds 
of revisions were designed only to promote pmdential regulation: the seventh in 1991 for 
limits on single exposures and the eighth in 1994 for large exposures.
In order to strengthen the credit rationing system, supporting the first Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan, which commenced in 1962, the first revision in May 1962 
increased the limit for the holding of risky assets that banks could own, from ten times to 
fifteen times a barJc’s equity capital. Risky assets were defined as the total assets of the 
bank minus cash, deposits with the BoK and/or foreign financial institutions and 
investment in monetary stability bonds of the BoK. The limit for investments in corporate 
bonds and securities with over three years’ maturity also increased. The minimum equity 
capital for banks, as required by the General Banking Act, increased by 50 %, i.e., from 
Korean won 100 million to 150 million. The Bank of Korea Act was revised at the same 
time. The ultimate authority for financial policy moved to the Finance Ministry from the 
BoK at the time of this revision.
bought (0/B); over-sold (0/S) is the opposite.
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Under the fourth revision in 1977 (undertaken in order to increase external 
confidence), the Act increased the limit that a bank was able to guarantee, from fifteen 
times to twenty times its equity capital plus reserves. Also, loans guaranteed by the 
central or local govemment or jointly-guaranteed with other financial institutions and 
insurance companies were excluded from the limit. Thus, the actual amounts guaranteed 
far exceeded the limit set in the Act. Moreover, in order to encourage large-size banking, 
the minimum size of equity capital for a bank was raised to Korean won 25 billion and 1 
billion for nationwide and regional banks respectively. Previously, it was Korean won 1.5 
billion for nationwide banks and 0.15 billion for regional ones.
The sixth revision, enacted in December 1982, repealed the Provisional Act on 
Financial Institutions of 1961 which had entmsted the right of selection of the presidents 
and directors of financial institutions with the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS). This 
coincided with the privatisation policy of the deposit money banks (DMBs). The 
maximum number of bank shares owned by a single person was, however, restricted to 
8%, in order to prevent too much money being lent to single persons.^ The maximum 
bank guarantees for single persons was limited to 50% of the bank’s equity capital.
Regulations aimed at promoting prudence by banks were included in the seventh 
and eighth revisions. To guard banks against possible instability of financial markets as a 
result of financial liberalization, the seventh revision of 1991 obliged banks to ensure the 
soundness of their business, by enlarging their equity capital and maintaining adequate
 ^Single person is a legal term, which includes companies.
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liquidity. In addition, the lending limit to a single exposure was reduced to 20% from 
25% of the bank’s equity capital, and the maximum bank guarantee for single persons 
decreased from 50% to 40% of equity capital.
Under the eighth revision in December 1994, the maximum number of bank 
shares to be owned by a single person was halved, from 8% to 4%.^ With respect to 
exposure to single persons, the maximum lending was reduced to 15% (from 20%) of 
equity capital and the maximum amount guaranteed by a bank was reduced to 30% (from 
40%) of equity capital. Limits for large exposures were introduced for the first time.
When a single exposure exceeded 15% of the bank’s equity capital, the amount of the 
exposure was termed a large exposure. The fixing of the aggregate limit for the large 
exposures was entrusted to the Monetary Management Board to determine and the Board 
decided that the limit should be 500% of equity capital (see section 4.5.2).
The changes in the General Banking Act (Table 4.1) show that, except for the 
limits on single and large exposures, prudential regulatory considerations were rare. Even, 
in relation to such prudential regulations, the large exposures limit of 500% was hardly 
“prudent”. In addition, as we examine later, such limits were applied to banking accounts 
of the DMBs only. Moreover, even the regulations on single and large exposure 
originated partly from the govemment wishing to promote fair trade, rather than 
exclusively from the wish to promote sound banking. Specific measures on capital 
adequacy requirements were not enacted prior to the crisis. Until then, the OBS had
There was an exception for “financial speciality entrepreneurs” who carry on
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merely issued management guidance, which was subordinate regulation to Act and 
Ordinance, on capital requirements. Moreover, criteria of loan classification, which were 
crucial in terms of implementing capital requirements, were lax from the perspective of 
international standards. Furthermore, implementation of such regulations was not strict. 
Regulations included many exceptions and ambiguous prescriptions, which enabled 
regulatory authorities to make arbitrary decisions.
financial business exclusively. However, none qualified under this criterion.
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Table 4.1 Key Changes in the General Banking Act
Revision Ownership/
Governance
Size o f  assets/ Paid-in 
capital
Single exposure Large exposure
] S t
(May 1962)
Extension o f  limit on 
risky assets (10 to 15 




Introduction o f the 
requirement for 
bank management 
to comply with 
comprehensive 
orders from the 
OBS Governor
-Extension o f limit on 
bank guarantees (15 to 
20 times o f  equity 
capital)
-Increase in minimum 
capital requirement 
(Won 1.5 to 25 billion 
for nationwide banks, 




-Revocation o f  the 
requirement for 
bank management 
to comply with 
comprehensive 
orders from the 
OBS Governor 
-Limit o f shares to 
be possessed by a 
single person 
(within 8%)
Limit o f  
guarantee for 
single person 
(50% o f  equity 
capital)
(D ec.l991 )* l)
-Extension of 
minimum capital (over 
Won 100 billion) 
-Limit on investment 
in securities (25 % of  
on demand deposits to 
100% o f equity capital)
Reduction in 
single exposure 
(loans: 25% to 
20% o f  equity 
capital,
guarantees: 50% 




Reduction in limit 
o f shares to be 
possessed by a 
single person: 4 % 




(Loans: 20% to 
15 % o f equity 
capital,
guarantees: 40% 
to 30% o f equity 
capital)
Limit on amount 
o f  loans - 15% o f  
equity capital to 
single persons, 
companies, - 
500% o f equity 
capital to groups
*1) Introduction o f  duty to ensure sound banking, by way o f sufficient equity capital and adequate liquidity. 
Source: Derived from OBS (1995)
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Impact o f  Institutional Centralization on the Process o f  Prudential Regulation
Prudential regulation/supervision consists of four different stages, i.e., licensing,
supervision stricto sensu, sanctioning and crisis management. It may seem natural that 
licensing and sanctioning of financial institutions should be under the jurisdiction of the 
Finance Ministry. Prior to the crisis, however, other areas were also under the control of 
the Finance Ministry. Specialist regulators, such as the OBS in respect of banking 
business, could conduct examination over financial institutions’ businesses in accordance 
with guidelines determined by the Finance Ministry and the BoK. However, because 
power for the enactment and amendment of regulations over supervision stricto sensu 
was the responsibility of the Finance Ministry, the role of the OBS was limited to on-site 
examination, i.e., whether banks were adhering to existing regulations and govemment 
policies or not.
As regards crisis management, the last stage of prudential regulation, the BoK 
appeared to share part of the responsibility because the Monetary Management Board of 
the BoK possessed the Lender-of-last-resort (LLR) function. In reality, however, it was 
also controlled by the Finance Ministry (see section 4.4.4). Moreover, foreign currency 
assets of the BoK, which could be used to prevent systemic risks in a foreign exchange 
crisis period, were used instead to fund foreign currency loans to Korean banks.
The BoK, in accordance with the order of the Finance Ministry, deposited its 
foreign currency assets with Korean banks, at a low interest rate, i.e. lower than at the 
rate payable by the banks on the international bank-loan market. The size of the foreign 
currency assets deposited with domestic banks by the BoK, which was not calculated as
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part of the international reserves, exceeded the level of the official international reserves 
at the end of 1996. This is the most extreme example showing the inadequacy of 
prudential regulation prior to the crisis and will be dealt with, in detail, in section 4.6 of 
this chapter.
4,3 Fervour o f Deregulation: Pressure from the Private Sector
Deregulation has emerged as a core objective of the govemment since 1993. The 
negative effects of over-regulation had been indicated by the private sector and the 
govemment had been concemed about regulatory relaxation from the beginning of the 
1980s. However, deregulation was not regarded as one of the major priorities of the 
govemment until 1993 when the new Kim Young-Sam administration took office and 
prescribed such a priority in its New Economy Five-Year Plan.
The Kim Young-Sam administration formed various institutions for deregulation 
(see Table 4.2) in consultation with the private sector. Deregulation policy was strongly 
conducted by the senior advisor to the President for Economic Affairs, Park Jae-Yoon, 
who even formed a team called the “Regulatory Reform Inspection Team” and checked 
the state of regulatory relaxation by ministries.^ A new senior post in the Presidential
 ^The team conducted such inspections for a limited period, i.e. between January 
1994 and June 1994. The team consisted of thirty people from the govemment (11 
ministries such as Premier’s office and BAI) and 27 people from five private sector 
interest group associations, such as FKI. The senior advisor. Park Jae-Yoon became the 
Finance Minister in 1994.
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secretariat, Secretary for Regulatory Reform, was established at the beginning of the Kim 
Young-Sam’s govemment in March 1993.
Table 4.2 Government Institutions for Regulatory Relaxation
Title Establishment Business Ministries
charged
Committee of Economic 
Regulatory Relaxation
March 1993 Review on proposals of 





April 1993 Decision of regulatory 






July 1993 Investigation, 































Review on government’s 



















Administrative help for 
regulatory reform
MoGA
Source: Private Sector Committee of Strengthening National Competitiveness (1996: 
128)
In June 1993, the “Special Act of Industrial Deregulation” was introduced 
(Private Sector Committee of Strengthening National Competitiveness 1996: 129). In 
accordance with the Special Act, the Industrial Deregulation Committee was established. 
The committee consisted of five people from the govemment and nine people from the
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private sector. The role of the Committee was to review industrial regulations, which 
were pinpointed as the subject of reform by the private sector, and to recommend 
regulatory change to relevant ministries. Ministries had to submit reform measures in 
response to any recommendation. The Committee recommended the reform of 47 
regulations to the Finance Ministry, of which 43 were related to financial and tax issues 
(Industrial Deregulation Committee 2002).
The establishment of such institutions as the Industrial Deregulation Committee 
was driven by the private sector, represented by the “Private Sector Committee of 
Strengthening National Competitiveness”. The Committee was formed in 1993 in order 
to concentrate the collective power of private sector interests by five private sector 
interest group associations, including Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Korean 
Foreign Trade Association (KFTA), and Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KCCI). Those five associations delegated twenty-seven people to the “Regulatory 
Reform Inspection Team” in the Presidential secretariats and inspected the situation of 
regulatory reform in the govemment. The Chair of the Committee was held by the 
Chairperson of the FKI, Choi Jong-Hyun (the owner of SK group, which was then the 
fourth biggest chaebol).
Among various areas of regulation, financial regulations (including foreign 
exchange controls) were targetted as core regulations, along with those of real estate and 
employment, which, the Committee argued, prevented corporations from developing 
international competitiveness. It has been claimed that the existence of such regulations
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was due to the bureaucratic interests of related ministries and insufficient understanding 
of the corporate situation. What should be noted was the aim of financial regulatory 
relaxation from the viewpoint of the Committee, that is, a reduction in interest rates. The 
Committee claimed that a backward financial market resulting from financial regulation 
was interfering with the development of the real economy. An increase in opportunities 
of corporate finance and a reduction in credit controls over the biggest groups {chaebol) 
were particularly suggested by the private sector. Also, the Committee argued for entry 
liberalization and a universal banking system by repealing regulations on the 
segmentation of financial business areas. Moreover, it demanded preliminary screening in 
newly-introduced regulations and the insertion of ‘sunset’ clauses and the name of the 
proposers in such regulations (Private Sector Committee of Strengthening National 
Competitiveness 1996: 157-171).®
Such private pressure for deregulation gave birth to a substantial decrease in a 
number of key regulations and institutional changes in the financial system and 
regulatory authorities during the Kim Young-Sam administration period. As regards 
economic regulations, as many as 1971 regulations were indicated as the subject of 
relaxation, of which 1342 regulations were relaxed during the period between March 
1993 and May 1994. In 1995, a further 501 regulations were indicated for relaxation 
(MoFE 1995). Some key regulations, such as the limit on overseas financing of 
corporations and on the use of proceeds by such financing, and the limit of a compulsory
A ‘sunset’ clause requires overall examination of regulation and its maintenance 
after a certain period of time.
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ratio of long-term funding for long-term lending by financial institutions, were relaxed 
during the period.
As regards institutional change in the financial system and regulatory authorities, 
an extension of business by different financial sectors and an increase in the number of 
financial institutions were observed.^ Among others, most important was perhaps the 
reorganization of the govemment, which integrated the Economic Planning Board (BPB) 
and Ministry of Finance (MoF) into the Ministry of Finance and Economy at the end of 
1994. The Private Sector Committee of Strengthening National Competitiveness argued 
that core regulatory reform such as that regarding corporate financing and foreign 
exchange made slow progress because bureaucrats were not willing to remove related 
regulations. It was claimed that this was due to the fact that the bureaucrats regarded 
regulatory relaxation as a reduction in their power. In order to defend bureaucratic 
territories, bureaucrats disguised their interest in maintaining regulations with policy 
objectives, thus rejecting regulatory relaxation, the committee argued (Private Sector 
Committee of Strengthening National Competitiveness 1996: 130). The reorganization of 
the govemment at the end of 1994, represented by the integration of the EPB and the 
MoF into the MoFE, occurred under such pressure. Accordingly, regulatory reform was 
only proceeding in the direction of deregulation. Re-regulation was hardly tried.
Officers of the Finance Ministry stated that it was difficult to remove capital 
controls at the same time as strengthening pmdential regulation in Korea during the mid-
As regards the increase in the number of investment and tmst companies and
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1990s (Testimony of Yoon Cheng-Hyim at the Special Investigation Committee on the 
Crisis 1999). Most advocates of liberalization and deregulation appeared to have equated 
capital account liberalization with the relaxation of regulations, regardless of whether 
those regulations included a prudential element or not.
A document published by the BoK shows that during the process of financial 
liberalization during the 1990s, a number of financial supervisory measures were also 
removed. In 1995, the BoK planned to remove 105 financial regulations and actually 
repealed 61 rules during the first half of the year, of which 44 rules were related to 
banking supervision (Bank of Korea 1995b).
After the crisis, Joseph Stiglitz argues, "Many of the so-called reforms 
undertaken under the name of financial market liberalization may have served to weaken, 
rather than strengthen, the financial sector." He continues, “The advocates of 
liberalization and deregulation seldom go so far as to advocate free banking; but by 
failing to understand the roles and fimctions of financial market regulation - and 
constraints under which it operates - they have left the financial sector in many countries 
far weaker” (Stiglitz 1999b: 44). This explanation is in accord with the experience of 
Korea.
merchant banks, refer to Table 7.1, Chapter 7.
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4,4 Prudential Supervision in Detail
4.4.1 Licensing
“Licensing is a key first step in the supervisory process; it acts as catalyst or filter 
to prevent bad banks and dishonest people from entering the banking system” (Lastra 
1996: 110)/^ Although licensing policies should strike a balance between the financial 
market’s stability and its efficiency (Lastra 1996: 110), policies in Korea appeared to be 
greatly influenced by the fervour of liberalization and deregulation, in particular during 
the first half of the 1980s and the mid-1990s.
As already described, licensing of short-term finance companies and mutual 
credit companies was liberalised in 1982: any person who fulfilled the single condition of 
capital size qualified for a licence. As competition in the industry intensified, the balance 
sheets of the companies started to deteriorate. The companies were again allowed to 
obtain foreign exchange business licenses by converting themselves into merchant banks 
in 1994 and 1996." However, the only criterion for that transformation to be allowed 
was the equity capital, i.e. there was neither a ‘fit and proper’ test nor emphasis on good 
corporate governance. The transformation occurred in the name of enhancing competition 
and in the interest of consumers. However, there was the strong interest of the industrial
“Bank charters are grants from sovereign governmental authorities to 
applicants who wish to engage in banking under terms and conditions that thus become 
authorized. (...) The terms and conditions of bank charters include privileges, obligations 
and restrictions” (Newman, Milgate, and Eatwell 1992a: 125).
' ' Merchant banks automatically get a business licence for foreign exchange 
business as a foreign exchange transaction bank in accordance with foreign exchange 
management law.
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sector, in particular the chaebol}^ Because there was no rigorous authorization procedure 
for a licence, it could arguably be said that in practice the procedure was abandoned. 
Management competence, integrity of the industry, and the future prospects for the 
industry were not considered. The policy objective of promoting growth and 
liberalization as well as the special interests of the chaebol may have been achieved but 
there was no serious concern in ensuring that financial institutions were prudent.'^
Historicaliy, in the developmental state, the value of having a banking licence 
was extremely high. It was a situation of oligopoly, and thus it was said, “Once you have 
a banking licence, you can survive.” Moreover, the ability to run a foreign exchange 
business was a privilege. Until the latter half of the 1980s, this business was only 
undertaken by the Bank of Korea and the Korea Exchange Bank. After that banks were 
allowed to do business. The transformation of short-term finance companies into 
merchant banks during the mid-1990s meant that the companies got the privilege of being 
able to conduct foreign exchange business without being adequately prepared. Some of 
the new entrants were partly owned by the chaebol, and others by construction companies 
which had close connections with politicians. The construction industry is indicated as 
frequently suffering from liquidity problems.
As shown in Chapter 7, the companies were a major financing source of the
chaebol.
Regarding the non-existence of a “fit and proper” test for new entrants of 
merchant banks during the 1990s, see Chapter 7.
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4.4.2 Supervision stricto sensu
Supervision stricto sensu is defined as “the monitoring of the safety and 
soundness of a bank during its ‘healthy’ life.”*"^ The monitoring process comprises the 
oversight of “asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, earning and management, 
including internal systems of control and security systems.” Focusing on ‘soundness,’ 
prudential supervision aims at collecting information about the condition of a bank. 
Regulatory authorities exercise it through different measures and instruments, including 
reports, ratings, on-site examinations, in-house surveillance and consultations with high- 
level management. It is supplemented by reports from independent external auditors 
(Lastra 1996: 111).
Reporting from Independent External Auditors
Prior to the crisis, due to the weakness of Korean accounting standards, the
financial statements of banks were not regarded as reflecting their true condition. In order 
for banks to maintain ‘suitable’ financial statements, accounting standards were often 
changed. For example, banks were allowed to have a grace period to determine the 
market value for bank loans and assets in securities during the mid-1990s. With respect to 
loan classification, the criteria on asset quality were much looser than international 
standards. Because the intermediate supervisory body (OBS) manipulated the accounting 
criteria in order to cover losses and thus ensure the achievement of the Finance Ministry’s 
policy objectives, such as special loans for industry restructuring during the mid 1980s,
In this sense, supervision stricto sensu can be distinguished from prudential 
regulation, which is concerned with mandating prudential rules for banks; supervision is 
the monitoring process carried out to make sure that these rules are followed by financial
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financial institutions did not feel any serious need for internal controls. This is a clear 
case of regulatory forbearance driven by industry pressure.
Financial statements did not reflect the real business state of financial institutions. 
Financial institutions were not required to be examined by external credit ratings agencies. 
Moreover, There were three domestic credit ratings agencies, all of which were owned by 
financial institutions and were never independent of the interest of the financial sector 
and government influence. Financial institutions had their accounts audited by auditors of 
their own choice.’^  The auditors themselves had few incentives to conduct arms-length 
investigations, as there were no sanctions for mis-reporting.
According to a survey on the credit ratings of Korean companies given by 
domestic credit ratings agencies, 98% of credit-rated companies were graded as suitable 
to invest i.e. higher than B which is equivalent to BBB in the criteria of S&P. 57.4% was 
ranked at the highest three levels i.e. A1 -  A3 which are equivalent to AAA -  A in the 
criteria of S&P. Among US companies examined by S&P, only 22.4 % was ranked at the 
three highest levels and 42.3% was judged as investment grade, which is suitable for 
issuing commercial paper (Table 4.3). In case of 40 companies liquidated in 1997 in 
Korea, no company was graded as junk even immediately before their bankruptcies (Cho 
1999:14-17). Thus, loans made by financial institutions to those companies were 
classified as normal rather than as Non-Performing Loans (NPLs).
institutions (Newman, Milgate, and Eatwell 1992b: 156).
After the crisis, banks have been required to have compulsory examinations by 
credit ratings institutions.
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Table 4.3 Credit Rating: Domestic Agencies ’and S & P s ’ Compared
Domestic Agencies’ Average Standard & Poors
Rating 1997 1996 1995 Rating 1995
A1 8.4% 8.2% 6.4% AAA 1.2%
A2 17.9% 22.0% 21.1% AA 5.4%
A3 31.1% 33.8% 32.5% A 16.2%
B 40.6% 35.9% 40.0% BBB 19.5%
C 0.4% 0.2% 0 BB 26.1%
D 1.3% 0 0 B 28.6%
No Action 0.3% 0 0 CCC 1.1%
Source: Cho, Y-J (1999: 16)
In-house surveillance and consultations with senior management
Internal controls of financial institutions were ineffective. For example, in
relation to foreign exchange business there was no internal regulation required for new
entrants to merchant banking during the mid-1990s. In the wake of the crisis, it was
revealed that some merchant banks had even issued ‘fraudulent’ commercial paper.
Merchant banks intermediated commercial paper between issuers and investors. Some
merchant banks, however, sold to investors more than had been issued by good
companies; merchant banks themselves collected the difference (Fund Department of the
Bank of Korea 1997).
On-site examinations
On-site examinations are required in order for information to be obtained in situ 
on the financial condition of an institution, and its compliance with the law (Lastra 1996: 
115). Examinations were strictly confined to the checking of whether financial
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institutions had conformed to the related regulations. The problem was that the prudential 
elements of regulation were too lax and not even strictly imposed.’^
4.4.3 Sanctioning
Sanctioning includes the power to revoke a bank’s licence which rests with the 
licensing or chartering authority (Lastra 1996). In order for this element of prudential 
regulation to work, banks should be allowed to fail. Some argue that early closure should 
be required in case of serious undercapitalization when a bank reaches the point of 
technical insolvency. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991 in the US, establishes five capital tiers: well-capitalized, adequately 
capitalized, undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, and critically 
undercapitalised -  and requires prompt corrective action in the last three cases.
In Korea before the crisis, it was difficult for even small financial institutions to 
fail. In a situation where closure of financial institutions was not allowed, the excessive 
issues of banking licences and the encouragement of over-competition caused problems.
Details are examined in the Section 4.5.
However, Lastra (1996) mentions that the concept of early resolution (e.g., 
closure at positive levels of capital) can be politically costly, constitutionally dubious and 
practically difficult.
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4.4.4 Crisis Management and Government Implicit Guarantees
Crisis management comes under the last stage of bank supervision, according to 
the classification of Lastra. It refers to the official protection by the authorities of banks 
in a ‘crisis situation,’ which is the situation of “either illiquidity or insolvency that may 
threaten the continuation of the activities of a particular bank or banks on a temporary of 
permanent basis.” (Lastra 1996: 124-5) Three ways have been indicated as to the action 
which the authorities can take in a crisis situation: the central bank acting as lender-of- 
last-resort, deposit insurance and bank insolvency proceedings (Lastra 1996).
Protection is likely to exacerbate the moral hazard problem of banks. In relation to 
deposit insurance, McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1998) have shown that the existence of 
government protection leads to risky behaviour and the problem of overborrowing, 
leading to a crisis. Thus, protection for banks should be designed to reduce uncertainly 
and to deter banks from taking undue risks in anticipation of government’s protection, 
thus minimizing moral hazard problems (Newman, Milgate, and Eatwell 1992b).
In Korea, however, the lender-of-last-resort function of the BoK was distorted. It 
was used as a means of industrial policy and even encouraged banks to make risky 
investments. Moreover, the resources to support the lender-of-last-resort function in a 
crisis situation, i.e., international reserves, were used for promoting growth, which 
reflected private sector interest. Foreign currency assets of the BoK were deposited with 
domestic banks and lent to industrial firms.
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In the wake of the crisis, it was revealed that overseas borrowing by industrial 
enterprises, mainly overseas subsidiaries of the chaebol, totalled US$ 18 billion as at 
February 1994 when the limit on the amount of such borrowing was still in force. After 
the limit was abolished in 1994, overseas ftmding by overseas subsidiaries of the chaebol 
surged to US$ 53 billion as at the end of 1997. The source of such overseas borrowing 
was largely Korean financial institutions, which borrowed from international financial 
institutions and lent to overseas affiliates of Korean industrial enterprises.
Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency Proceedings
Deposit insurance was not introduced in Korea until 1995. This does not mean
that the moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance was not in evidence before 1995.
This was because the authorities did not feel it necessary to introduce such a scheme
because in Korea banks had never gone bankrupt. There were no insolvency proceedings
specific to banks as distinct from that for other businesses.
Lender-of-Last-Resort Role o f the Central Bank
Lender-of-last-resort (LLR) is defined as “the central bank’s responsibility to
accommodate demands for high-powered money in times of crisis, thus preventing panic-
induced contractions of the money shock. The central bank discharges this duty either
through open-market purchases or by making emergency loans through the discount
window to solvent but temporarily illiquid banks at penalty rates on good collateral”
(Newman, Milgate, and Eatwell 1992b: 571).
The idea of LLR was developed by Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot, who 
clarified it in the form of a set of rules for hindering bank panics and crises. These rules
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What is important is LLR support should include restraint measures to prevent 
banks from taking immoderate risks. However, this was not consistent with the case of 
Korea. The Finance Ministry even argued that the LLR function was also the 
responsibility of the government. In accordance with the order of the Finance Ministry, a 
special section of the BoK, supporting the LLR function, did not disclose information 
about insolvent banks to the Monetary Management Board or to other parts of the BoK. 
The information was kept secure by the Finance Ministry, which decided on special loans 
and then asked the Monetary Management Board to issue them. Such special loans were 
made without the knowledge of the market and they carried no penalty charge; thus banks 
even sought to get LLR special loans from the BoK, in particular between 1985 and 1988. 
Some BoK staff members sarcastically referred to the lender-of-last-resort function of the 
central bank as “the lender of first resort function.”'^
There were several lender-of-last-resort measures in the 1980s and 1990s, which 
diverged substantially from the ideal concept of LLR. In the 1980s, the measures were 
aimed at preventing industrial firms from going bankrupt. After banks, in accordance 
with government policy, extended special loans on favourable conditions to certain 
enterprises, the BoK supported those banks by making special loans to them at low 
interest rates. Between February 1985 and February 1988, the Korean government (the
emphasized the LLR’s responsibility as follows:
(1) To protect the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions; (2) to support central 
bank objectives o f gold convertibility and long-run stable money growth; (3) to let insolvent 
institutions fail; (4) to accommodate creditworthy institutions only; (5) to charge penalty rates; 
(6) to require good collateral, and (7) to preannounce its policy well in advance o f  crises to 
minimize the chances o f a panic (Newman, Milgate, and Eatwell 1992b; 571).
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Finance Ministry) named 78 firms as requiring industrial rationalization. Faced with a 
slowdown in the international economy and the resultant slow turnover in certain 
industries, such as the shipping and construction industries to which banks had made 
loans which could not be repaid, the Korean government took action to improve the 
situation. Eighteen of 78 companies recovered through their own efforts, and four were 
liquidated, while the other 56 were sold to third parties.
In relation to the 56 companies which changed ownership, if their assets 
exceeded their liabilities, then the ownership of the companies was transferred to the third 
parties without any additional compensation. However, when the value of the assets of 
the companies was less than their liabilities, the banks extended special loans to the 
buyers on preferential terms. For example, the ownership of Kyungnam (a construction 
company) was transferred to Daewoo (a trading company at that time). As the liabilities 
of Kyungnam were bigger than its assets by 450 billion Won, the government 
compensated Daewoo for this deficiency in the way of extending special loans by a 
Korean bank with a favourable interest rate (Kim 1995).
As a result of making special loans to the third parties with favourable conditions, 
losses of the banks increased. The banks were compensated for these losses by receiving 
special loans made to them by the BoK. Relying on its money-issuing power, the BoK 
supplied the banks with special loans to the total of 1722.2 billion won between 1986 and
Based on an interview with an anonymous BoK staff member in August 2000.
173
1988. The rate of interest on the special loans was only 3%, compared to the then 
interbank rate of 8%.
In the 1990s, special loans by the BoK were made directly to financial 
institutions. There were five cases of this prior to the crisis. The first was to support three 
investment trust corporations (ITCs) in 1992, which had been asked to buoy the stock 
market by buying stocks in spite of the market’s slow-down. As a result, all the fimds 
managed by the ITCs recorded huge deficits. Because most investors were withdrawing 
their money from the ITCs, the ITCs were on the verge of bankruptcy. This was bad not 
only for the ITCs and investors but also for the stock market; in order for the ITCs to 
repay investment in their funds, they had to sell stocks and this pushed the stock market 
down further. The BoK made special loans of 2900 billion won (US$ 3.7 billion) to seven 
deposit money banks.^^ The banks then lent these funds to the investment trust 
corporations at an interest rate of 3%, which was far below the then market interest rate, 
with the collateral being commercial paper issued by the ITCs themselves (BoK 1998).
The second case was the support of the Korea First Bank (KFB) in September 
1997, when the economy was on the brink of the crisis. The amount of special loans 
made to the KFB totalled 1000 billion Won (US$ 1.1 billion) with a market interest rate 
of 8%.^' The third case in October 1997 was in respect of merchant banks with non- 
performing loans caused by the ‘bankruptcy protection agreement,’ which exceeded half
On the basis of the won-dollar exchange rate at end of the year
This is on the basis of the won-dollar exchange rate as at the end of September
1997.
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the banks’ equity capital. Again, the amount of the special loans extended by the BoK 
was 1000 billion won at an interest rate of 8% per annum. In the second and third cases, 
the KFB and merchant banks had special loans with a market interest rate, which was 
much lower than they could actually get in the interbank market. The fourth case was the 
support of the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO), which bought the bad 
assets of Korean financial institutions. The special loans to the KAMCO at the end of 
November 1997 totalled 2000 billion (equivalent to US$ 1.7 billion on the basis of the 
won-dollar exchange rate as at end of November 1997) and the interest rate was 5% per 
annum (BoK 1998).
4,5 Examination o f Key Prudential Regulations
4.5.1 Capital Adequacy Requirements
Capital adequacy requirements require banks to set aside funds to provide for 
possible non-repayment of loans made by them in order to protect depositors and 
creditors. Because banking regulation aims at protecting the banks’ payment systems and 
bank depositors, these requirements are one of the most crucial measures to achieve that 
goal.
Along with the introduction of obligations imposed on banks to ensure soundness 
in accordance with the 1991 revision of the General Banking Act, the OBS in July 1992 
introduced BIS capital adequacy requirements as one of its management guidance 
standards. However, the regulation applied only to banking accounts in deposit money
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banks. The requirements were neither applied to non-bank financial institutions including 
merchant banks nor to trust accounts in deposit money banks; they were not the subjects 
of the application of the Act. The new management guidance asked the relevant banks to 
maintain the ratio at over 7.25 % from 1994 and at over 8% from 1995.
Capital includes both core capital (tier I) and supplementary capital (tier II) and 
assets are weighted by category to reflect credit risks. In Korea, Tier II capital was 
composed of revaluation reserves, gains on securities valuation, general provisions for 
loan losses and subordinated term liabilities (Shim 2000: 108).
However, the standard for loan classification and provisions was much laxer in 
Korea, compared to that of the major OECD countries and even to some developing 
countries. The Korean authorities defined non-performing loans as loans that had been in 
arrears for six months or more, the Japanese standard, while the US standard definition 
was arrears of three months or more. In addition, bad loans were defined as the loans 
which were non-performing and not covered by collateral (much of which was in risky 
real estate assets).
The rules requiring provisions to be made against the value of securities holdings 
had a detrimental effect on the soundness of banks. Since 45% of unrealized profits were 
recognized as Tier II capital, the rules encouraged bank portfolio investment in listed 
stocks. Because the stock market in Korea performed badly after 1995, losses on 
investments increased. In this situation, the regulatory authorities relaxed regulations
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requiring provisions to cover unrealised losses resulting from the market value of 
securities deteriorating in 1995 (Board of Audit and Inspection 1998). The requirements 
for provisions to cover doubtful loans were brought down from 100 per cent to 75 per 
cent and for securities losses from 100 per cent to 30 per cent (Balino et al. 1999: 28).
The grace period until the full implementation was extended to the end ofl 998 for 
doubtful loans, and to the end of June 1999 for securities losses. This was to enable banks 
to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of more than 8%. Although official capital adequacy 
ratios of Korean banks remained over 10% in 1993 and 1994, if stricter rules had been 
applied, five out of six of the major deposit money banks would have failed to meet the 
minimum 8% ratio as at the end of 1993 (Shim 2000: 109).^^
The ‘Memorandum on Economic Program’ on July 24 1998, agreed between the 
IMF and Korean authorities, reveals that the Korean authorities had allowed some loan 
loss provisions in part of Tier II capital before the crisis. It also shows that capital 
adequacy requirements did not apply to the assets in trust accounts in deposit money 
banks.
The argument is that most Korean banks’ general provisions for loan losses 
related to their non-performing loans. The provisions for losses and doubtful loans and 
part of substandard loans were calculated as provisions created against an identified 
deterioration in the value of particular assets. The provisions for loan losses as provided 
by the Korean standard could not appropriately be regarded as supplementary capital if 
international standards were applied; therefore, if these provisions were excluded, the real 
adequacy ratios of Korean banks would have been substantially lower, not to mention if 
collateral was correctly valued (Shim 2000: 109).
The relevant part of the “Memorandum” was as follows:
“The ESC will issue an implementation plan by August 15 to bring Korea’s prudential 
regulations closer to international best practice as expressed in the Basle Committee’s Core 
Principles. Such a plan will cover ... Deduction from Tier 2 Capital o f  all provisions except 
those in respect o f  all assets classified as ‘normal’ and ‘precautionary’ ... All trust accounts
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4.5.2 Large Exposures
Apart from capital adequacy requirements, other regulations directly addressing 
banking prudence were also less rigorous than required by international standards. A 
representative example is the large exposure limit. This restricts large exposure to single 
borrowers or groups within a specified limit; it was first introduced at the end of 1994. If 
financial institutions were exposed too much to single borrowers or groups, the 
soundness of the institutions would come to rely on the viability or performance of such 
borrowers; limits over large exposures is thus one of the crucial prudential regulations. 
When exposure to such borrowers exceeded 15% of the equity capital of certain financial 
institutions, the authorities regarded the whole exposure as Targe exposure’, and the 
regulations required all such exposure not to exceed a certain aggregate limit. The 
aggregate limit was determined by the Monetary Management Board, which specified it 
to be 500% of the bank’s equity capital.
There had been similar regulations before that, such as single exposure and the 
‘basket system.’ However, because a single exposure limit applied only to single 
companies, the limit could not prevent financial institutions from becoming over-exposed 
to several companies owned by a chaebol. Although exposure to each company was
with guarantees will be regarded as on balance sheet for all supervisory and accounting purposes. 
For capital adequacy purposes, assets in such accounts will be weighted at 50 percent from 
January 1, 1999, and 100 percent from January 1, 2000. (Letter o f  Intent o f the Government of 
Korea, July 24, 1998).
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below the single exposure limit, the total exposure to several companies consisting of a 
chaebol could be excessive.
The regulation on large exposure was based on the ideas set out in the January 
1991 Basel paper on ‘measuring and controlling large exposure’. This policy took the 
form of strict limits in a number of countries, notably in the European Union (EU) 
through the “Large Exposures Directive” (Bank for International Settlements 1999: 26). 
The EU asked its member countries to reflect this directive in their legislation.
However, ‘exposure’ was narrowly defined in Korea (Office of Bank 
Supervision 1995: 23). Loans plus bank guarantees shown in balance sheets was the 
definition of exposure in Korea, whereas the definition of exposure in the EU was 
broader, including exposure to off-balance-sheet items, such as forward interest rate and 
currency contracts and swaps. A single group, according to the EU regulation, includes 
companies cooperating with each other, and subcontractor companies. Table 4.4 below 
compares the regulations on single and large exposure in Korea and some developed 
countries.
Moreover, certain forms of ‘exposure’ were not calculated as part of large 
exposure. Guarantees were not calculated as part of ‘exposure,’ when those guarantees 
had already been guaranteed by the government or other financial institutions, including 
not only other banks but also short-term finance or insurance companies. In addition, 
guarantees for opening Letters of Credit (L/C), offshore loans and borrowings from
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overseas branches of domestic banks were also excluded. This is also a clear case of 
strong influence by private interest over regulatory outcomes. These exceptions led to 
serious consequences during the crisis period.
Table 4.4 Regulations on Single and Large Exposure in some Developed Countries and
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* Percentage is against financial institution’s equity capital. 
Source: Office of Bank Supervision 1995: 20
At the meetings prior to the crisis, the Basel Core Principles Liaison Group, 
which consisted of the regulatory authorities of 14 emerging market countries, the 
Korean representatives took the position that the 25% exposure limit to single or related 
counterparties would disturb the economy and thus the specific limit should be
determined in the light of the particular situation in each country.24
This is based on the information given by the FSS in response to the ‘questions 
for Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)’, posed by Dr. Andrew Walter in September 
2000. In fact, the Core Principles did not specify the ratio of ‘large exposure’.
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In addition, the Monetary Management Board allowed a 5-year grace period to 
enable the banks to reduce excessively large exposures. This means that the large 
exposures limit was in fact never enforced before the crisis. In addition, if it proved 
difficult to reduce the exposure to within the limit due to the financial market situation, 
the Governor of the OBS was able to extend the grace period further. Furthermore, when 
banks exceeded the large exposure limit because they were required to comply with the 
industrial policy of the government (including M&A because of changes in exchange 
rates, or a reduction of paid-in capital in banks), they were able to request an exemption 
from the OBS Governor. The Governor could provide a 3-year grace period, while in 
other cases the grace period was 1 year (Office of Bank Supervision 1995: 28). In other 
words, the authorities had a lot of room for regulatory forbearance.
Furthermore, regulations on large exposures only applied to deposit money banks 
and foreign banks’ branches in Korea. Development banks were not subject to the 
General Banking Act. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the regulation, however, this 
regulation was made to apply to development banks in a somewhat different form, by 
order of the Finance Minister. The large exposure limit applied to the Korea 
Development Bank (KDB) and The Export-lmport Bank of Korea (Koex-im) were 
1500% and 1000% of equity, respectively, in view of their development function (Office 
of Bank Supervision 1995: 27; Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997a: 142). 
These limits were two to three-times larger than that of the DMBs. Given that those 
development banks largely supplied credits to the big corporations, such as the affiliates 
of chaebol, those lax limits can be argued to reflect strong industry pressure.
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4.5.3 Foreign Currency Exposure (1): foreign currency loans and short- term borrowing
Financial institutions intermediated foreign funds to domestic industrial firms. 
The major form of intermediation was by means of foreign currency loans. The loans 
were denominated in foreign currencies and had only been allowed for limited usage, 
such as facility investments before 1993 when the Kim Young-Sam government took 
office. The loans had a long-term maturity, say of three years or longer, though usually 
they were for over 5 years. Since direct borrowing of foreign funds by chaebol was 
limited, foreign currency loans from financial institutions in Korea were the major way 
for chaebol to raise funds for investment. From the Korean financial institutions’ 
perspective, on the other hand, the loans to the industrial firms represented the financial 
institutions’ assets.
There was substantial liberalization of the rules relating to borrowing and lending 
of foreign currencies during the Kim Young-Sam government period. In April 1993, just 
after the new President took office, the incumbent government relaxed the compulsory 
ratio of long-term foreign currency borrowings to foreign currency loans from 70% to 
50%. Following the relaxation in January 1994 of other regulations on the eligibility for 
the use of foreign currency borrowings, the demand for foreign funds jumped and this 
was met by short-term borrowing by the banks.
182
In June 1992, the Engineering Committee for the Relaxation of Financial 
Regulation in the Korean government indicated that it was very difficult to maintain the 
compulsory ratio of 70% in a situation where the government controlled the amount of 
long-term financing. The Committee therefore suggested a relaxation of the ratio. 
Following that suggestion, another committee, the Committee for Economic Regulatory 
Relaxation of 1993 decided to reduce it to 50%. Moreover, considering that another 
confidential BoK document in September 1996 stated, “in order to stem the increase in 
foreign currency loans their ratio to long term funds should be adhered to”, even the ratio 
of 50% appears not to have been strictly observed (International Department of the Bank 
of Korea 1996).
Teaching material for foreign exchange business staff, published by the Korea 
Exchange Bank (KEB), indicated that many foreign exchange business institutions 
financed their foreign currency requirements by borrowing with short-term redemption 
periods.^^
“A foreign currency loan usually has an over 5 years maturity. There are two sources for the loan: 
foreign currency funds deposited by the Bank o f Korea, and those raised by the Korea Exchange 
Bank (KEB) itself. The loans for which the source was financed by the KEB itself are called
Foreign Exchange Business Institutions mean financial institutions with a 
licence for foreign exchange business. In Korea, the business was strictly limited to the 
BoK and the Foreign Exchange Bank until the latter half of 1980s. After that, most 
deposit money banks were given foreign exchange business. The merchant banks 
originally got their licences when they were set up at their inception in the latter half of 
the 1970s, when the Korean government licensed merchant bank business for the first 
time in order to overcome a possible foreign currency crisis. Six merchant banks 
collaborating with foreign financial institutions were licensed between 1976 and 1979
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general foreign currency loans, while the others are called special foreign currency loans. The 
source o f general foreign currency loans should be long-term borrowing. However, if  a loan were 
financed by funds whose redemption period was long-term, it would not have been profitable 
though it may have had stability. Thus, source o f general foreign currency loans was short-term 
borrowing from international banks” (Training Department o f  Korea Exchange Bank 1995 #186: 
18).
The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) indicated that the lowering of the ratio 
in 1993 contributed to the rapid increase in short-term borrowings by foreign exchange 
business institutions. Between 1993 and 1996, short-term borrowings were US$ 51.8 
billion out of a total of US$ 79.6 billion of the aggregate foreign funds borrowed by 
domestic financial institutions during the period.
Both the short-term foreign borrowings required to fund foreign currency loans 
and the substantial liberalization of trade-related credits contributed to the increase in the 
country’s short-term foreign currency exposure. The Finance Ministry relaxed trade 
credits for imports and encouraged DMBs to buy foreign exchange bills from exporting 
firms.
International banks, rather than domestic banks, mainly supplied trade credits for 
imports, though overseas branches of Korean financial institutions supplied substantial 
amounts of trade credits to domestic firms. In order to facilitate the buying of foreign 
exchange bills by financial institutions from exporting firms, the Finance Ministry asked 
the BoK to deposit its foreign currency assets with domestic banks. In addition to the
(Ministry of Finance and Economy 1998a: 494).
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foreign currency deposits from the BoK, the domestic banks also borrowed short-term 
funds from international banks and increased the quantity of foreign exchange bills 
purchased from exporting firms.
Trade credits were liberalized throughout the 1990s. The International 
Department of the BoK argued in 1996 that “The vulnerability of a debt structure, where 
short-term liabilities represented 60% of total liabilities, resulted from the fact that banks 
were prohibited from procuring long-term foreign currency fimds, while the rules on 
trade credits for deferred payments relaxed.” It stated that “following the relaxation of the 
deferred period by a further 30 days at end-1995, an increase in trade credits with 
deferred payment was estimated to amount to US$ 5 billion during the first eight months 
of 1996” (International Department in the Bank of Korea 1996). A relaxation of the limits 
on trade credit was what the FKI had continuously demanded for the international 
competitiveness of Korean corporates (FKI 1992).
The relaxation of the regulations on trade credits therefore appears to have 
contributed to the deterioration in the balance of payments. From 1993, the eligible term- 
period for deferred payments was continuously getting longer, and thus the financial 
burden for imports was reduced from a firm’s point of view. Since the interest rate for the 
credits was low, e.g. Libor + 0.5% (6% per annum) in 1996, importers could profit from 
the gap between the interest rates for international and domestic financing.
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The scale of the trade credits was extraordinary.^^ In 1995, deferred payment 
inflows reached IIS$ 50.9 billion, which was almost 38% of total imports of US$ 135.1 
billion.^^ Outflows were US$ 47.7 billion in 1995. Due to the increase in the eligible 
term-period at the end of 1995, during the first three quarters of 1996, the inflows 
increased by 25.5% and the ratio to aggregate imports jumped to 42.1%. The amount of 
the inflows was expected to reach almost US$ 63.8 billion in 1996 (International 
Department of the Bank of Korea 1996). The increase in the deferred payment inflows 
led to an increase in foreign exchange bills issued by trading firms since the major part of 
the imports, financed by deferred payment, were goods used for exports.
With regard to the relaxation of trade-related credits, Nam Sang-Woo has 
commented that the policy-makers were not concerned with the increase in the credits 
since they were transaction-based capital flows; there was no significant effect on 
monetary growth in the long run.^  ^ At the National Assembly, Lee Kyu-Sung, the 
Finance Minister in 1989 stated, “Increased short-term borrowings of financial 
institutions are due to foreign currency management funds which are required for regular
This demonstrates the economy’s heavy dependence on trade, and the poor 
financial structure of Korean business. Moreover, the reduction of trade financing from 
the end of 1980s contributed to the dependence of Korean business on these trade credits 
during the 1990s.
The deferred payments scheme was introduced in January 1975. It had been 
strictly managed in order to serve foreign exchange and monetary policy objectives 
although the allowable term-period for the payment of goods had been flexibly 
coordinated according to the balance of payments position. However, during the 1990s, 
following foreign exchange and capital account liberalization, regulation governing the 
term-period had been continuously relaxed.
Based on an interview with Dr. Nam Sang-Woo, senior research fellow at the 
Korea Development Institute. He was the senior advisor to Deputy Premier for Economic 
Affairs during the first half of the 1980s and was involved in making many important
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international financing transactions. These short-term borrowings would not be a cause of 
monetary growth nor be used as funds like hot-money. In terms of external liabilities, the 
borrowings would accompany the same amount of increase in foreign currency assets.” 
(Minutes of the Committee of Finance at the National Assembly, 6**^ meeting in the 146^ *^  
Congress on May 23^  ^ 1989)
In fact. Table 4.5 shows that US$ 27 billion (3 months’ financing between 
January 1997 and March 1997) to US$ 55 billion (6 months’ financing between January 
1997 and June 1997) of funds of Korean banks were used for supporting current account 
transactions. The source of the funds was short-term borrowings from international banks.
policy decisions during the last two decades.
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Table 4.5 Trend o f Trade Related Financing, such as Foreign Exchange Bills, o f Foreign
Period Amount Period Amount
January 1997 8,670 January 1998 7,120
February 1997 7,903 February 1998 8,811
March 1997 9,779 March 1998 10,274
April 1997 10,505 April 1998 9,967
May 1997 10,632 May 1998 8,730







Source: Bank of Korea, Data for Members o f the Committee on Political Affairs at the 
National Assembly, the 198^ Congress on October 1998.
4.5.4 Foreign Currency Exposure (2): offshore and overseas fnancing^^
Another regulatory policy, which brought about the increase in the magnitude of 
external liabilities in the DMBs, was the regulatory forbearance given to offshore 
banking and overseas financing. In addition to the fact that this was what the private 
sector strongly demanded, the government believed that offshore banking and overseas 
branch operation did not affect domestic macroeconomic indicators, such as monetary 
growth and exchange rates. The BAI report on the crisis clearly indicated this as follows:
“Offshore banking and financial institutions’ overseas branch operation were not appropriately 
supervised by the authorities since they did not affect domestic macroeconomic indicators, such 
as monetary growth, and exchange rates. However, offshore/ overseas branch borrowing was
29 Overseas financing refers to foreign currency financing by firms’ overseas 
branches. The amount of fimding had not been the subject of regulation since 1994. The
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part o f  the country’s external liabilities, and thus pressure from international banks to demand 
repayment o f the borrowing was applied as the country’s external credibility decreased. ( .. .)  For
foreign creditors, overseas branch operations were no different from those o f Korean banks 
operating in Korea since foreign currency assets o f overseas branches were closely linked with 
overseas Korean companies. As external credibility o f Korean financial institutions was 
downgraded,/jres'j'Mre for repayment by not only main offices but also overseas subsidiaries 
came from international investors at the same time” {emphasis added) (Board o f Audit and 
Inspection 1998).
As prescribed in the Foreign Exchange Management Act, offshore banking was 
where foreign exchange business institutions borrowed foreign currency funds from 
“non-residents” and managed them for “non-residents.” It was divided into two 
categories in the statistics of external liabilities; offshore banking by the main offices and 
offshore banking by the overseas branches of Korean banks. In the analysis of external 
liabilities, the former was categorised as offshore banking debt, while the latter was 
overseas branch debt. Offshore borrowing had not been included as part of external 
liabilities according to the debt compilation of the World Bank and the Korean authorities 
also adopted this way of categorization until just before the late 1997 crisis.
Offshore banking by the main offices of the banks started in January 1988. It was 
accounted for separately; offshore banking was only shown in accounts for offshore 
operations and separated from the onshore accounts.^® Businesses allowed to conduct
authorities however limited the scale of guarantees by the main offices in Korea.
This is the same system as that adopted by the US, Japan and Singapore. There 
are two other types of offshore banking. One is an integrated system of onshore and 
offshore accounts. All financial transactions are freely conducted, without any limitation.
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offshore banking were restricted. Offshore banking business was getting bigger due to 
some regulatory relaxation over tax and operations, though the scope of such business 
was limited to traditional commercial banking businesses such as deposits and loans, plus 
issuing and purchasing foreign currency securities. Moreover, offshore banking by the 
DMBs was not subject to this compulsory ratio regulation. This was to give Korean 
banks the same opportunity as foreign banks of managing assets, according to Lee Kyu- 
Sung, the Finance Minister in 1989 (Minutes of the Committee of Finance at the National 
Assembly, the 3*^  ^meeting in the 147^ Congress on October 19 1989).
Since 1988, the amount of offshore borrowing has increased. As of the end of 
1995, offshore assets in the main offices of Korean financial institutions amounted to
16.1 % of the total foreign currency assets of Korean financial institutions in Korea 
(Table 4.6). The ratio of offshore assets among the total foreign currency assets rapidly 
increased (Chart 4.6).
Table 4.6 Offshore Banking Transactions in Main Offices (As o f end-period)
(US$ Billion)
1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Offshore foreign currency 0.0 3.1 5.4 7.2 10.1 16.9 26.3
assets (A) ( - ) (135.1) (37.4) (33.4) (40.9) (67.6) (55.6)
Total foreign currency 27.9 39.0 51.1 58.4 75.6 104.8 n.a.
assets (B) <6.2> <7.1> <9.5> <14.3> <29.5> <38.6>
Component ratio (A/b, %) - 7.9 10.5 12.2 13.3 16.1 n.a.
( ): Incremental ratio compared to that in the same period of the last year 
< >: Constituent percentage.
Source: (Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997b: 171)
There are no restrictions on the type of financed transactions being conducted. This is the 
system adopted by the UK and Hong Kong. Another is a tax-haven system; transactions 
are initiated in some main international financial markets, but accounting is dealt with in 
tax-haven areas such as Bahama, Cayman Islands.
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Chart 4.6 Change in Offshore Banking Transactions in Main Offices (Incremental Ratio 
o f Offshore Foreign Exchange(FX) Assets and Total FX Assets Compared) (%)
160  1 
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Source: Presidential Committee for Financial Reform (1997b: 171)
As for overseas affiliates’ local financing, the limit on the amount of such 
financing by corporates was repealed on February 24 1994. In testimony before the 
Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Exchange Crisis in the National 
Assembly in January 1999, the Assistant Minister for Finance and Economy, Um Nak- 
Yong stated that the relaxation of the rules on offshore banking was not related to the 
country’s entry into OECD, nor was there any pressure from the US. Liberalization of 
offshore financing for financial institutions and local financing for industrial firms was 
allowed because of the demand from within Korea.^' Beneficiaries of such regulatory 
relaxation were overseas construction companies (in many cases, general trading 
companies having licences for construction and trading, such as Daewoo Corporation, 
Samsung Corporation), foreign direct investors (such as chaeboTs general trading
31 Testimony of Um Nak-Yong before the Special Investigation Committee on the 
Foreign Exchange Crisis in the National Assembly, 11/^  meeting held in January 1999.
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companies), and vessel transportation companies, most of them being affiliates of 
chaebol.
Table 4.7 Outstanding Balance o f Overseas Local Funding by Non-Financial Companies 














Outstanding balance 24.4 32.5 33.8 46.2 53.2 46.8
(By 30 biggest chaebol) n.a. 28.1 n.a. 39.1 45.0 39.1
Trading 12.1 16.2 16.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Construction 3.4 3.7 3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Overseas
Investment
4.0 5.5 6.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Others 5.0 7.1 7.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guarantees of Main 
Offices in Korea
16.9 24.0 24.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Derived from Ministry of Finance and 
Finance and Economy (1996: 78).
Economy (1998b: 272), Ministry of
As Table 4.7 shows, the amount of such financing was enormous. Borrowing of 
foreign funds was not only the province of the overseas branches of Korean banks and 
the offshore banking of Korean banks’ main offices in Seoul but also of Korean overseas 
affiliates of foreign banks. Borrowings were made on a secured and unsecured basis.
When the Daewoo group filed for court protection, the group’s foreign currency 
liabilities had reached US$ 9.9 billion as at the end of June 1999. Of this total, US$ 7.6 
was financed through overseas local financing; 62% of this had a maturity of less than 6 
months (Financial Supervisory Commission 1999) (Tables 4.8 and 4.9). As at the end of
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1996, the amount of overseas local financing by the Daewoo group was said to be close 
to US$ 10 billion ”
Table 4.8 Maturity of Daewoo’s Foreign Currency Debts (end of period, US$ billion)







3.27 3.34 3.20 3.10
Overseas registered 
affiliates
6.35 5.89 6.34 6.84




Overseas branches 0.97 1.87 0.86 0.80
Overseas registered 
affiliates
6.35 5.89 6.34 6.84
Total 7.32 7.76 7.20 7.64
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission (1999) Dae-ugeulub-ui gujojojeong 
chujinsanghwangkkg [Situation of Thrust in Restructuring Daewoo Group] August 11 
1999. pl4.
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Jin Young-Wook, then Director for International Finance in the Finance Ministry, 
stated in his testimony before the National Assembly:
“There was no appropriate regulatory measure governing overseas operations between non­
residents and non-residents. It was difficult to make new prudential regulation at that time 
when fervour o f deregulation was so strong. In addition, it was difficult to distinguish 
prudential regulation from regulation restricting competition. Because people who examined 
the efficacy o f regulations were not those with special expertise on finance, but entrepreneurs 
or officials in secretariats o f  the Premier’s office, it was an uphill task to try and impose new  
regulations.”^^
Interview with Lee Dong-Won in December 2001. Mr Lee was responsible for 
an organization called the ‘British Finance Centre’ of the Daewoo group, which managed 
secret accounts. Kim Woo-Joong, the chancellor of the group controlled Daewoo and 
initiated a so-called ‘Global Management’ of Daewoo by controlling the secret accounts 
on his own. The major source of capital flows into those accounts was overseas financing 
of overseas registered affiliates. See Kim (2000).
Testimony of Jin Young-Wook before the Special Investigation Committee on
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Table 4.9 Structure o f  the Maturity o f  Daewoo s Foreign Currency Debts
By end-1999 
(less than 6 months)
After 2000 
(more than 6 months)
Total






Total 5.48 4.46 9.94
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission (1999) Dae-ugeulub-ui gujojojeong 
chujinsanghwangkkg [Situation of Thrust in Restructuring Daewoo Group] August 11 
1999. pl4.
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4,6 Use o f  International Reserves o f the BoK as Implicit Guarantees for  
Korean Banks
Insofar as the liabilities of banks and other borrowers are denominated in foreign 
currency (as they are in many emerging markets), this has limited the ability to undertake 
the lender-of-last-resort operations necessary for those debtors to make good on their 
obligations.^"  ^In this regard, foreign exchange reserves should be regarded as a means of 
financing lender-of-last-resort operations in emerging economies. Prior to the crisis, 
however, the Finance Ministry used the BoK’s foreign currency assets, which were 
previously part of the country’s international reserves to support the private sector.
the Foreign Currency Crisis in the National Assembly, 17**^ meeting of the 200 "^ Congress 
on 3"^  ^February 1999.




Foreign currency reserves are “the stock of official assets denominated in foreign 
currencies, held primarily to make foreign payments without the need to sell domestic 
currency in the market -  for example, to enable the authorities to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets, either to counter disorderly conditions or to support their currency in a 
more systematic way while other policies are taking effect” (Newman, Milgate, and 
Eatwell 1992b: 161).
Foreign currency reserves management policy prior to the crisis, however, 
explicitly fostered moral hazard in deposit money banks. On the surface, as it is in other 
countries, the responsibility for management of the reserves appeared to lie with the 
cental bank, in this case, the BoK. The BoK managed its foreign currency assets in two 
ways; one was just in the ordinary way that most central banks managed their 
international reserves. But another was quite unique, i.e. some of the foreign currency 
assets of the BoK were deposited with domestic commercial and development banks.
This started from the end of the 1980s. The deposits were used by the banks as a major 
source of their funding for foreign currency loans to businesses. There were two types of 
foreign currency deposits made by the BoK with Korean banks. Type A deposits were 
calculated as part of official reserves but Type B deposits were not so included. Type A 
deposits were with the overseas branches of domestic banks, while Type B deposits were 
with domestic branches of domestic banks. Until the end of October 1997, the amount of 
Type A deposits was around $ 8 billion, while Type B deposits were over $ 30 billion.
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What should be noted is not only the way the BoK’s foreign currency assets were 
used but also the total amount of the deposits, which was almost the same as the amount 
of the official foreign exchange reserves of Korea as at the end of 1996, i.e., over US$ 30 
billion. If these foreign currency assets of the BoK had not been deposited with domestic 
banks, the amount of usable official international reserves in Korea would have been over 
US$ 60 billion as at the end of 1996.
As for the use of such foreign currency assets, there had been a dispute between 
the Finance Ministry and the BoK but the view of the Ministry, with its orientation of 
growth, prevailed. The deposit of foreign currency assets of the BoK with domestic banks 
can be regarded as evidence that the authorities were in effect guaranteeing the viability 
of the foreign exchange business of the domestic banks. Normally, crisis management 
measures, such as the provision of funds as a LLR should be conducted in such a way as 
to restrain moral hazard. In reality quite the contrary occurred in Korea.
The BoK explained that the deposit of public foreign currency assets with 
domestic banks was introduced to promote the internationalisation of financial 
institutions, to expedite facility investment by industrial firms and to discourage an 
increase in foreign debt (Bank of Korea, 1999). The assets were shown as an internal 
account in the BoK’s balance sheet and accordingly were not included as part of the 
official foreign currency reserves of the BoK. It is unlikely that foreign investors were 
informed of this, but this prompted the Korean banks to take more risks in their foreign 
currency asset management than would otherwise have been the case. In addition, this
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use of Korea’s foreign currency assets made foreign investors confused as to the exact 
amount of Korea’s available foreign currency reserves and thus contributed to the run by 
foreign investors.
This use of public foreign currency assets of the BoK is thus one of most striking 
aspects in explaining the crisis, but the literature on the crisis pays hardly any attention to 
it. The use of the assets also reveals how far the Finance Ministry dominated the other 
regulatory authorities. Only a few works (e.g. Adams 1998; Balino 1999), written by 
some IMF researchers who were involved in the IMF’s dealings with the Korean crisis, 
mention this, but even they do not notice its significance. Moreover, even in those works, 
this issue is examined only as an information flow problem, not in relation to other 
crucial issues, such as the government giving implicit guarantees in the context of the 
developmental state.
In most countries, the public foreign currency assets of central banks are the 
official foreign exchange reserves. These assets enable the authorities to intervene in 
foreign exchange markets, either to counter disorderly conditions or to support their 
currency in a crisis situation. From the perspective of prudential regulation/ supervision, 
the assets should be available to support the LLR function of the central bank. In Korea, 
however, almost half of the public foreign currency assets of the BoK were deposited 
with domestic banks and thus could not be used in the crisis period since the banks could 
not repay the foreign currency deposited with them by the BoK.
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This is a unique case, which has not occurred in other countries. In terms of 
achieving the highest possible return, managers of the foreign currency reserves of some 
countries such as Japan have deposited the reserves with domestic banks, but there has 
not been any reported case other than that of Korea where the reserves were no longer 
liquid and accordingly could not be used in a crisis period.
The IMF's Description o f the Use o f Public Foreign Currency Assets
A member of IMF staff briefly describes such a characteristic use of foreign 
currency assets under the title ‘the liquidity of measured reserves and usable reserves’ in 
an IMF survey on international capital markets (Adams 1998: 20). As regards Type A 
deposits, the relevant section of the IMF article describes them in detail as follows:
“As the crisis in Korea unfolded, official reserves o f the Bank o f  Korea fell from a reported $31 
billion at end-October 1997 to $ 24 billion by early December. “Usable” reserves, however, were 
reported to be some $6 billion. This discrepancy between measured and usable reserves arose as a 
result o fforeign currency deposits placed by the Bank o f Korea with foreign branches of  
domestic banks that became illiquid. That is in light o f  the liquidity pressures faced by these 
institutions, these deposits could not be withdrawn. The practice o f  the Bank o f  Korea placing 
deposits with foreign branches o f domestic banks was begun in the late 1980s with the purpose o f  
encouraging globalization o f domestic banks, and their offshore branches used these deposits to 
fund loans primarily to Korean entities, both off- and onshore. The practice remained relatively 
small, with some 10 percent o f official reserves placed in such deposits, and by end-1996 
amounted to $ 3.5 billion. However, in January 1997, as the overseas blanches o f Korean banks 
suffered liquidity problems in the wake o f the Hanbo affair, the Bank o f  Korea extended liquidity
Interviews with some staff members in the department in charge of the 
management of the international reserves in Bank of Korea., August 2000.
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support to them, and by the end o f  March the amount o f such deposits had grown to $ 8 billion. 
Finally as pressures grew in November, by early December such deposits had risen to above $ 10 
billion.” (Adams 1998: 20)
The description of Type B deposits in the IMF article, however, is somewhat 
insufficient, as follows:
“In addition to measured official reserves o f $ 30 billion prior to the crisis, the Bank o f  Korea had 
deposits o f $ 30 billion with banks onshore. As the BoK sought to draw on these deposits, it 
discovered that these deposits too could not be accessed as they had either been on lent to Korean 
corporate or invested in -  primarily emerging market -  assets that the commercial banks were 
either unable or unwilling to liquidate in prevailing market conàiiions.”(emphasis added) (Adams 
1998:20)
Detail of Type B Deposits
Some confidential BoK documents, submitted to the National Assembly in the
wake of the crisis, detail the use of Type B deposits. According to those documents. Type
B deposits were made for particular objectives, mainly to support exports and investment
by corporations. Of the US$ 33.8 billion Type B deposits at the end of July 1996, US$12
billion went to deposit money banks to enable them to buy foreign exchange bills from
exporting firms. US$ 8.9 billion went to deposit money banks as well as development
banks to enable them to make loans to finance imports by corporations. US$ 8.2 billion
went to development banks to enable repayment of their foreign debts. In addition to
these three major uses of Type B deposits, another US$ 4.7 billion was used for various
purposes: early repayment of foreign debts by deposit money banks (US $ 3.2 billion).
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overseas portfolio investments for mainly development banks (US$ 1.0 billion), factory 
automation of SMEs’ (US$ 0.2 billion) and for financing merchant banks through deposit 
money banks (US$ 0.3 billion) (International Department of the Bank of Korea 1996b).
In most cases, the authorities specified not only the use of the deposits, but also 
the interest rates if the deposits funded foreign currency loans to industrial firms. The 
BoK, in accordance with the policy of the Finance Ministry, deposited its foreign 
currency assets at lower interest rates than Libor. Financial institutions did not bid for 
deposits from the BoK by offering higher interest rates. Moreover, rollover of the 
deposits was the norm, rather than the exception, until the beginning of 1997, although 
the deposits were basically made on a short-term basis, e.g. for 6 months. Interest rates on 
the deposits that the banks had to pay to the BoK were around Libor or less.
In return, the authorities required the banks to charge interest at rates within 
Libor plus 0.5 % - 1.0 % on foreign currency loans (Type B deposits). If the lending had 
been funded from the banks own resources, they would charge the borrower Libor plus 
0.5 -  1.5% (Bank of Korea 1995a). As regards Type B deposits, banks did not take 
serious responsibility for the viability of borrowers although the banks would eventually 
be responsible for the credit risks related to the loans. Furthermore, the reliance by 
Korean banks on the availability of the BoK assets at low interest rates for repaying their 
external debts on which high interest rates were payable, may have inevitably led to 
moral hazard in the banks’ foreign exchange operations.
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From the perspective of the Finance Ministry, the making of Type B deposits 
was a good source of power and leverage over the banks to ensure that they fulfilled the 
authority’s policy. Thus, at least up to the mid-1990s. Type B deposits appeared to be a 
kind of win-win game for all parties in Korea, i.e., the government, banks and 
corporations. But after mid-1996, when the Korean balance of payments moved into the 
red, the authorities felt the need to increase the level of the country’s official reserves. 
Table 4.10 shows that the amount of Type B deposits was exceeding US$ 33 billion at 
the end of 1995. Table 4.11 implies that the rapid increase in foreign currency loans by 
the DMBs to corporates was ignited by such BoK deposits.
Table 4.10 BoK’s Foreign Currency Deposits with Domestic Banks
(US$ Billion)
Classification 92.12 93.12 94.12 95.12 96.12 97.12
Public foreign currency assets 36.8 45.8 55.7 66.2 65.4 60.3
*1 \Type B deposits 19.6 25.5 30.0 33.5 32.2 39.9
Official FX reserves 17.2 20.3 25.7 32.7 33.2 20.4
Type A deposits 2.8 2.3 3.3 3.3 3.8 11.5
Usable reserves 15.4 18.0 22.4 29.4 29.4 8.9
*1) Type B deposits; BoK’s foreign currency assets deposited with domestic banks onshore. This was not 
calculated as a part o f international reserves o f the BoK.
*2) Type A deposits: BoK’s foreign currency assets deposited with domestic banks’ overseas branches or 
subsidiaries
*3) Usable reserves: Official FX reserves minus deposits in overseas branches o f  domestic banks (Type A 
deposits).
Source: Derived from Board o f Audit and Inspection (1998)
Table 4.11 Outstanding Balance o f Foreign Currency Loans (as at end-period)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Outstanding Balance 16.3 19.8 19.5 19.4 23.3 29.1 33.5
Based on the BoK’s foreign 
currency assets
9.6 11.2 10.2 9.8 12.9 12.8 11.6
Source: Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997a): 171.
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Conflict between the MoFE and the BoK on the Use o f  Public Foreign Currency Assets
The BoK managed public foreign currency assets, which were mainly obtained
by intervention in the country’s foreign exchange market. However, in accordance with 
Clause No. 2-66 in the Foreign Exchange Management Ordinance (regulation on foreign 
currency funding and the use of the proceeds), the Finance Ministry exercised its 
supervisory authority over this area. The ordinance reads, “The finance minister can 
regulate funding, investment of the proceeds, amount, qualifications to be required for the 
funding of foreign exchange banks, and others, if needed.” As the BoK was regarded as 
one of the foreign exchange banks and subject to the above regulation, according to an 
additional clause of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, the BoK therefore managed 
its public foreign currency assets in accordance with the policy of the Finance Ministry.
On the basis of the above regulation, at the beginning of each year the Finance 
Ministry established a yearly plan for the use of the public foreign currency assets of the 
BoK and decided “how much” and “for what purpose” the assets should be deposited 
with domestic banks. The Finance Ministry also decided the ways in which the BoK 
should manage the assets, the amount for each particular use and the interest rates, and 
the BoK had to comply.
It was argued that Type B deposits were used for maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. Dr Oum, then senior counsellor to the Finance Minister in 1994, mentioned that 
“(in order to limit capital inflows) we urge domestic companies, instead of bringing in 
additional capital from abroad, to utilize foreign currency loans provided out of the 
foreign assets of domestic banks and, even out o f the foreign reserves held by the Bank o f
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Korea .''(Emphasis added) (Dombusch et al. 1995: 479) However, such deposits reflected 
business interest and resulted in macroeconomic instability nonetheless.
Source o f  Public Foreign Currency Assets
Public foreign currency assets came from the BoK’s intervention in the foreign
exchange market. When the supply of foreign currencies exceeded demand, the central 
bank would buy foreign currencies in the foreign exchange markets, if it wished to 
restrain appreciation in the value of its own currency. The consequence was monetary 
growth in the Korean economy. The BoK could then issue monetary stability bonds in the 
capital market to stem such monetary growth but the ability to issue the bonds would be 
limited because of the burden of interest on such bonds. Since Korea had recorded 
surpluses in its balance of payments from the latter half of the 1980s to mid-1996, there 
had been strong pressure either for monetary growth (when the BoK would intervene) or 
for the won to appreciate.
The surpluses in the balance of payments derived from trade account surpluses 
between 1986 and 1989 and capital account surpluses exceeded trade account deficits 
during the 1990s. After the Korean stock market opened to foreign investors in a limited 
way after 1992, the amount of foreign capital inflows caused monetary concern to the 
Korean government. The response of the government was the use of the international 
reserves of the BoK which it deposited with domestic banks. These deposits were used to 
fund foreign currency loans by Korean banks to businesses in such a way as not to cause 
any monetary growth, e.g. for payment for imports of foreign capital goods. As a 
consequence, the authorities believed that such use of foreign currency assets could
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restrain increases in external liabilities and monetary growth. However, this was only 
viable while Korea’s balance of payments remained in surplus.
As at the end of 1996, the level of public foreign currency assets was over US$
65 billion and half of those assets had been deposited with the main offices of Korean 
banks. If the assets had been kept by the BoK, thus enabling the BoK to maintain its 
international reserves at the level of US$ 65 billion as at the end of 1996, the situation at 
the end of 1997 might have been different. The confidence of foreign creditors might not 
have been adversely affected during the period and the roll-over ratio for short-term 
borrowing might have been much higher than it was. Among groups of financial 
institutions, domestic DMBs were the main beneficiary of the BoK’s deposits in foreign 
currency. Non-bank financial institutions received almost none of the assets being 
distributed. In spite of the magnitude of the foreign currency assets and the distribution of 
such assets not being replicated in other countries, the BoK’s policy of making deposits 
in domestic banks has not been fully investigated until now.
1992 93 94 95 96 97.1-10
Balance of net inflows'^ 2.1 7.8 9.7 12.0 16.5 17.2
<0.7> <2.3> <2.5> <2.6> <3.4> <n.a>
Ratio of total equity ownership 
limits for foreigners (Ceiling, %)
10 10 12 15 20 23
* End o f Period
1) US$ billion, < > is outstanding balance/GDP
2) Ceiling refers to the ratio o f  total equities in each company, within which foreign investors could 
buy; End o f period
Source: Oh, H-I 1997.
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Between 1992 and 1996, US$ 48.1 billion worth of foreign portfolio investment 
flowed into the Korean stock market (Table 4.12). During the same time, the amount of 
increase in foreign currency assets of the BoK was US$ 28.64 billion: the increase in 
international reserves was US$ 14.0 billion and the increase in Type B deposits was US$
14.6 billion.
Explanation o f  the Deposit o f  Public Foreign Currency Assets with Domestic Banks
The reason why public foreign currency assets were deposited with domestic
banks resulted from the regulatory institutional structure: the subordination of the BoK to
the Finance Ministry and the growing influence of the private sector. After 1995, the BoK
argued that public foreign currency assets, obtained from the foreign exchange markets,
should be added to the official international reserves. However, in accordance with the
Finance Ministry’s policy, more of the assets were used to fund Type B deposits. When
the capital flows started to reverse, increases in Type B deposits stopped. Although the
BoK wanted to withdraw some of the Type B deposits in order to increase the level of
official reserves, this was difficult since the banks in which the deposits had been made
would have had great difficulty in obtaining funding elsewhere.
Banks, such as development banks and some of the DMBs, which were in a 
relatively better position, were asked to repay some Type B deposits to the BoK from the 
latter half of 1996. Between January and October1997, a net value of US$ 2.5 billion was 
repaid. US$ 7.77 billion was calculated to have been returned to the BoK, mainly by 
development banks. This led to mixed policy effects for foreign investors. During the 
first half of 1997, official international reserves increased, thus making foreign investors
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more comfortable. They fell in the second half of 1997 along with Type A deposits, 
confusing foreigners and increasing their worries about the exact level of official reserves.
In sum, the Type B deposits and some Type A deposits meant that the Finance 
Ministry de facto gave explicit guarantees to Korean banks on their foreign exchange 
business, encouraging the moral hazard of those banks. The significance of the deposits, 
in particular the Type B deposits, was not fully disclosed to foreign investors. However, 
this certainly caused uncertainty as to the level of official reserves and therefore 
contributed to the panic of foreign investors. Because financial institutions have close 
links to each other, the financial distress of some can spread contagiously to others and 
potentially endanger the entire system. If banks’ creditors are less than fully informed 
about the quality of their loans, a run on one bank may be taken as a signal of potential 
problems elsewhere in the system.
Table 4.13 Change in the Amount o f Type B Deposits in the Wake o f the Crisis
(US$ Billion)
1997 1998 1999 July 2000 Sep. 2002
Outstanding
Balance
39.88 24.38 17.47 11.32 0.8
Change (repayment) A7.7* 15.5 6.91 6.15 10.5
* A means that the deposits had increased over the previous year.
Source: Bank of Korea, Data requested by the Committee for Finance and Economy in 
the National Assembly, Korea. October 2000.
In the wake of the crisis, Korea is said to have recovered quickly from the crisis. 
The rapid increase in the level of its international reserves has been a major sign of 
recovery (e.g. Rodrik 2000). However, the rapid increase in international reserves, such 
as from US$ 8.9 billion as at the end of 1997 to US$ 116.7 as at 15 October 2002, largely
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originated from the repayment of the Type A and B deposits to the BoK. At the end of 
1997, Type B deposits were US$ 39.88 billion (See Table 4.13). Deposits with Korean 
banks were US$ 53 billion in total.^  ^The remaining deposits at the end of September 
2002 were less than US$ 1 billion (BoK 2002b: 22). This means that US $ 52 billion 
deposits were repaid to the BoK during the five years following the crisis. Moreover, 
unlike an ordinary increase in reserves, the increase absorbed monetary growth, rather 
than increasing it.^  ^As the literature on the crisis missed the significance of the Type B 
deposits in explaining the crisis, the literature on the recovery from the crisis has not fully 
understood this significant aspect of the deposits.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the lax prudential regulatory policy prior to the 
crisis from the perspective of the strong influence of the private sector. The question of 
how various areas of prudential supervision including key prudential measures, i.e. 
capital adequacy reqirements and rules on large exposures and foreign currency 
exposures, were distorted in favour of special interests was examined.
This chapter has revealed a unique relationship between the Finance Ministry- 
BoK-financial sector regarding the use of the foreign currency assets of the BoK, which 
has not arisen in other countries. Such a relationship was certainly a reflection of the
Interview with Cho Moon-Ki, Deputy general director for International 
Department, the BoK, 12 November 2002.
37 Interview with Chung Tae-Yon, Deputy Director for Monetary Policy, the BoK,
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country’s close govemment-burearcracy-industry {chaebol) relations. In the name of the 
efficient use of international reserves and preventing further increases in external 
liabilities, the Finance Ministry asked the BoK to deposit its foreign currency assets with 
domestic banks. The policy-makers argued that the banks would be able to use such 
foreign currency assets in order to lend foreign currency-denominated loans to industrial 
firms without further borrowing in international capital markets. In addition to causing 
monetary growth, it encouraged risky behaviour by banks in particular with regard to 
their foreign exchange business. Accordingly, this characteristic use of the central bank’s 
foreign currency assets gave birth to various problems - encouraging moral hazard of 
domestic financial institutions, monetary growth, confusion by foreign investors about 
the level of international reserves of the BoK, and the loss of usable international reserves 
for the Korean authorities.
Such a moral hazard problem, resulting from these solid govemment- 
bureaucracy-industry relations, led to a financial crisis for proper prudential measures 
were not initiated. This chapter has shown that regulatory forbearance was pervasive 
because the political influence of the private sector was strong.
on 13 November 2002.
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Chapter 5 Regulatory Policy and Deposit Money Banks
5,1 Introduction
Explaining the regulatory policy applied to deposit money banks (“DMBs”) is 
particularly interesting because DMBs were the only financial sector which was 
supervised by the Monetary Management Board of the Bank of Korea (“BoK”) with strict 
stabilization objectives. To what extent did such objectives endure? If such objectives 
were distorted in the introduction and enforcement of the regulatory process, how was 
such distortion related to the then growing private influence and the regulatory 
centralization?
Although they were still lax by international standards, relatively strict prudential 
regulatory measures such as BIS (Bank of International Settlement) capital adequacy 
requirements were imposed on DMBs; while did not apply to other financial sectors, i.e. 
development and merchant banks.* In addition, another key prudential measure, the limits 
to large exposures of 500 % of each bank’s equity capital, was introduced in 1995. But 
the limits imposed upon development banks were much lax, being 1500% (for the Korean 
Development Bank) and 1000 % (for the Export-Import Bank of Korea). There were no
* In accordance with the 1991 revision of the General Banking Act, the Office of 
Bank Supervision (“CBS”) introduced in July 1992 the BIS capital adequacy 
requirements as one of their “management guidance” standards. Such requirements were 
not imposed on development banks or on merchant banks. However, this was a regulation, 
its status among regulations was the lowest, being subordinated to Act and Ordinance.
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such limits applied to merchant banks though there was a single exposure limit regulation 
which was 25% of each merchant bank’s equity capital.^
On the surface, therefore, one might think that the application of such relatively 
strict regulations to DMBs by the BoK seems inconsistent with the argument in this thesis 
for regulatory failure in Korea, i.e. regulatory capture by private interest and regulatory 
centralization. If so, was the regulatory outcomes to deposit money banking sector 
consistent with the strong state argument that the government policy was autonomous of 
private interest? This chapter argues, however, that the regulatory policy applied to the 
DMBs is consistent with the argument of this thesis, i.e. regulatory capture by private 
interests being facilitated by the regulatory centralization or, to put it another way, the 
subordination of the BoK and the OBS to the Finance Ministry.
The chapter consists of six sections. Section 5.2 describes the change in 
govemment-DMBs-industry relations with regard to ownership and governance of the 
DMBs and the control of credits by the DMBs to chaeboL Section 5.3 focuses on the fact 
that the regulatory policy imposed on the DMBs was complicated due to the growing 
influence of the private sector. Although the BoK, with substantial supervisory authority, 
had adopted monetary targetting in its operation of monetary and credit policy and had 
conducted a relatively strict regulatory policy, the authority of the BoK was limited to the
 ^As mentioned in Chapter 4, if financial institutions were exposed too much to 
single borrowers or groups (whose individual borrowings were below the single exposure 
limit), the soundness of the institutions would come to rely on the viability or 
performance of such borrowers; in this regard, the large exposure limit, which restricts 
the aggregate exposure to a group of single borrowers, is distinguished from single
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banking accounts of the DMBs only.^ As the Finance Ministry allowed the DMBs to do 
trust account business which was subject to relatively lax regulation by the Finance 
Ministry, the size of the trust accounts business of the DMBs increased to almost the 
same level as that of bank accounts. The tmst accounts of the DMBs were a major source 
of corporate finance because the banks managed the assets in the account largely by 
buying securities, such as commercial paper (CP) and equities in listed companies.
Section 5.4 examines the external and internal explanatory factors which 
increased the vulnerability of the DMBs against systemic risks. As regards external 
factors, the depressed stock market in Tokyo deteriorated the ratio of capital adequacy 
requirements of Japanese banks which had to accumulate provisions for the unrealized 
capital losses due to a drop in the price of the securities they held. Thus, Japanese banks 
have reduced their exposure to Asian banks, including Korean DMBs in particular, every 
quarter since the end of March 1997, thus decreasing the roll-over ratios of short-term 
liabilities in the Korean DMBs. Also, overseas regulatory authorities in Hong Kong and 
Tokyo consolidated their regulatory supervision of liquidity in the overseas branches of 
Korean financial institutions. Accordingly, the main offices of the Korean DMBs had to 
supply long-term foreign currency assets to their overseas branches. As regards internal 
factors, regulatory liberalization such as a relaxation in entry barriers to non-bank 
financial institutions as well as the DMBs in the 1980s and 1990s led to over-competition
exposure limits and is a key prudential measure.
 ^M2 as the monetary aggregate had been the core monetary index for that 
targetting; customers’ savings and time and demand deposits with DMBs were the major 
components of M2.
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among financial institutions, thus decreasing the value of the licence to conduct banking 
business.
Section 5.5 investigates the BoK’s foreign currency assets which were deposited 
with the DMBs. hi particular, the questions of “how did the deposits foster the moral 
hazard problem of the banks?” and “how was the lender of the last resort function of the 
central bank distorted from its original raison d ’etre?'\ are raised and addressed. Section
5.6 describes two rounds of banking crises which occurred in Korea in 1997 before the 
foreign exchange crisis at the end of that year and the crisis management policy of the 
government. During the crisis periods, conflicts among the regulatory authorities, in 
particular between top officials in the Finance Ministry and the BoK, suggested that the 
state was far from strong. Section 5.7 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Change in Government-Bank-Chaebol Relations and Regulatory 
Relaxation
When the DMBs were privatised in the 1950s, the banks were controlled by a few 
chaebol. After 1960, the voting rights of the shares of the banks were forced to be handed 
over to the government “in order to nationalize corruptively accumulated wealth” (the 
Provisional Act on Financial Institutions of 1961). The influence of the government over 
financial institutions was therefore substantially strengthened; as a consequence of the 
transfer of voting rights along with other measures, including the revision of the Bank of
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Korea Act, the financial system in Korea changed into a growth-oriented one to support 
the government’s plan for economic growth. The DMBs came to focus on their public 
functions rather than on their own profitability.
As for the role of the banks in Korea, Joseph Stiglitz puts it as follows:
A number o f East Asian governments played a large role both in helping create financial 
institutions and in maintaining their capacity to lend. Historically, financial institutions in most 
countries have lent largely for trade credit and collateralised real estate. Development lending 
(long-term investment lending) by banks in limited. But in countries such as Korea, the 
government helped create a number o f banks and encouraged them ( through a variety o f  
mechanisms) to go beyond these traditional lending avenues (Stiglitz 2001 ;514).
What is interesting is that the development lending practice came to be adopted 
not only by development and specialist banks but also by the DMBs. Tlie Monetary 
Management Board in the BoK and the OBS tightly controlled the DMBs and in return 
the viability of the banks was guaranteed in various ways, such as the BoK frequently 
supplying special loans to the DMBs. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, when the DMBs 
had formally been privatised, the DMBs were still a means of enabling the government to 
further its economic policy to help corporate financing.
Regulations on Ownership and Governance o f DMBs
The regulations for ownership and governance of the DMBs did not allow them to 
be privately controlled. In other words, no dominant shareholder was allowed to control
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the operations of a DMB, whereas the Korean government had various methods of 
exerting a strong influence on the DMBs, for example, by proposing the appointment of 
presidents and directors of the DMBs in accordance with the special provisional act of 
1961, which was in effect until 1982.
The regulatory authorities imposed the limit of ownership of the DMBs. The 
maximum percentage of a DMB’s equity owned by a non-govemment shareholder was 
restricted by the General Banking Act. The rationale for this limit was to prevent 
industrial capitalists {chaebol) from manipulating DMBs for private gain (Bank of Korea 
1999: 73). Until 1982, the maximum equities that any single person could have were 10%. 
Moreover, in accordance with the Special Provisional Act, introduced in 1961, private 
shareholders had no voting rights. When the DMBs started to be privatised in 1982, the 
limit was reduced to 8%; the 8% limit for ownership remained for the following 10 years. 
In May 1992, regulation over ownership was further tightened by extending the definition 
of any “single person” who could own the stocks of a DMB.
In order to prevent any single person from controlling a substantial number of 
shares, the definition of a “single person” who was able to own 8% of the equities was 
tightened. Before 1992, a person and spouse, relatives by blood within “the eighth 
degree” and those by marriage within “the fourth degree,” were defined as a single 
person. But thereafter, a company owned by a chaebol and officers of that company were 
also defined as a single person. In December 1994, the limit was lowered further from
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8% to 4% / However, institutional investors such as investment trust companies were 
allowed to own within 8%. As at the end of 1999, the maximum percentage of the equity 
of a DMB that any single stockholder or person could own or actually control still 
remained at 4% /
In May 1993, the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS) introduced a new scheme 
“the Committee for the Recommendation of Bank’s Presidential Candidates.” Details of 
this scheme were embodied in a revised version of the General Banking Act at the end of 
1994. The Committee consisted of nine members, of which three were former bank 
presidents, the Directors’ Committee choosing the other six members. However, this 
Committee did not have a checks-and-balances function which could have enabled it to 
evaluate and check on the president’s management performance. The Committee 
therefore came to be responsible only for recommending presidential candidates. 
Accordingly, governance of the DMBs lay with the presidents of the banks rather than 
with the Directors’ Committee. Due to the fact that the presidents of the banks were 
habitually chosen by the authorities, western commentators have often indicated that the 
governance system was the main reason why Korean banks could not establish their own 
responsible management system; important decisions, such as large loans, were entirely
In the 1994 revision, the Korean government introduced a financial specialist 
corporation scheme which allowed such corporations to own 12% of a bank’s equity. 
However, no financial specialist corporation qualified under the scheme. In the wake of 
the crisis, the scheme was repealed.
 ^There were exceptions for local, foreign-invested banks, and for two newly- 
established small nationwide DMBs. The limit for local banks was 15%, while a foreign- 
invested bank, KorAm Bank, was able to allow for nationals to own as much as was 
allowed for foreigners. In this case, it was 18.56 %. Lastly, two small nationwide DMBs, 
Hana and Boram, were transformed from merchant banks and had single shareholder
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determined by the presidents of the banks. This governance system, they argued, 
ultimately led to huge bad debts.
Since January 1997, following the revision of the General Banking Act, the 
Directors’ Committee has been empowered to recommend presidential candidates and the 
auditor. Non-executive directors numbered more than half the aggregate number of 
directors. However, even after this the Directors’ Committee remained dominated by the 
incumbent president; the ftmctions of decision-making and day-to-day operations were 
not separated.
To What Extent Did Chabol Own Shares o f  the DMBs
Regardless of the regulation on ownership, which was 4% for a single person, the 
chaebol owned a substantial amount of the DMB equities. For example, the Samsung 
group was a shareholder of all the big DMBs (except for Kookmin Bank, of which the 
major shareholder was the Korean government), from 2.81% (Choheng Bank) through 
7.03% (Commercial Bank) to 18.56% (Koram Bank, a foreign invested bank). Table 5.1 
shows that the Stock Market Stabilization Fund, non-bank financial institutions (in 
particular: Investment Trust and Insurance companies), and the chaebol were the major 
shareholders of the DMBs as at the end of 1996. The Stock Market Stabilization Fund 
was established in May 1990 when the stock market was seriously depressed. In order to 
maintain the market’s stability, securities companies, banks, insurance companies and 
listed firms invested in the Fund.
equity limits of 8%. These two new nationwide DMBs merged into Hana Bank in 1999.
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Table 5.1 Large Shareholders ’ Lists o f  10 Biggest DMBs*
Bank Shareholders (Ratio o f  shares)
Choheng Citibank N.A (11.691** Stock Market Stabilization Fund ('6.551 Tae-Kwang Groun (5.471. 
Daehan Life Insurance (4.48), Korea Investment Trust (4.18), Daehan Investment Trust 
(3.841, Samsung (2.811. Kvobo Life Insurance (2.431. Ssangvong (1.981. OE Int’l Ltd. 
(1.19)***, Kookmin Investment Trust Company (1.11)
Commercial Stock Market Stabilization Fund (7.251. Samsung (7.031. Korea Investment Trust (5.011, 
Kyobo Life Insurance (4.06), QE Int’l Ltd. (4.00), Daehan Investment Trust (3.07), 
Kookmin Investment Trust (1.361. Ban grim (1.261. Lee Sang-Soon (1.031. Daehan Life 
Insurance (1.03)
Korea First Stock Market Stabilization Fund (7.001. Daehan Life Insurance (5.481. Samsung Life 
Insurance (3.961. LG Fire Insurance (3.031. Korea Investment Trust (2.951. Kvobo Life 
Insurance (2.501. Daehan Investment Trust (2.331. Hvundai Marine & Fire Insurance (2.201. 
OE Int’l Ltd (1.721. CMB-Euro (1.231. CMB-CAP (1.131. SG Warburg (1.071. Kia Auto 
a . 041
Hanil Stock Market Stabilization Fund (6.961. Korea Investment Fund (4.861. Samsung (4.761. 
Daehan Investment Fund (4.181. Kvobo Life Insurance (2.501. Daelim Corp. (3.571. Yoon 
Bvung-Kang (3.031. CMB-CAP (3.001. CMB-EURO (2.511. LG group (2.471. Hvundai 
Group (2.001. FTCI (1.98), Kookmin Investment Trust (1.26), Korea First Bank (1.14)
Seoul Stock Market Stabilization Fund (7.471. Daehan Life Insurance (4.571. Samsung Life 
Insurance (3.771. Kvobo Life Insurance (2.441. BEAR STERNS Co. (2.091. Asan Trust 
(1.991. Korea Investment Trust (1.921. Donga Construction Co. (1.501. Lee Sang-Soon 
(1.461, DongKuk Steel (1.271. First Life Insurance (1.07), Korea Investment Trust (1.01)
Korea
Exchange
Bank o f Korea (47.88), Korea Investment Trust (2.02), QE Int’l Ltd. (1.94), Daehan 
Investment Trust (1.51), Gartmore (1.27), Kim Tae-Jin (1.21), Kookmin Investment Tmst 
(1.091. Samsung Life Insurance (1.051, Ssangvong Investment Securities (1.041
Kookmin Government (17.08), Bank o f  New York (13.86)**, Korea Investment Trust (6.24), Daehan 
Investment Trust (3.80), Kookmin Investment Trust (2.41), Ssangyong (1.96), Kyobo Life 
Insurance (1.09), Hannam Investment Trust (1.04), Shinhan Bank (1.00)
Shinhan Daehan Investment Trust (3.921. Korea Investment Trust (3.581. Samsung (3.361. Stock 
Market Trust Fund (3.29), Kookmin Investment Trust (1.13), Shinhanil Electrics (1.09)
KorAm Bank o f America (18.561. Daewoo Corp. (18.561. Samsung (18.561. Stock Market 
Stabilization Fund (4.74), Daehan Electrics (4.00), HanGlass (1.72), Dongil Corp. (1.72), 
QE Int’l Ltd. (1.48), Dongsuh Food Co. (1.05)
Hanna Kvobo Life Insurance (6.791. Long-term Credit Bank (6.571. Dongwon Securities (5.801. 
Cho Seok-Rae (Hvosung Groupl (5.161. Stock Market Stabilization Fund (4.171. Wooieon 
Oil (Jinro Groupl (3.511. Samsung Life Insurance (3.421. Incheo Saekwang Hospital (3.401, 
Nomura Securities (3.12), Woo Sang-Ki (2.65), E.M. Warburg (2.50), Daehan Investment 
Trust (2.091. Ssangvong Cement (1.531. Barings Securities (1.471. CMB-TEMP EM (1.371. 
Hong Young-Chul (Korvo Steell (1.281. OE Int’l Ltd. (1.151. Kvobo Life Insurance (1.121, 
CMB-TEMIT(1.04)
* Underlined entities are affiliates of chaebol. **Deposit Receipts 
***Run by George Soros’ Quantum Fund.
Source: Presidential Committee for Financial Reform (1997b: 28-29)
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The reason why some chaebol owned more than 4% was that Article 2-1 of the 
supplementary provision of the General Banking Act allowed a grace period until 28 May 
1998 before the 4% regulation came into effect for the chaebol (Bank of Korea 1995c).^ 
However, the Presidential Committee for Financial Reform of 1997 indicated that the 
chaebol’s actual shares were higher than the official figures given in Table 5.1. This was 
because the staff of the chaeboVs affiliates possessed additional shares. However, due to 
the regulation of the authorities and the difficulty of collusive action among the chaebol, 
they did not try to control the management of the DMBs (Presidential Committee for 
Financial Reform 1997b: 14).
Basket System and Government-DMBs-Chaebol Relations
Korea was one of the few coimtries in which large ‘commercial banks (deposit 
money banks in Korea)’ have been a tool of government policy rather than governing in 
their own right. The Financial Times once argued that the DMBs served two main 
purposes - aggressively financing the country’s rapid industrial expansion and keeping a 
watchful eye on behalf of the Government on the big conglomerates, the chaebol. “If, 
along the way, these purposes have meant that the banks could earn only low returns or 
became saddled with huge non-performing debts, then that was the price that had to be 
paid” (Financial Times, 14 May 1987). The role of supporting rapid industrial expansion 
has been examined, while the other aspect of containing the concentrated power of the 
chaebol has not been well illuminated in the literature on regulatory failure.
 ^However, the revision did not allow the voting right of the private shareholders
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At the same time, however, the Korean government tried to limit the amount of 
the financial resources that the DMBs and development banks extended to the chaebol. 
What is interesting is that this was to restrain the concentrated power of the chaebol 
rather than to promote the soundness of the banks. The Loans Limit System (the so-called 
Basket system) evolved of such considerations. Credits to the 30 biggest chaebol (the 10 
biggest chaebol after 1996) extended by the DMBs and development banks were subject 
to regulation from 1984 (Presidential Committee for Financial Reform 1997a: 127-129).
The Monetary Management Board introduced “Financial Institutions’ Loan 
Management Regulation” which was followed by the OBS’s “Enforcement Regulation on 
Loan Management to Conglomerates”. According to the regulation, the OBS Governor 
imposed a limit (called Basket), within which each DMB (or development bank) was free 
to extend loans to the chaebol. In the initial period, the limit was not fixed and was at the 
discretion of the OBS Governor. After 1987, however, the Governor imposed ratios 
(loans to the chaebol/ loans in total made by the DMBs) and the effectiveness of the 
Basket system appeared to be strengthened. As Table 5.2 shows, credits by banks to the 
chaebol which were subject to the Basket system had continuously decreased.
Regulatory Relaxation
However, not all loans made to the chaebol were subject to this regulation. First 
of all, loans from the overseas branches of Korean financial institutions and deferred 
export credits were excluded from the Basket for the reason of promoting the
to exceed 4% (Bank of Korea 1995c).
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international competitiveness of Korean corporates and financial institutions (Testimony 
of the Finance Minister, Lee Joon-Sung, in 1989 at the National Assembly). Moreover, 
for the reason of “strengthening the manufacturing sector’s competitiveness,” the number 
of exceptions to the application of the Basket system increased. In 1991, each chaebol 
could choose three major companies which became exceptional to the Basket system. In 
addition, a certain group of listed firms of the chaebol could be free from the regulation 
when over 50% of their shares were held by members of the public who were not related 
to the chaebol (so-called equity-ownership-well-distributed-companies).
Table 5.2 Basket Ratios and Real Shares
5 biggest chaebol 30 biggest chaebol
Regulatory ratios Shares Regulatory ratios Shares
1987 18.6 15.3 30.4 26.5
1988 15.2 12.7 25.7 22.0
1989 8.6 7.2 16.8 14.7
1990 7.2 6.6 14.7 13.5
1991 5.8 5.8 10.8 10.9
1992 5.6 5.2 10.4 9.3
1993 6.2 4.9 10.9 8.4
1994 5.7 4.4 10.6 7.6
1995 5.3 3.6 9.9 6.3
1996 4.9 3.6 6.6* 4.5*
*10 biggest chaebol only
Source: Presidential Committee for Financial Reform (1997a: 130)
Regulatory relaxation expanded. Again, to strengthen corporate competitiveness, 
three main industries (rather than main companies) for each chaebol came to be excluded 
from the application of the Basket system in January 1994. Thus, the number of 
companies which were not subject to regulation increased because the chaebol usually 
had multiple affiliates in certain industries which were, they thought, important. In 1996, 
smaller chaebol, i.e. between 11‘^  and 30* in terms of size, came to be free of regulation:
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only the 10 biggest chaebol remained the subject of regulation. Due to the exceptions 
made for main industries and equity-ownership-well-distributed companies, as Table 5.3 
shows, only 36.5% of aggregate loans made to the 10 biggest chaebol by the DMBs were 
within the Basket (Lee Y-H 1999: 438-439).




Exceptions to the Basket Loans 








Loans 13333 23100 17900 5200 36400
Ratio 36.5% 63.5% 49.2% 14.3%
100.0%
Source: Lee Y-H (1999)
In sum, seemingly strict regulatory policies of ownership, governance and loans 
management system were imposed on the DMBs but the real effectiveness of such 
regulations was doubtful. In particular, the Basket system came to be only nominal due to 
continuous regulatory relaxation as the Kim Young-Sam government continuously 
increased the number of exceptions in the name of promoting corporate competitiveness. 
Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter 7, the chaebol could borrow more loans from non­
bank financial institutions, such as merchant banks, than ever before during this period.
In addition, they tap directly into international capital markets by issuing securities. 
Opportunities for corporate finance and the amount of financial resources that the 
chaebol could attract increased dramatically.
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5,3 Regulatory Complexity: Growth with Monetary Targetting
Regulatory policy towards the DMBs became complicated and the regulatory 
authority of the BoK over the DMBs shrank due to the growing influence of special 
interests/ The regulatory policy applied to deposit money banks was originally 
formulated to achieve the policy objectives of the regulatory authorities, i.e. growth (for 
the Finance Ministry) with stabilization (for the BoK). The regulatory institutional 
structure over the DMBs also reflected these dual objectives. Before the outbreak of the 
crisis in November 1997, the BoK had adopted monetary targetting in its operation of 
monetary and credit policy. Under that system, the objective of price stability and 
economic growth had been pursued through the establishment of intermediate targets for 
the M2 and MCT monetary aggregates and strict management of those variables (Bank of 
Korea 2002).^ The size of M2 was tightly controlled by the Monetary Management 
Board and the BoK. However, such targetting was only applied to DMB banking 
accounts while DMB trust accounts were free from such regulatory policy.
 ^This is consistent with the argument of Olson (1982).
 ^M2 is defined as Ml plus customers’ savings and time deposits in banks plus 
residents’ foreign currency deposits. Although customers’ savings and time deposits are 
held to increase wealth and to cover future expenditure, it was assumed that they were not 
very different from demand deposits which are an element of Ml because, if customers 
incurred a small penalty, deposits could be easily withdrawn. MCT is M2 plus certificates 
of deposit and customers’ trust money held with banks. Lastly, M3 is MCT plus 
customers’ deposits with non-bank financial institutions, bonds and commercial papers 
issued by financial institutions, repurchase agreements (“RP”) etc. M3 is the monetary 
index which is broader than any other indices.
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During most of the time between 1979 and 1997 the Korean authorities used M2 
as the monetary index because increases in M2, more than in any other monetary indices, 
had parallelled economic growth and inflation rates in Korea. M2 consisted of Ml (the 
sum of legal tender notes and coins held by the public plus customers’ demand deposits 
placed with banks) plus customers’ savings and time deposits with banks plus residents’ 
foreign currency deposits. Because deposits in the DMBs were directly related to the size 
of M2, the businesses of the DMBs were strictly controlled by the regulatory authorities. 
The DMBs were the only financial institutions able to create credit. However, after the 
considerable liberalization of trust business was introduced in May 1996, MCT became 
as significant a central monetary index as M2.^
The policy of monetary targetting partly affected the precise form of regulatory 
policy including domestic financial liberalization and capital account liberalization policy. 
The authorities, in particular the BoK, wanted monetary growth to remain within a 
certain limit’ thus, regulatory relaxation which would increase monetary growth in 
terms of M2 was carefully examined. However, this objective was hampered by the 
growth-oriented policy of the Finance Ministry which reflected private sector interests.
As a consequence, regulatory outcomes as applied to the DMBs became complicated.
As a result of changes in trust business on 1 May in 1996, liquidity moved from 
trust money in financial institutions to savings accounts in deposit money banks. Thus, 
the effectiveness of the MCT index increased since the effects of such movement would 
have been offset under the index system.
The limits were arranged on the basis of a target for growth and the inflation
rate.
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On the one hand, the business of the DMBs was relatively less liberalized than 
that of other types of financial institutions. On the other hand, in order to promote growth, 
the Finance Ministry actively liberalised the business areas of non-bank financial 
institutions, which included operation of the trust accounts of the DMBs. Moreover, 
various business areas of the DMBs, such as asset management of DMBs overseas 
branches, were not subject to the monetary targetting policy objective of the BoK. Such a 
regulatory institutional environment resulted in the unintended consequence of regulatory 
arbitrage by the DMBs.
According to the policy objectives of the authorities, for example, foreign 
currency funding of the DMBs had to be used mainly to finance the source of foreign 
currency loans rather than for domestic currency loans.’* Regulations on the use of 
foreign currency loans were carefully formulated in order not to cause monetary growth 
in terms of M2. No foreign currency loan was to be used for the working capital of the 
borrowers: the loans could be used only to pay for import facilities and overseas 
investment by firms or for high technology and services for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs).’^  However, to promote corporate competitiveness, US$ 2.5 billion 
of foreign currency loans were allowed for banks to lend corporates for purchasing 
machinery made by domestic companies in 1996. This certainly caused an increase in the 
monetary aggregate.
’ ’ As will be described in Chapter 6, development banks were allowed to 
undertake foreign currency funding as a resource for domestic currency loans.
12 See Chapter 3 regarding the use of foreign currency loans.
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5,4 Explaining the Vulnerability o f DMBs
It should be emphasized that Korean banks did not suddenly get into trouble at 
the end of 1997. During February and August 1997, there were two rounds of banking 
crises. But even well before 1997, Korean banks had suffered from structural 
vulnerability. According to an inside BoK report, an unprecedented phenomenon 
attracted the attention of a section of the Bank, the Monitoring Team in the International 
Department, which was responsible for monitoring the foreign exchange business of the 
DMBs. The report indicated that “the phenomenon originates from the structural 
vulnerability of Korean banks, rather than from temporary problems in the international 
capital markets, and has deteriorated; thus a proper corrective measure is required.” 
(Monitoring Team in International Department of Bank of Korea 1996)
The unprecedented phenomenon referred to the fact that the DMBs were having 
difficulty in securing foreign currency term loans with a maturity of 3 or 6 months 
despite their willingness to pay high interest rates. Thus, the banks had to rely on 
extremely short-term loans, such as call-money, which resulted in their foreign currency 
funding structure becoming unstable. The report indicated four areas as being particularly 
worrisome:
This report belongs to the documents submitted to the Special Investigation 
Ccommittee on the foreign currency crisis in the National Assembly in January 1999. The 
title of the report is “The Recent Situation of Domestic Banks' Deepening Instability in 
Financing Foreign Funds and a Suggestion.” This was made by the Monitoring Team of
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Accordingly, first, the “Korean premium” for short-term funding in April 1996 
suddenly jumped in April 1996 and remained high, exceeding the interest rates payable 
on long-term foreign currency funding (see Table 5.5 and Chart 5.5). Second, from 1996 
the DMBs were increasingly dependent on extremely short-term loans, i.e. over-night and 
call money. The amount of Euro time-deposits (international money market loans having 
a maturity of 3 months and 6 months), was stationary, while extremely short-term 
borrowing, i.e. over-night and call money, was increasing throughout the period. The 
major DMBs were borrowing approximately US$ 0.4 -  0.5 billion in over-night loans. 
Third, short-term foreign borrowings were continuously increasing as the DMBs relied 
on short-term borrowings for long-term investments such as foreign currency loans, 
overseas securities investment, and foreign currency leasing. Due to the restrictions by 
the authorities on long-term borrowings and because foreign banks would not lend long­
term loans to Korean banks, the long-term assets (investment) of the DMBs could not be 
funded by long-term borrowings. Also, as the DMBs purchased foreign currency 
securities, issued by financial institutions, such as merchant banks that were set up after 
the DMBs, the ‘dual foreign currency funding structure’ clearly appeared.Fourth, the 
overall availability of foreign currency funding for Korean banks’ overseas branches 
deteriorated. In support of their overseas branches, the main offices of the DMBs had to 
borrow foreign currency and transfer the funds to their overseas branches.
the BoK’s International Department in June 1996.
Dual structure means that a Korean bank would borrow foreign funds from 
another Korean bank which itself borrowed the funds from international banks or markets.
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This situation was extraordinary because it was at a time when Korea was in its 
final stage of obtaining entry to the OECD; conventional wisdom would have indicated 
that the premium for borrowing foreign fimds would have decreased in the expectation of 
entry. This does not mean that all banks had to pay more for short-term fimding than for 
long-term fimding. Foreign banks were in fact unwilling to lend long-term fimds to some 
Korean banks and only short-term borrowings at high interest rates were available to 
those banks.
Table 5.4 Trend o f Short-term and Long-term Spread over Libor for DMBs*^^












































'^Figures are spreads over Libor for eight main DMBs; unit is percentage.
* 2) Euro Time-Deposit refers to short-term funds with a maturity o f 1-6 months, which were financed by 
banks in international money markets.
Source: Monitoring Team o f International Department o f the Bank o f Korea (1996)
Table 5.5 Structure o f Short-term Borrowing in DMBs (US$ billion)
1/95 3 6 9 12 1/96 2 3 4 5 20/6











































Source: Monitoring Team o f International Department o f  the Bank o f  Korea (1996)
In the confidential document on which this table is based, there was no specific 
reference to the number of DMBs used for this statistical research. However, considering 
that the main banks were renewing over-night loans each of US$ 0.4 - 0.5 bn, there is no 
doubt that the number was four out of the eight main banks.
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*1) Long-term and over-night spread over Libor is (maximum + minimum spread)/2. 
Source: the Monitoring Team of the International Department of the Bank of Korea 
(1996)
External and Internal Factors
As regards the cause of the problems, on the surface the jump in the premium 
was related to Japanese banks. At the end of every three months, Japanese banks, the 
major lender to Korean banks at that time, had to withdraw their loans to comply with 
BIS capital adequacy requirements. This appears to have increased the Korean premium 
because Japanese banks provided funds for 30-40% of international borrowings by 
Korean banks. The reality, however, was that the premium for funding jumped at the end
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of March 1996 and remained high even after the period for settlement of the accounts of 
the Japanese banks. At the end of June 1996 spread-over Libor for over-night borrowing 
by Korean banks reached almost 1%.
The BoK report showed that this was caused by an increase in demand for 
foreign funds caused by regulatory liberalization, in particular the sudden lowering of the 
barrier to foreign exchange business, rather than for external reasons. Eleven leasing 
companies were authorised to do foreign exchange business in July 1994 and a further 
nine in July 1995. Nine merchant banks were authorized to do this business in November 
1994 and a further nine in July 1996. Consequently, there was over-competition for 
foreign funds among Korean financial institutions, along with an increase in demand for 
foreign funds corresponding to an increase in the size of the economy. In particular, as 
new merchant banks with low international credibility were created from investment and 
finance companies, they tapped into the international capital market and borrowed 
regardless of the level of interest rates in order to extend their foreign exchange business. 
The overall credibility of Korean financial institutions declined and this led to raised 
interest rates for borrowings (the Monitoring Team in the International Department of the 
Bank of Korea 1996).
Overseas branches of DMBs were having particular difficulty in attracting 
foreign funds. The BoK report indicated that the authorities in the United Kingdom and 
Japan had strengthened their supervision over term mismatch ratios. The UK and 
Japanese authorities applied the same terms of mismatch regulation as imposed upon
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their countries’ financial institutions to Korean branches within their territories. As 
overseas branches had tended to rely on short-term loans for long-term investment in 
order to increase their profitability (see Table 5.6), the enforcement of these regulations 
by the British and Japanese authorities came to be a serious problem to Korean overseas 
branches.
As at the end of 1995, the mismatch ratio of overseas branches was 83.9%, 
which was twice as much as that of their main offices. From 1996, the Bank of England 
started to enforce regulation on liquidity mismatch ratio in respect of Korean banks’ 
branches in London and Hong Kong. At the same time, the Bank of Japan also expressed 
its concern over the Korean banks’ excessive dependence on over-night loans and 
indicated its intention to regulate the liquidity ratio of Korean banks. Thus, on 29‘*^ of 
January 1996 the OBS in Korea asked the Korean financial institutions to prepare a plan 
to reduce the size of call money loans (the Monitoring Team in the International 
Department of the Bank of Korea 1996). It was not known whether the authorities 
specified a certain level or not.
Table 5.6 Foreign Currency Asset Management o f Overseas Branches o f DMBs
1993 1994 1995 April 1996
FX assets 41.4 (4.3)*** 52.4(11.0) 64.4 (12.0) n.a.
Mismatch ratio*
Main offices 38.6% 43.5% 36.9% 32.2%
Overseas branches 83.6% 88.1 % 83.9% n.a.
Local branches** 70.5 % 62.3% 58.3% n.a.
*Main offices: 1 0 0 -  ( long-term borrowings/ foreign currency loans x 100)
Overseas branches, Local branches: 100 -  [(long-term deposits with the branches +  long-term 
borrowings/ (long-term loans + long-term deposits with other financial institutions) x 100]
** Local branches refer to financial institutions independently registered in accordance with local 
legislations.
*** Inside the parentheses is the amount o f the increase over previous balance.
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Source: the Monitoring Team in the International Department of the Bank of Korea 
(1996)
Enthusiasm for Deregulation
According to published research by the BoK in June 1996, the market value of 
DMBs compared to their book value deteriorated due to competition from new entrants to 
the business (Monetary Economy Research Institute 1997). As the report of the 
Monitoring Team at the BoK points to over-competition for foreign funds, this BoK 
research also indicates that over-competition occurred in the domestic currency business 
area as a result of the authorization of new entrants to the deposit money banking 
business.
Four points were made on this subject. First, competition between banks 
intensified; second, the gap between interest rates for deposits and for loans decreased; 
third, new entry by six deposit money banks negatively affected the profitability of all the 
banks; lastly, the vulnerability of the banks increased as the ratio of portfolio equity 
investment by the DMBs to deposits in the banks increased. As a consequence, the 
probability that a bank could go bankrupt increased, and the market value of the banks 
compared to their book value continued to decline. The research concludes that the 
relaxation of entry barriers has reduced the value of a licence to conduct banking business 
(Monetary Economy Research Institute 1997).
The BoK research did not blame the relaxation of entry barriers itself for causing
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the problems. It argued that the relaxation was implemented in a non-market friendly 
manner, which meant that the decision to admit new entrants was influenced by the 
enthusiasm for financial liberalization, while other regulations on interest rates remained 
unchanged and financial institutions were not allowed to fail. This indicates that the 
financial liberalization adopted was asymmetrical.
Financial liberalization, promoted by the new leadership of the Finance Ministry 
(formerly EPB officials) focussed on the substantial reduction of entry barriers to the 
financial industry. Permission granted for new deposit money banks in 1982 and 1983 
coincided with the emergence in the Finance Ministry of the new leadership under Kang 
Kyung-Sik.’^  Two new deposit money banks were established: Shinhan Bank in July 
1982 and KorAm Bank in March 1983. Between 1989 and 1992, six more deposit money 
banks were allowed. Four of those banks were founded to increase the electoral chances 
of the then ruling party (reflecting business interests in regional areas) and two of them 
were originally investment and finance companies which were allowed to become DMBs 
under the Act Concerning Mergers and Conversion of Financial Institutions.
In relation to foreign currency business, the enthusiasm for deregulation together 
with the policy objective of growth led to a relaxation in the enforcement of key 
restrictions such as the compulsory long-term funding ratio for foreign currency loans. 
The compulsory ratio, 70%, for long-term funding for foreign currency loans was a key 
prudential regulation because the loans were the major foreign currency assets of the
16 Kang Kyung-Sik became Finance Minister again in 1997.
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DMBs and demand for the loans from firms rapidly increased as a result of the easing of 
the restrictions on the use of the loans.
Relaxation of the ratio to 50% was a kind of symbol of the incumbent government 
of Kim Young-Sam, who took office in April 1993. The government started its term with 
the ‘New Economy 100 days’ Plan’ which was very growth-oriented. Having relaxed the 
ratio in April 1993, the government eased restrictions on the eligibility for firms to be 
able to use foreign currency loans with a generally long maturity of over 5 years. Because 
the loans were given at very cheap interest rates, such as Libor plus 1%, demand jumped. 
Due to the relaxation of the ratio, much of the new demand was funded by short-term 
borrowings by the DMBs. Moreover, offshore banking of DMBs was not subject to the 
application of the compulsory ratio of 50%.
In the wake of the crisis, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) indicated that 
short-term borrowings represented 65% of aggregate foreign currency borrowings of 
Korean financial institutions between 1993 and 1996. Since development banks 
continued to borrow long-term funds as their major funding sources, the ratio of short­
term borrowings by the DMBs must have greatly exceeded 65%. As described in Chapter 
4, the term period for trade credits was substantially eased during the Kim Young-Sam 
presidency. Due to the economy’s high dependence on trade, the scale of trade credits 
was large. Although trade credits for imports contributed to an increase in exports, those 
credits are partly to blame for the rapid increase in trade deficits in the mid-1990s. Also, a 
rapid increase in exports meant a corresponding increase in foreign exchange bills, which 
were included in the foreign currency assets of the DMBs. The bills were bought from
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trading firms which were the major affiliates of the major chaebol. When capital flows 
reversed on the eve of the crisis, the foreign exchange bills possessed by the DMBs were 
illi quid for at least a 3 to 6 month term. The DMBs were the only group of financial 
institutions which bought foreign exchange bills from trading firms. There were about 10 
trading firms before the crisis, the firms all being affiliates of the chaebol.
Regulatory Forbearance by the Finance Ministry
The debt structure of the DMBs was short-term oriented and over half the short­
term liabilities were incurred through offshore/overseas branch borrowing. This was a 
consequence of regulatory liberalization. As explained, the Monetary Management Board 
within the BoK was the major supervisory authority over the DMBs and the authority 
imposed relatively stricter rules over the DMBs than other groups of financial institutions. 
As also indicated, the strict rules were prompted by the BoK’s concern with monetary 
targetting.
However, not all the regulatory policy imposed upon the DMBs was made by the 
Monetary Management Board of the BoK. As is well-known, only part of the business of 
the DMBs was supervised by the Board. Regulatory authority over the trust accounts of 
the DMBs was under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry. The trust business, which 
had been restricted to the Bank of Seoul, was opened to local banks in May 1983 and to 
the nationwide DMBs in February 1984. Thereafter, foreign bank branches (in September 
1985) and specialist banks (in January 1989) were also allowed to transact trust business 
(Money and Banking Division in Research Department 1994: 11).
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This resulted from the Finance Ministry’s concern to raise the competitiveness of 
the DMBs vis-à-vis non-bank financial institutions which, since the 1970s, were enjoying 
relative freedom over their business.’^  In addition to the concern to maintain the 
competitiveness of the DMBs and non-bank financial institutions, the ability of the 
DMBs to meet the growing and diversified demand for financial services was also taken 
into account. Authorization by the Finance Ministry enabling DMBs to transact trust 
business was facilitated by the fact that the increase in trust account deposits with the 
banks did not affect monetary growth as measured by M2 and also the regulatory 
authorities over banking and trust accounts were different.
The rapid growth of trust accounts held by the DMBs during the 1980s and 
1990s, however, certainly weakened the application of prudential regulatory policy to 
deposit money banks. As the prudential regulatory measures imposed over the DMBs by 
the Monetary Management Board, such as the capital adequacy requirements and the 
single and large exposure limits, were not applied to the trust accounts of the DMBs, the 
prudential measures applied to the banking accounts of the banks would not be effective 
in restraining the banks from activities which made them vulnerable to taking systemic 
risks. This is strongly suggestive of the influence of special interests which seem to 
dominate when not in overt conflict with the narrowly-interpreted monetary objectives of 
the BoK.
17 As we will see in Chapter 7, the establishment of non-bank financial institutions
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In the wake of the crisis, it was revealed that, if the exposure to the chaebol 
arising from the trust accounts of related banks were included, the exposure to Hanbo 
Steel by related banks exceeded the single and large exposure limits, which were set by 
the regulatory authorities. When loans arising from trust accounts to the chaebol were 
included, for example, those to Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors of the KFB would be more 
than the single exposure regulatory limit, i.e. 15% of equity capital. However, when loans 
from banking accounts only were calculated, those of the KFB to Hanbo Steel and Kia 
Motors were below the limit, i.e. 14.1% and 9.3%, respectively. On 1 October 1997, the 
Finance Ministry imposed a new single exposure limit applied to trust account of the 
DMBs which was 5% of the balance of the aggregate loans arising from trust accounts 
(Statement of the OBS Governor, Lee Hyun-Jae, at the National Assembly).
Offshore loans by the DMBs to non-residents, i.e. overseas branches or affiliates 
of firms, were not calculated as part of single or large exposures. Lee Kyu-Sung, Finance 
Minister at the end of the 1980s, stated at a hearing of the National Assembly that, as 
offshore banking was competing with foreign financial institutions, any substantial 
regulation over the asset management of Korean banks would restrict their 
competitiveness (the Minutes of the Committee of Finance at the National Assembly, 6* 
meeting in the 146‘^  Congress on 23 May 1989).
was originally prompted by the growth-oriented policy of the government.
Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency 
Crisis, the Meeting of the 200* Congress on 21 January 1999).
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5.5 Bank o f  Koreans Foreign Currency Deposits with the DMBs
It is now known that the BoK deposited some of its international reserves at 
overseas branches of Korean banks prior to the 1997 crisis (Balino et al. 1999; Fischer 
2002). Before the crisis, international reserves were defined by the Korean authorities as 
foreign currency assets in the central bank’s external account; thus assets deposited at 
overseas financial institutions, which included not only foreign banks abroad, such as 
Citibank in New York, but also Korean banks’ overseas branches, such as Korea First 
Bank in London, were calculated as part of international reserves. Foreign currency 
deposits with overseas branches of Korean banks have been classified as Type A deposits 
in this research and described in Chapter 4. As at the end of 1996, the amount of Type A 
deposits with overseas branches of Korean financial institutions was US$ 3.82 billion. 
The deposits increased to US$ 8.01 billion as at the end of October 1997. Most of the 
Type A deposits (US$ 3.5 billion as at the end of January 1997) were deposited with 
overseas branches of the DMBs and used as resources for establishing overseas branches 
of the DMBs and their business (the International Department of the Bank of Korea 
1997e).
In the wake of the crisis in 1997, international reserves of the BoK came to 
exclude foreign currency deposits held by overseas branches of Korean banks. Also, 
almost all the foreign currency assets of the BoK previously deposited at the main offices 
of the Korean banks, i.e. over US$ 40 billion as of end-July 2000, has been returned to 
the BoK to form part of the international reserves of the central bank. Without 
understanding this complex mechanism regarding the BoK’s foreign currency assets, it 
would be difficult to understand the rapid increase in the international reserves of the 
BoK in the wake of the crisis.
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As Korean DMBs suffered from a foreign currency liquidity problem during the 
course of 1997, however, Type A deposits were no longer usable international reserves of 
the BoK, but the deposits were still defined as part of the Bank’s international reserves. 
International creditors blamed this inaccurate classification for causing uncertainty during 
the crisis period.
It has however never been revealed in the literature on the crisis in Korea that 
there were huge amounts of foreign currency assets deposited with the main offices of 
domestic banks including the DMBs. The deposits have been classified in this research as 
Type B deposits and briefly described in Chapter 4. The amount of the Type B deposits 
was large; as at the end of 1996 the deposits were US$ 32.2 billion. What is remarkable is 
that the BoK put Type B deposits in its internal account, thus the deposits were not 
regarded as part of the international reserves. Out of the total Type B deposits, US$ 11.5 
billion (36%) was deposited with the main offices of the DMBs in Seoul, Korea 
(International Department in the Bank of Korea 1997e). Type B deposits were used to 
fund Korean banks to enable them to conduct foreign exchange business.
Regulation on Domestic Operations o f Foreign Currency Assets by the BoK
Type B as well as Type A deposits were handled by the order of the Finance 
Ministry. The making of the foreign currency deposits by the BoK with domestic banks 
was in accordance with “Regulation on Domestic Operation of Foreign Currency Assets” 
which fell under the jurisdiction of the BoK.^  ^The objective of the regulation in Article 1
It was established on 29 December 1984.
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reads, “This regulation is to prescribe relevant particulars regarding domestic utilisation 
of foreign currency assets, such as buying and selling of foreign funds, deposits of 
foreign funds with domestic foreign exchange business banks, call-loans of foreign 
funds.” Article 8 of the regulation ordains three different kinds of deposits: (1) deposits to 
support short-term foreign currency loans for businesses; (2) deposits to support early 
repayment of foreign debts; and (3) deposits to support foreign currency loans by Korean 
banks, which are specially approved by the BoK Governor.
Article 9 of the regulation prescribes where the deposits should be placed. 
Deposits to support short-term foreign currency borrowings by businesses were to be 
placed with domestic foreign currency business banks (excluding foreign banks’ branches 
in Korea and development banks, i.e., Korea Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of 
Korea, Long-term Credit Bank and merchant banks). Thus, in effect, the regulation 
clearly prescribes that the deposits to support short-term foreign currency borrowings by 
businesses should be placed only with the DMBs, whereas deposits to support early 
repayment funds of foreign debts were to be placed with foreign exchange business banks, 
excluding foreign banks’ branches. Thus, not only the DMBs but also the development 
banks were authorised to receive the deposits. The specific approval by the BoK 
Governor of deposits to support foreign currency borrowings was entirely at the 
Governor’s discretion. However, as indicated in Chapter 4, the ultimate authority over the 
deposits was with the Finance Ministry.
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The management by the BoK of Korea’s international reserves did not conform 
to the normal management of most central banks of their international reserves, which 
focus on security and liquidity with profitability. “Deposits by the BoK with domestic 
banks were made taking into account the situation of demand and supply of foreign funds 
and demand by foreign exchange business banks for foreign funds” (Article 10 of the 
regulation). Term periods were within 1 year (Article 10) and the interest rates of the 
deposits were to be based on Libor.
It is not clear when the practice of making these Type B Deposits started. 
Although the regulation was made at the end of 1984, a supplementary provision of the 
regulation prescribed “previous regulations on different kinds of deposits would be 
repealed when the 1984 regulation was enforced”. This means that such deposits had 
been made before the regulation was introduced. One of the previous regulations 
authorised deposits by the BoK to support the funding of a new subway; in this case, the 
deposits were placed with some of the DMBs which then lent the funds to local 
governments to finance the construction of the subway systems.
Type A deposits were placed with the overseas branches of the DMBs in the 
latter half of the 1980s. In order to sterilize large capital inflows, which resulted from 
Korea’s huge trade surpluses between 1986 and 1989, the authorities prompted the 
DMBs to establish overseas branches. The deposits were used as the equity capital of 
such branches as well as for operating funds for foreign currency business. The number 
of overseas branches of the DMBs was 123 as at the end of 1996 (Bank of Korea 1997).
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Overseas branches including overseas local affiliates of Korean financial institutions 
borrowed over US$ 31.7 billion as at the end of 1996, representing 20% of their 
aggregate external liabilities, i.e. US$ 157.5 billion at that time. US$ 26.4 billion out of 
the US$ 31.7 billion was short-term borrowings (Ministry of Finance and Economy 
1998). In this regard. Type A deposits were partly a consequence of capital account 
liberalization (authorisation of overseas branches to promote capital outflows) and 
stabilization policy. International operations of the DMBs without adequate preparation 
were encouraged by the regulatory authorities and this must have aggravated the moral 
hazard problem of the DMBs.
Type B deposits also exacerbated the DMBs’ moral hazard problem. The central 
bank’s Type B deposits with the DMBs were introduced to support them in making 
foreign currency loans and in buying the export bills of trading firms. Although foreign 
currency loans usually had a maturity of more than five years, the term period of the 
deposits to support the loans was less than one year; therefore, renewal of the deposits 
was the norm rather than the exception. Thus, Type B deposits meant that the authorities 
(the BoK and the Finance Ministry) encouraged DMBs to make long-term loans sourced 
by short-term borrowings. The DMBs’ liquidity problem was, therefore, aggravated by 
the regulatory authorities.
The rationale for such deposits was, as mentioned, to promote economic growth 
without damaging macroeconomic stability. In order to reduce the demand by Korean 
banks for foreign currency funds and maintain the macroeconomic stability of the
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economy, the BoK deposited its foreign currency assets acquired by its intervention in the 
foreign exchange market with domestic financial institutions. This meant that demand for 
foreign funds could be met without increasing Korea’s external liabilities. By reducing 
the demand by the DMBs for foreign currency funds, the authorities tried to manage 
foreign exchange rates and to ensure stable monetary growth. Since the interest rates on 
the BoK’s foreign currencies deposited with the domestic financial institutions were 
Libid (London Inter-bank Bid Rates), those institutions preferred such deposits to 
borrowing funds directly. Accordingly, the central bank was effectively subsidising 
Korean banks including the DMBs.
5.6 Banking Crises and Crisis Management Policy in 1997
This section examines the banking crises of February and August 1997 and the 
foreign currency crisis at the end of 1997. The collapse of some chaebol, starting with the 
insolvency of Hanbo Steel, had raised significant questions regarding the viability of 
some banks. Overall, the DMBs were revealed as having a poor assets and liabilities 
structure, for example, having too large an exposure to those chaebol, a foreign currency 
liquidity mismatch and risky investments. When foreign investors started to reduce their 
exposure to Korean banks following the collapse of Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors, this 
reduction immediately led to a banking crisis which could only be alleviated by the BoK 
making additional foreign currency deposits with the banks.
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The crisis management policy of the Korean government during the course of 
these crises merits scrutiny because it reflects the change in the developmental state, i.e. 
the strong emergence of proponents for “market discipline.” In the wake of the crisis, 
Kim Young-Sup, Senior Advisor to the President on Economic Affairs between 
November 1997 and February 1998, referred to Kang Kyung-Sik, Deputy Premier, and 
Kim In-Ho, Senior Advisor to the President on Economic Affairs, between March -  
November 1997 when he said, “they did not appropriately harmonize market discipline 
with the role of the government.” *^
Significance o f DMBs in Foreign Currency Funding
The DMBs were the major constituent of Korean financial institutions. No other 
constituents of the Korean financial sector were more significant than the DMBs in terms 
of the magnitude of their external liabilities and assets. The difficulties of the DMBs led 
directly to the outbreak of the foreign exchange crisis in late 1997. The crisis broke when 
some major DMBs were no longer able to obtain foreign currency funds from other 
sources, i.e., the BoK and development banks and some other solvent DMBs. In other 
words, the crisis occurred because some DMBs could not settle payments for imports by 
industrial firms which were guaranteed by the DMBs nor repay their borrowings from 
international banks on maturity.
Statement of Kim Young-Sup, former Senior Advisor to the President on 
Economic Affairs, before a public prosecutor in 22 April 1988. Refer to separate volume 
supplement of Monthly Chosun (a magazine), October 1999 issue.
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Table 5.7 shows that the foreign funds borrowed by the DMBs were much bigger 
than those borrowed by other segments of the financial sector, i.e., the development and 
merchant banks. It also indicates that short-term funding in 1997 dropped by over US$ 
32.6 billion compared with 1996, while short-term assets reduced by only US$ 15.7 
billion. This implies that the DMBs had difficulty in renewing their short-term external 
liabilities. In Table 5.7 the liquidity ratio of the DMBs of 78% as at the end of 1996 was 
the ratio of assets to liabilities both with less than 1 year’s maturity. As at the end of June 
1997, the liquidity ratio of assets to liabilities (with less than 3 months maturity) was 63% 
for the nationwide DMBs (Board of Audit and Inspection 1998).
Table 5.7 Foreign Currency Liabilities 
Group
and Assets by Different Financial Institutional 
(End of Period, Unit: US$ billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
DMBs Liabilities Long-term 16.3 19.7 23.4 29.1 35.1 51.2
Short-term
(A)
40.4 43.9 58.7 76.3 92.8 60.4
Total 56.7 63.6 82.1 105.4 127.9 111.6
Assets
Management
Long-term 23.1 25.0 34.8 46.2 55.8 55.2
Short-term
(B)
33.6 38.6 47.3 59.2 72.1 56.4
Total 56.7 63.6 82.1 105.4 127.9 111.6
Liquidity ratio (B/A) 83% 88% 81% 78% 78% 93%
Development
Banks
Liabilities Long-term 15.4 17.6 21.1 26.0 30.0 31.1
Short-term
(A)
4.0 5.0 7.0 9.4 13.2 17.5
Total 19.4 22.6 28.1 35.4 43.2 48.6
Assets
Management
Long-term 18.1* 21.0 25.8 31.7 37.5 37.8
Short-term
(B)
1.2* 1.6 2.3 3.7 5.7 10.8
Total 19.4* 22.6 28.1 35.4 43.2 48.6
Liquidity ratio (B/A) 31% 33% 33% 40% 43% 62%
Merchant
Banks
Liabilities Long-term 1.3 2.0* 2.2 4.6 6.0 5.4
Short-term
(A)
3.3 3.6* 5.1 7.1 12.6 13.7
Total 4.6 5.5* 7.3 11.7 18.6 19.1
Assets
Management
Long-term 4.4 5.4 7.1 11.4 17.8 17.1
Short-term
(B)
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 2.0
Total 4.5 5.5 7.3 11.7 18.6 19.1
Liquidity ratio (B/A) 4% 4% 3% 3% 6% 15%
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* Figures are rounded off to the first decimal place; therefore, the total of long-term and 
short-term ones may have an error of 0.1.
Source: Board of Audit and Inspection (1998)
Poor Foreign Currency Assets and Liabilities Structure o f DMBs and the First Banking Crises
Some of the DMBs had difficulty in repaying their foreign currency liabilities in 
February and March 1997 and many of them could not settle their liabilities in August 
1997. These crises occurred when international banks reduced credit lines to those DMBs 
which had difficulty in renewing their commercial paper.
During the first quarter of 1997, the only way in which the banks could avoid 
default on their foreign currency debts was by obtaining support from the authorities. The 
BoK was therefore obliged to deposit its foreign currency assets with the banks. After the 
collapse of Hanbo Steel in January and Kia Motors in July, some international banks 
reduced their credit lines to Korean banks (Table 5.8). Other international banks, which 
still maintained their lines to the Korean banks, shortened the redemption period of the 
remaining credits. During the two months following the collapse of Hanbo Steel, the 
credit lines of international banks to seven major DMBs were reduced by US$ 9.1 billion 
(International Department in the Bank of Korea 1997c) (Table 5.8).








1.1 1.6 2.6 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.9 9.1
After Kia 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 7.1
Total 2.1 2.9 3.9 2.7 2.1 1.2 1.3 16.2
1) Between Feb. 1997 and Mar. 1997
2) Between 16 Jul. 1997 and 30 Sep. 1997
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1997c)
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This difficulty derived not only fi*om an increase in bad debts due to the collapse 
of several chaebol during the course of 1997 but also in part from a reduction of credit 
lines supplied by Japanese financial institutions at the end of March 1997 when the 
period for settlement of accounts of the Japanese banks was near (Table 5.9).







Matured (A) 0.24 0.79 1.20 0.67 0.56 0.38 0.20 4.03
Renewal or 
switch to other 
sources (B)
0.03 0.25 0.58 0.24 0.12 0.05 1.27
A - B 0.21 0.54 0.62 0.43 0.56 0.26 0.15 2.76
Source: bitemational Department in the Bank o Korea (1997c)
Amid the instability caused by the collapse of Hanbo Steel, the statement at the 
end of January 1997 by the Senior Advisor to the President on Economic Affairs that 
“Banks could go bankrupt” aggravated the situation. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, 
the senior advisor’s statement made foreign fund-bolders nervous and hesitant to lend 
money to Korean banks, and therefore the Governor of the BoK, Mr Lee Kyung-Sik, 
asserted at a press conference on 1 February 1997 that the BoK would not let Korean 
banks fail.
hi relation to the press conference of the BoK Governor, Jin Young-Wook, the 
Director of the Department of International Finance in the Finance Ministry revealed that, 
“Following the statement of Lee Seok-Cbae (Senior Advisor to the President), Korean 
banks, in particular Korean banks’ branches in Japan, bad difficulty in revolving their
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over-night loans from Japanese financial institutions. Thus, I asked then finance minister, 
Han Seung-Soo, that he requests that the BoK Governor hold a press conference aimed at 
correcting the statement of the senior advisor to the President for economic affairs” (The 
Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency Crisis at the 
National Assembly, 17*’^ meeting of the 200^ Congress on 3 February 1999).
After the BoK Governor’s news conference, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) expressed 
its gratitude for the BoK’s swift action in holding the conference, which contributed to 
capital market stability in Japan and helped resolve the difficulty of the ftmding of 
Korean banks in Japan. In addition, the BoJ stated its intention that it would inform 
Japanese banks and short-term finance companies of the BoK Governor’s message 
(Report of the Tokyo office of the BoK to the Director of Planning Department of the 
BoK on 3 February 1997). Nihon Kezai (a Japanese Economic Newspaper) reported, 
“BoK Governor stated that the supervisory responsibility over the ability of settlement of 
Korean overseas banks’ branches lies with the BoK.” The newspaper interpreted the 
message as “the BoK’s expression of support to Korean banks”, and wrote that “the BoJ 
also has a view that the situation has been calmed down.” (Nihon Kezai on February 2"^  
“Korean Banks Difficulty in Funding towards Normalization: The Central Bank in Korea 
Expressed its Support for Korean Banks”)
During the first quarter, not only were credit lines being reduced but also 
commercial paper (CP) issued by the banks was also difficult to renew. According to the 
BAI’s investigation report on the crisis, in the course of 1997 over 90% of the CP in 13
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Korean banks (including major DMBs, special and development banks) was not renewed. 
The amount of CP issued by the banks as at the end of 1996 was US$ 7.4 billion but only 
US$ 0.7 billion worth of CP was outstanding as at the end of 1997 (Board of Audit and 
Inspection 1998).
There is no doubt that the reduction in credit lines by US$ 9 billion was a 
significant blow to the DMBs. However, considering the fact that the DMBs possessed 
foreign currency assets of US$ 31 billion with less than 1 year’s maturity as at the end of 
1996, the detrimental effect of the reduced credit lines could be balanced by a realisation 
of part of their short-term assets. The reality was that immediate realisation of the assets 
was difficult. In relation to that situation, the BoK indicated, “the underlying reason 
originated from the weakness of foreign currency funding and asset management 
structure, which could not cope with change in international capital markets” 
(International Department in the Bank of Korea 1997c).
In relation to asset management of the DMBs, over 65% of the assets (US$ 20.2 
billion worth) were discounted foreign exchange bills which the banks had bought from 
trading companies. US$ 5.0 billion of the assets were deposits with other financial 
institutions (Table 5.10). Among the deposits, US$ 2.5 billion was deposited with Korean 
merchant banks as at the end of February 1997. Since the merchant banks had started to 
suffer from a liquidity problem earlier than the DMBs, they could not meet the DMBs’ 
demands for repayment of foreign currency deposits. Furthermore, seven major banks 
possessed US$ 2.2 billion of international securities, of which only US$ 0.4 billion had
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an ‘A’ rating. The rest of the securities were issued by Korea and developing countries 
(the International Department of the Bank of Korea 1997c).
Table 5.10 Foreign Currency Assets Portfolio o f DMBs* (Units: US$ billion)
93 94 95 96 97.2
1. Long-term assets 11.9 17.1 23.3 26.6 26.0
<42.6>** <46.5> <47.4> <46.2> <46.5>
(Foreign currency loans) 9.7 13.5 18.5 21.0 21.1
2. Short-term assets 16.1 19.8 25.8 31.0 29.9
<57.4> <53.5> <52.6> <53.8> <53.5>
(Foreign exchange bills) 9.1 12.3 16.5 20.2 19.0
(Deposits) 2.8 3.2 3.9 5.0 5.1
Total (1 + 2 ) 28.0 36.9 49.1 57.6 55.9
* Outstanding balance 
**< > is %.
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1997c)
Table 5. II Foreign Currency Liabilities o f DMBs (US$ billion)
93 94 95 96 97.2
1. Long-term 2.2 2.1 4.2 7.3 7.1
<7.7> <5.7> <8.6> <12.9> <12.9>
2. Short-term 9.5 14.9 22.3 28.3 30.3
<33.9> <40.5> <46.0> <50 .1> <54.8>
3. Foreign Currency assets o f 16.4 19.7 22.0 21.0 17.9*
BoK deposited at the DMBs <58.4> <53.8> <45.4> <37.0> <32.3>
Total 28.1 36.7 48.5 56.6 55.4
*This does not mean that the BoK withdrew their assets in foreign currency from the DMBs. The BoK 
moved the assets deposited at main offices o f DMBs (Type A deposits) to overseas branches o f DMBs 
(Type B deposits). By doing this, the BoK could increase the official figure o f  international reserves o f  
the BoK. In fact, in the course o f Feb. 1997, BoK’s deposit at DMBs including both those at main 
offices and at overseas branches increased by US$ 1 billions.
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1997c)
Table 5.12 Assets and Liabilities Ratios* by Maturing Terms in 7 Major DMBs (%)
Within 7 days Within a month Within 6 months Within a year More than 1 year
61.9 61.4 69.9 75.9 171.3
* Ratio = Assets by maturing terms/ Liabilities by maturing terms x 100
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1997c)
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The poor portfolio structure derived from the nature of regulatory policies in 
Korea. Liberalization of trade credits increased the short-term liabilities and the assets of 
the DMBs but the assets could not be easily liquidated in case of emergency. The 
difficulty could only be resolved by the BoK providing support to the DMBs. The BoK 
increased its foreign currency deposits at the overseas branches of the DMBs by US$ 1 
billion during the last week of March 1997. Table 5.13 shows that the branches of the 
DMBs in Tokyo were having the most serious liquidity problems. By making these 
deposits, the BoK could support the DMBs without apparently reducing the figure of 
international reserves, though the level of usable international reserves inevitably 
decreased.
Table 5.13 BoK s Additional Deposits at Overseas Branches o f DMBs by Region as at the 
End o f March 1997
Tokyo Singapore Hong Kong New York London Total
0.59 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.95*
* The remaining US$ 50 million was expected to be deposited at those banks, which would have difficulty 
in settling their liabilities on the last day o f March 1997.
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1997d)
In addition, BoK asked the DMBs to dispose of their foreign currency securities 
in order to obtain liquidity. Securities held offshore were also to be disposed of in order 
to supply overseas branches with liquidity. For seven major banks, less than half of the 
securities held (US$ 1 billion out of US$ 2.2 billion) could be realised. In addition, the 
BoK suggested an increase in the ceiling from 20% to 23% for foreign direct investment 
in the Korean stock markets earlier than expected.
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It also decided to establish country funds earlier than expected and recommended 
that the Finance Ministry remove the restriction on long-term funding by financial 
institutions. In the regulatory area, the BoK introduced the same prudential measure 
over the mismatch gap as the Bank of England had done. The BoK established the 
guideline that the mismatch gap between assets and liabilities having less than one 
month’s maturity should be under 10% whereas the main DMBs had a mismatch gap of 
on average 13.5%. As this mismatch gap was based on aggregate foreign currency assets, 
a 10% mismatch was not an insignificant problem. For example, if  a bank had assets of 
US$ 10 billion, a 10% mismatch gap meant that the bank had to attract at least US$ 1 
billion within a month.
Table 5.14 Mismatch Gap'^ between Assets and Liabilities Having Less Than a Month 







12J 122 1K5 1&4 7.7 12.1 1 1 2 1L5
* Mismatch gap (%) = I (Assets by maturing terms -  Liabilities by maturing terms)/
(Aggregate foreign currency assets) 1x100
Source: International Department in the Bank o f Korea (1997c)
These measures appeared to have been successful in enabling some o f the DMBs 
to survive the banking crisis. Withdrawals by Japanese banks o f US$ 2.8 billion were 
balanced by the BoK’s deposit (US$ 1 billion) and the DM Bs’ disposal o f their securities.
Establishing country funds, which were particularly aimed at the stock market 
in Korea, had been strictly limited since it would cause capital inflows and disrupt the 
policy objective o f stabilization by increasing the monetary aggregate and strengthening 
the exchange rate of the Korean won.
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For example, Korea First Bank, which had the most serious liquidity problem, raised 
almost US$ 1 billion by the end of March 1997 by disposing of international securities 
(US$ 0.5 billion) and receiving deposits of part of the BoK’s foreign currency assets 
(US$ 0.3 billion). According to a BoK report, once the BoK had allocated its 
international reserves to the DMBs’ overseas branches, their ability to borrow from 
international banks appeared to get better, according to a BoK report ( International 
Department in the Bank of Korea 1997c). For some banks, spreads for borrowing 
declined: Spread over Libor for 0/N (overnight) money borrowed by the Seoul bank 
decreased from 0.50% to 0.40%, and that for the Foreign Exchange Bank and the Hanil 
Bank also decreased by 0.05% - 0.10 %.^  ^Therefore, the Korean DMBs survived beyond 
March 1997 which was a period expected by international capital markets to be very 
difficult, because of the effects of the settlement of year-end accounts by Japanese banks 
and the aftermath of the Hanbo Steel’s collapse.
The Second Banking Crisis
The borrowing of foreign funds again became difficult after the end of July 1997, 
soon after Kia Motors became the subject of the bankruptcy protection agreement (Table 
5.15). Major damage came from international credit rating agencies which placed 11 
Korean banks (not only the major DMBs but also special and development banks) on a 
watch list. Spread-over Libor for short-term funding by the DMBs increased to Libor plus 
67 bp. Interest levels for overnight (0/N) borrowing also jumped. After 11 August 1997, 
some Korean financial institutions got into trouble: a couple of the overseas branches of
These DMBs were the main creditors of Hanbo Steel.
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the DMBs such as the Los Angeles branch of the Korea First Bank and the Chicago 
branch of the Commercial Bank were all recorded as being overdrawn (0/D). On 14 
August 1997, the Dongnam Bank was only able to settle its liabilities with emergency 
support, i.e. additional deposits of foreign currency assets from the BoK. During this time, 
the liquidity problems of merchant banks were much more serious than those of the 
DMBs. "^  ^Japanese banks again reduced their exposure to Korean banks, in order to 
prepare their accounts for the half year.
Table 5.15 First and Second Banking Crisis Compared
First Second
Period 23 Jan -  end March 15 July -  20 November
Stock market index 677 ^ 6 1 7 755.05 488.41
Won/Dollar FX rate 853.60 897 8 9 1 .4 0 -*  1035.50
Usable international reserves US$ 27.2 bn (end Jan)—* 21.1 (end 
March)
US$ 25.7 bn (end July) —* 7.3 
(end Nov.)
Spread over Libor in funding 
Overnight 
Term loans
17 bp (Jan.) —* 27 (Mar.) 
25 bp (Jan.) 36 (Mar.)
63 bp (Jul.) 178 (Nov.) 
55 bp (Jul.) 124 (Nov.)
Reduction in credit lines US$ 9.1 billion (between Feb. and 
Mar.)
US$ 9.0 billion (between 16 Jul. 
and Oct.)
Roll-over ratio (%) 115.4 (Jan.) ^  109.0 (Mar.) 90.9 (Jul.) 58.8 (Nov.)
Trade deficits (US$ billion) 7.4 (first quarter) 2.1 (third quarter)
Source: Derived from Board of Audit and Inspection (1998)
It is interesting to note that the situation was not so adverse just after Kia Motors 
collapsed but it deteriorated soon afterwards because the position of the government was 
not clear as to how it would deal with the Kia problem and whether it would help the 
company to repay its foreign currency liabilities. The credit lines of international banks to 
Korean financial institutions decreased rapidly, as Table 5.15 shows. Within a week of 
the Kia Motors collapse, credit lines had been reduced by US$ 0.51 billion; however, 
within the following two weeks, this reduction increased to US$ 1.45 billion, which was
24 Details will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
253
believed to be the consequence of the government’s obscure position (International 
Department in the Bank of Korea 1997e).
In contrast to the early 1997 period, development banks also had some difficulty 
in issuing CP and attracting further foreign funds; thus, the development banks could not 
fully support the DMBs and non-bank financial institutions. Moreover, the BoK’s support 
for the DMBs by way of depositing its foreign currency assets with the overseas DMB 
branches was difficult since usable international reserve levels were rapidly decreasing. 
During the period of the first banking crisis, the BoK could increase its usable 
international reserve level by getting its foreign currency assets back from the 
development banks. Furthermore, September 1997 was the closing month of the first half 
of the fiscal year for Japanese banks. The further reduction of credit lines to Korean 
banks by Japanese banks worsened the situation.
The BoK was only able to allocate US$1 billion of its international reserves to 
seven of the major DMBs. It suggested that the government should announce clear and 
concrete measures to help foreign creditor banks owed money by Kia Motors before 
international rating agencies downgraded the ratings of Korean financial institutions. The 
BoK also tried to encourage the DMBs as well as development banks to attract foreign 
funds, by paying high interest rates, and asked them to re-lend those funds to other 
financial institutions which were experiencing a liquidity problem. The BoK argued that 
the high interest rates could be recovered from the secondary borrowers and that the 
primary borrowers would not suffer a loss. In view of the urgent situation, the BoK
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recommended the DMBs to obtain finance by short-term rather than long-term 
borrowings which would take longer to set up (International Department in the Bank of 
Korea 1997e).
In order to attract more foreign portfolio funds, the BoK encouraged investment 
tmst companies to set up overseas funds enabling foreigners to invest in Korean 
securities and increased the ceiling on aggregate and individual portfolio investment by 
foreigners in the Korean stock market. As in the previous crisis of early 1997, the BoK 
also asked the DMBs to liquidate their foreign currency portfolio assets.
As the DMBs were having liquidity problems and had thus to withdraw their 
deposits with merchant banks, the liquidity of the merchant banks was seriously 
threatened. A regional DMB and seven regional merchant banks became virtually 
bankrupt. Without the support of the BoK by way of depositing its international reserves 
with the DMBs and the lending by the DMBs to the merchant banks, those banks would 
not have been able to settle their liabilities. As the DMBs had difficulty financing time 
deposits, the level of extremely short-term borrowings surged firom US$ 4.3 billion as at 
the end of 1996 to US$ 7.3 billion as at 10 August 1997. Euro time deposits had terms of 
one, three and six-months but one-month term borrowings became the norm.
The Foreign Exchange Crisis in the Late 1997
The last 1997 crisis commenced late in that year after international credit rating 
agencies, such as Moody’s and S&P, had at the end of October downgraded the credit
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rating of development banks. The banking crisis developed into a foreign currency crisis. 
Sovereign rating as well as ratings of special and commercial banks were lowered at the 
same time. During the latter part of October 1997, credit lines to the relatively healthy 
DMBs were further reduced by US$ 2 billion. The downgrade of the credit ratings might 
have been affected by the Hong Kong stock market crisis on 23 October 1997 but the 
continuous collapse of chaebol, uncertainty over the Korean government policy and the 
low level of international reserves in the BoK appeared also to have been critical.
As the placing of additional foreign currency deposits by the BoK with the 
DMBs and the making of call loans by relatively healthy banks to troubled banks became 
extremely difficult, the troubled DMBs and non-bank financial institutions rushed to buy 
foreign currency in the foreign exchange market and this made the market extremely 
volatile. Because international reserves in the BoK had almost dried up, the BoK could 
not supply the market with sufficient foreign currency. Usable international reserves were 
only US$ 13.7 billion as at 8 November 1997.
It was very clear that without emergency measures there would be a default 
within a month. The level of usable international reserves could only settle 1.1 month’s 
import payments and was almost the same as the amount of foreign money invested in 
the Korean stock market. Both short-term borrowings and also matured long-term bank 
loans had to be repaid. Most financial institutions relied on the BoK’s support for their 
settlement of foreign exchange transactions. The Finance Ministry decided to extend the
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foreign exchange rate band from ±  2.25 % to ±10% and asked for support from 
international financial institutions such as the IMF.
This late 1997 crisis was the final banking crisis during that period. From early 
1997, some of the DMBs could not meet the demands for repayment of foreign funds by 
the international banks. By early November 1997, any further assistance from other banks, 
i.e. some of the strong DMBs and development banks, was not available. Most of the 
DMBs fell into de facto default. Without the foreign currency deposits allocated to the 
banks by the BoK on a day-to-day basis, most of the DMBs could not meet the 
repayment demands by international creditors in late November and December 1997.
Table 5.16 Credit Ratings o f DMBs by Moody a
(as at end of the period)
Bank end-1995 Jan. 1997 end-1997 Apr. 1998
Choheng A3 A3 Bal Bal
Commercial Baa2 Baa2 B1 B1
Korea First A3 Baal B1 B1
Hanil A3 A3 Bal Bal
Seoul Baa2 Baa2 B1 B1
Korea Exchange A3 A3 B1 B1
Shinhan A2 A2 Bal Bal
Kookmin A3 A3 Bal Bal
Housing and 
Commercial
A1 A1 Bal Bal
Hanna - Baal Bal Bal
Boram - Baal Bal Ba3
KorAm Baal Bal Bal
*1) Long-term credit rating
* The top six banks were called ‘six major banks.’ The top seven banks were called 
‘seven major banks.’
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Data for Members o f the Committee o f 
Finance and Economy at the National Assembly, October 1998.
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Conflict within the Government over Crisis Management Policy
According to a BoK proposal on 25 August 1997, the most urgent task of the 
government was to remove doubts held by Korean and overseas investors on the viability 
of the domestic banks. Therefore, it felt that the government should put in place both 
emergency support measures for the financial institutions which faced serious financial 
difficulties and also measures to eliminate the bad debts owing to financial institutions. In 
this connection, the BoK recommended that the government authorise the central bank 
immediately to extend special loans to the Korea First Bank (KFB). Although there were 
many other banks including the Seoul Bank which were suffering from an increase in bad 
debts, support to the KFB had to take first priority because the bank was in the most 
serious situation and evaluation by S&P of the bank was pending. An immediate measure 
suggested by the BoK was that the BoK provide the KFB with Korean Won 2,500 billion 
at an interest rate of 3% per annum (Bank of Korea 1997b). What is remarkable was that 
this suggestion was rejected by the then Finance Minister, Kang Kyung-Sik, though the 
Department of Financial Policy in the Finance Ministry was sympathetic to the BoK’s 
recommendation (Monthly Chosun 1999).
Throughout 1997 there had been conflict among the authorities as to how to deal 
with the chaebol and their creditor banks and this had delayed the introduction of the 
measures. This conflict and the resultant delay had a detrimental impact on foreigners’ 
confidence in the Korean financial system. This by and large reflected the strong 
emergence of the ‘market discipline’ idea among senior officials such as the Finance 
Minister and Senior Advisor to the President on Economic Affairs.
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Emphasis on ‘market discipline’ by those senior officials led to controversy not 
only among the Korean authorities but also among the domestic banks and foreign 
investors. It started with the statement of Senior Advisor to the President, Lee Seok-Chae, 
“Banks can go bankmpt” in January 1997, referring to those banks which were exposed 
to large loans to Hanbo Steel, which collapsed on 23 January 1997. The statement 
diminished the confidence of foreign investors in the Korean financial system, which was 
already fragile. In the wake of the collapse of Hanbo Steel, BoK indicated: “Due to the 
uncertainty as to how the government would deal with the company and its creditor banks, 
funding offers by international banks to Korean banks reduced to US$ 0.2-0.5 bn from 
1.0-1.5 bn per day.” (the International Department of the Bank of Korea 1997a)
In another report, the BoK also indicated that “The obscure position of the Korean 
government as to whether it would support the country’s financial institutions 
exacerbated the foreign investors’ worry about the institutions’ ability to repay their 
external liabilities.” (International Department in the Bank of Korea 1997e) As 
mentioned, the instability caused by the statement by Lee Seok-Chae had been redressed 
by a strong statement from the Governor of the BoK that the central bank would be 
responsible for the external liabilities of Korean financial institutions followed by 
additional foreign currency deposits in the DMBs by the BoK.
Senior Advisor to the President for Economic Affairs, Kim In-Ho, who was the 
successor to Lee Seok-Chae, stated: “The question of whether some companies would be 
bankrupt or not is to be judged by financial institutions.” This was understood as a sea-
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change in dealing with insolvent companies; previously, the government had determined 
the answer to that question and had usually asked financial institutions to extend 
additional loans to those firms to ensure their solvency. Thus, financial institutions not 
only became unwilling to extend additional loans to companies whose financial structures 
appeared problematic, they also rushed to withdraw the loans they had previously made 
to the companies (Lee 1997).
Lee Seok-Chae established the Presidential Committee for Financial Reform on 
11 January 1997, most members of which came from the private sector. Officials of the 
Financial Policy Department in the Finance Ministry were excluded from being members 
of that Committee. In the wake of the crisis, the Director of the Department stated in the 
Prosecutor’s Office: “The committee was initiated by Lee Seok-Chae, consisted of people 
from private companies and banks and excluded officials of the Finance Ministry. 
Therefore, in many respects, there was a conflict between the presidential office and the 
Finance Ministry. Officials in the department of financial policy were angry about the 
establishment of the committee. It was set up when the term of the government had 
almost ended. The Finance Ministry was formulating various financial reform policies. 
We thought it was not acceptable because, all of sudden, the presidential office bypassed 
the ministry in relation to the establishment of the committee and constituted it with 
people who were not experts on finance.” (Monthly Chosun 1999)
There was a conflict within the government on the issue of whether it would 
declare that it would guarantee the foreign debts of Korean financial institutions. The
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delay in supplying the KFB with special loans by the BoK in September 1997 was a 
result of the Deputy Premier, Kang Kyung-Sik’s idea of ‘market discipline’ without 
regard to the stability of the financial market. The BoK suggested in relation to this issue: 
“Although the recent deterioration of foreign currency fimding by Korean banks is 
basically blamed for the collapse of Kia Motors, it is also substantially traced to the 
uncertainty of the direction as to how the government would deal with Kia Motors and its 
creditor banks. Therefore, in order for the creditor banks to ease their difficulty in 
obtaining funding and to prevent the further downgrading of credit ratings, clear and 
concrete measures on the issues by the government is required as soon as possible (in 
especially for the KFB). In particular, the government measures including special loans 
and support of foreign currency funding by using international reserves of the central 
bank should be in place before international credit rating agencies adjust the credit ratings 
of Korean banks. S&P and Moddy’s are expected to publish credit ratings of Korean 
banks between 21 and 31 August and between September and October 1997, 
respectively.” (Bank of Korea 1997b)
Kang Kyung-Sik, however, opposed the proposed special loans to the Korea First 
Bank by the BoK. “Kang Kyung-Sik thought the bank, the KFB, should be responsible 
for the bad debts, caused by the collapse of the chaebol (Hanbo Steel, Sammi Steel, and 
Kia Motors etc) because the bank had made the loans to the chaebol. Accordingly, Mr 
Kang speculated that the suggested special loans to the KFB by the BoK at such a low 
interest rate of 3% were not consistent with the ‘market discipline.’ Initially, the officials 
in the department of financial policy had approved the suggestion.” (Statement of Yoon
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Jeng-Hyun, the Director of the Department of Financial Policy in the Finance Ministry). 
Eventually, the special loans were made but the amount of the loans was reduced to 
Korean Won 1000 billion from the original BoK suggestion of Korean Won 2500 billion, 
and the interest rate was increased from 3% to 8%.
In November 1997, there was confusion within the Finance Ministry over the 
authority for the management of foreign exchange, i.e. whether the Ministry (the 
Department of Financial Policy) should intervene in the foreign exchange market or 
completely delegate this to the BoK. This confusion and conflict within the government 
further undermined investors’ confidence in the government’s ability to protect the 
Korean financial system which had been already become unstable due to continued 
bankruptcies in Korea and the instability of the international financial markets.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has raised an important question, namely why relatively strict 
regulatory policy was applied to the DMBs compared to that over other types of financial 
institutions, i.e., development banks and merchant banks? Monetary targetting based on 
M2, which originated from a major policy objective of the BoK, stabilization, has been 
suggested as the explanatory factor for this regulatory policy. The precise form of capital 
account liberalization policy in relation to the operations of the DMBs was also partly 
affected by the BoK’s concern that monetary growth should remain within a certain limit.
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This chapter has argued, however, that such a regulatory policy objective was not 
implemented effectively in reality. Growth concern, reflecting private sector interests, 
interferred with the original regulatory objective applied to the DMBs in a number of 
areas and created regulatory complexity. Also, deregulation, in particular in the area of 
the issue of licences to conduct foreign exchange business, created structural weakness in 
the DMBs. The weakness was revealed well before 1997 by a jump in the Korean 
premium for foreign funding. Relatively strict prudential regulation of the DMBs by the 
BoK was often negated by the regulatory forbearance shown by the Finance Ministry 
during the mid-1990s.
In relation to the BoK’s foreign currency deposits with Korean banks, the 
majority of the deposits (Type A deposits) were made in accordance with the wishes of 
the Finance Ministry, in order to achieve growth. When the deposits were due for 
repayment, the DMBs not only had to comply with the renewal of the deposits but 
required additional deposits from the central bank in order for them to settle their 
outstanding foreign currency liabilities. As previously indicated, prudential regulation/ 
supervision is crucial to restrain the moral hazard problem that banks inherently tend to 
have. In particular, where domestic banks intermediate foreign funds, they are exposed to 
greater risks than banks who do not; thus, there is a greater necessity for a prudential 
regulatory policy to stem this moral hazard problem (McKinnon and Pill 1998). This 
chapter has shown that the regulatory authorities in Korea, in particular the Finance 
Ministry, aggravated the moral hazard problem rather than restraining it, by extending
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special loans in won currency to the DMBs and depositing foreign currency assets with 
the banks.
Finally, this chapter has shown that during the course of the crisis the authorities 
failed to produce an effective and coherent crisis management policy. Such regulatory 
features certainly undermine the strong state arguments.
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Ch 6 Development Banks in the Developmental State
6,1 Introduction
The existing literature on the crisis and the regulatory failure in Korea largely 
overlooks the role of the development banks in the developmental state. Haggard (2000) 
may be an exception but his interest in the development banks is also limited. He 
indicates the role of the Korea Development Bank (KDB), one of two wholly-owned 
government development banks in Korea, in relation to both the government’s ownership 
of banks and the moral hazard problem. He explains that “Although the government’s 
ownership of banks was not as extensive in Indonesia, neither was it trivial... During the 
1994-96 period, the Korean Development Bank increased credit for facility investment at 
a rapid pace. This lending signalled the government’s commitment to larger projects, 
again raising moral hazard questions” (Haggard 2000: 29).' In other words, lending by 
the KDB to chaebol is criticized because it implied that the Korean government was 
committed to large projects, thus for encouraging Korean deposit money banks (DMBs) 
to extend credit for such projects.
Beyond those points indicated by Haggard (2000), this chapter illuminates the 
role of development banks in the government-financial sector-industry triangle. If
' The moral hazard problem raised by Haggard is one concerning domestic banks 
and the government. Other moral hazard problems arose between international investors 
and their governments and also between investors’ governments and the governments of 
countries in which the investments were made.
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authorities-DMBs-industry relations which were examined in Chapter 5 included strain 
and collusion at the same time (at least on the surface), the proximity of the Finance 
Ministry to industry brought about unlimited support for industry by the development 
banks. The Development banks were supervised by the Finance Ministry and the 
regulatory policy applied to them were much laxer than that applied to the DMBs. The 
business of the development banks frequently interferred with the stabilization objective 
of the Monetary Management Board of the Bank of Korea (BoK).
Section 6.2 examines the emergence, governance and objectives of the 
development banks. It describes the emergence in the 1960s of the KDB as a key 
financial institution for the enhancement of the country’s economic development. Since 
their inception the development banks had supported the special interests of certain 
industries. The banks were owned by the government and behaved as if they were part of 
the Finance Ministry. Section 6.3 shows that the Finance Ministry imposed lax regulatory 
policy on the development banks. It also indicates that, due to the “full faith and credit” 
provision and the long-term oriented funding structure, the development banks could 
enjoy good credit ratings on a par with Korean sovereign ratings by international credit 
ratings agencies.
Section 6.4 reveals the conflict between the regulatory authorities’ policy 
objectives in connection with the business of the development banks, i.e. growth (the 
Finance Ministry) and strict stabilization (the BoK). Evidence shows that the growth- 
oriented objective of the Finance Ministry, reflecting the special interests of the chaebol.
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interfered with the strict stabilization objective of the BoK. Section 6.5 reveals that the 
KDB and the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Ko-exim Bank), among other financial 
institutions, were the first and second biggest beneficiaries of the BoK’s foreign currency 
deposits. The banks, however, repaid most of the deposits during the crisis period, thus 
postponing the onset of the impending crisis on the one hand and obscuring the level of 
international reserves of the country on the other.
Section 6.6 reviews the development banks’ chaebol-oÙQniQà lending structure 
and the downgrading of the credit ratings of the development banks. As the development 
banks found it difficult to attract foreign fimds and in view of the depletion of the 
international reserves, there was no option left for the government but to ask the IMF for 
help. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter and sets out the implication for the thesis.
6,2 Emergence, Governance and Objectives
The development banks were specialized banks, established to supply sufficient 
credit to special business areas. The biggest development bank, the KDB, was established 
in the early 1950s. Due to the lack of funding resources and professional expertise of the 
DMBs and the uncertain profitability of special business which was perceived necessary 
for economic development, the Korean government took the view that the DMBs could 
not supply such business areas with sufficient and necessary credits. Thus, between the
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1950s and 1970s, the government founded several specialized banks including the 
development banks which had particular objectives (Bank of Korea 1999a).
The specialized banks were to promote the “balanced development” of the 
national economy in accordance with the legislation which established them, such as the 
Korea Development Bank Act of 1953. Development banks were distinct from other 
specialized banks in that the former concentrated on very large-scale industries, such as 
heavy and chemical industries, where long-term and large fixed capital is required, while 
the latter specialised in such areas as private accounts, house purchase loans and banking 
for Small- and Medium- sized Enterprises (SMEs).^
Emergence o f Development Banks
After World War II, various types of development banks were set up by different
countries to promote reconstruction and economic development. Development banks 
were different from the DMBs (or commercial banks) in that the object of the former was 
to support certain industries with low profitability where investments had long pay-back 
periods.
Development banks took different forms in different countries. While the source 
of fimding in the development banks in developed countries was surplus funds from the 
private sector for long-term economic development projects, the role of the development
 ^The Kookmin bank (for private accounts), the Housing bank (for house 
purchase loans) and the Industrial bank of Korea (for SMEs) belonged to the latter 
category. When the special acts setting up these two banks were revoked in 1995 (the 
Kookmin bank) and 1997 (the Housing bank), they were then converted into ordinary
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banks in developing countries was different in some countries. These banks were proxies 
acting for the government to invest and finance certain projects, or in other countries to 
supplement industrial financing by way of attracting domestic credit and foreign funds. 
The banks had the objective of supporting the country’s economic development plan over 
countries (Korea Development Bank 1997). The banks were established either under 
general company law or special laws. The Industrial Development Bank of Israel was 
established under general company law, while Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) in 
Germany, Japan Development Bank and the KDB belong to the latter category (Korea 
Development Bank 1997: 29-30). The KDB was and is wholly owned by the Korean 
government.
The setting up of the KDB was a consequence of the industrial development-first 
policy of the government after the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. At the inception of the 
KDB, there was a controversy between the monetary stability-first policy and the 
industrial reconstruction-first policy (Korea Development Bank 1997). The former view 
was well-expressed by a recommendation of A.I. Bloomfield and J.P. Jensen of the New 
York FRB, who were asked at the beginning of the 1950s by the Korean government to 
construct a blueprint for the Korean financial system.
The US experts argued that as Korea had an agriculture-oriented economy, 
lacked spontaneous savings/capital accumulation and faced serious inflation, measures to 
deal with the inflation were the most important in terms of its monetary policy. Thus,
deposit money banks.
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long-term credit business had to be carried out within the terms of the then General 
Banking Act and was required to be funded in such a way as would not cause inflation. 
The experts advised that establishing development institutions had to be postponed until 
US counterpart funds, which had been used to cover the Korean government budget 
deficits, could be used for economic reconstruction and other resources, which would not 
cause inflation, could also be mobilized. In this regard, the establishment of the KDB in 
1954 meant that the government put an end to the controversy on policy and decided that 
the KDB should follow the industrial reconstruction-first policy. Long-term financial 
institutions in Japan were modelled on the KDB (Korea Development Bank 1997: 14-
15) '
The Ko-exim Bank was founded “in order to establish a financial system, based 
on mid and long-term deferred-payment for exports, and thus enable exports to increase” 
(The Export-Import Bank of Korea Act). Although the Ko-exim Bank Act was passed in 
1969, establishment of the Bank was delayed until 1976. This was because the size of 
business envisaged by the Act was so small that the government did not feel it necessary 
to establish an independent bank until then. Instead, the business envisaged by the Act 
was carried out by another special bank, the Korea Exchange Bank."^
 ^Article 1 of the Act of the Japan Development Bank, which served as the model 
of the KDB, prescribed that, “in order to reconstruct the economy and to promote 
industrial development, the bank aims at either supplementing or promoting financing of 
general financial institutions.”
When the Korea Exchange Bank Act was revoked, the bank became privatised 
and an ordinary deposit money bank.
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The Korean government decided in 1976 to establish an independent expert 
credit agency. The Ko-exim Bank was established under the country’s slogan of 
“Constmcting a heavy and chemical industry export-oriented country” (The Export- 
Import Bank of Korea 2000: 614). During the early years after its inception, the Ko-exim 
Bank mainly supported the shipbuilding industry. Exports by the shipbuilding industry 
grew rapidly due to the support of the Ko-exim Bank for deferred payments.
Ownership and Governance
Three development banks existed before the crisis, two of which were owned by 
the government. The KDB was wholly owned by the government, while the major 
shareholders of the Ko-exim Bank were the Korean government (46.5%) and the Bank of 
Korea (37.3%) as at the end of August 1997.  ^These two development banks are 
investigated in this research.^
Of the two development banks, the KDB merits particular attention. The Ko-exim 
Bank was established in 1976 and its asset size was much smaller than that of the KDB. 
The Governor of the KDB had often been appointed by the former deputy Finance 
Minister. Also, the KDB Governor was often appointed as a new Finance Minister. The 
Development banks submitted their budget and business plan to the Finance Minister at
 ^ The remaining 16.2% share of the Ko-exim Bank was owned by the Korea 
Exchange Bank which was owned by the Korean government. Thus, the Ko-exim Bank 
was de facto wholly government owned (Minutes of the Committee for Finance and 
Economy at the National Assembly, 14 October 1997).
 ^The third development bank was the Long Term Credit Bank of Korea (LTCB). 
Since this was a private bank, and its foreign currency liabilities and assets were much 
smaller than those of the other two development banks, the LTCB, established in 1980, is 
excluded from this research. The LTCB was merged into the Kookmin Bank in the wake
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least one month before, i.e. by the end of November. For example, the KDB did so in 
accordance with Article 32 of the KDB Act. Presidents of the development banks were 
nominated by the President of the Korean government, by a prior recommendation of the 
Finance Minister. In particular, the president of the KDB was called 'Governor,' a title 
held by only one other bank president, namely, the President of the BoK. The title was 
intended to imply that the KDB was an important government institution rather than just 
an ordinary financial institution.^
Developmental Objectives o f Defending Private Sector Interest
Establishing the KDB had been conceived as one of five pillars of the Korean
financial system since the 1940s. According to ‘Draft for Overall Financial Legislation’
prepared by the then Korean government, the government was to establish five axes of
the financial system, i.e. four government banks consisting of the central bank, the KDB,
the foreign exchange bank and the people’s cooperative bank (for ordinary households).
In addition, there were the DMBs, owned and managed by private investors (Korea
Development Bank 1997: 14). The Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act were
approved in 1950 but founding the KDB was delayed until the end of 1953. This was
because it was difficult to extract funds from the government to establish the KDB. In the
wake of the Korean War, however, the need for the development of financial institutions
to speed up the reconstruction of industrial facilities and the economy was strongly held
within the government.
of the crisis.
7 Testimony of the KDB Governor, Kim See-Hyung, before the Committee for
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The Korea Development Bank Act was therefore approved at the end of 1953 and 
established at the beginning of 1954. Ko-exim Bank was founded in 1976 almost two 
decades after the KDB. The Ko-exim Bank aimed, during the latter half of the 1970s, to 
support the policy of developing the heavy and chemical industries. In this regard, it is 
clear that the establishment of the Ko-exim Bank itself was related to the special interests 
of particular industries, such as the shipbuilding industry. All the shipbuilding companies 
were the main affiliates of the chaebol.
Development Function and Targeted Industries
The KDB supported “important industries” which were prescribed in the KDB
Act. Since its inception the KDB “aimed at supplying and managing funds for important
industries, in accordance with the government policy.” (Article 1 of the KDB Act of
1953) The important industries were specified by the government and reflected in the
revisions of the KDB Act (in Article 18 until the 11* revision of 1997). At its inception,
the KDB focussed on reconstructing the industrial facilities destroyed by the Korean War
and on economic development. During the 1950s, it supported industries manufacturing
products essential for the people’s well-being and basic industries such as electricity and
coal.
When the government started putting the First Economic Development 5 Year 
Plan into effect in 1962, the industries designated ‘important’ changed into basic 
industries and export and import substitution industries. The definition of basic industry 
extended to include the shipbuilding and steel industries in addition to those which had
Finance and Economy at the National Assembly of Korea, 1997.
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previously been included such as electricity and coal. When the government targeted 
heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s, loans from the KDB were concentrated 
on the heavy and chemical industries, mainly the shipbuilding, steel, machine and export 
industries in order to strengthen Korea’s international competitiveness (Korea 
Development Bank 1997: 28).
In the 1980s, the Korean government paid much attention to economic 
stabilization and industrial restructuring. Accordingly, the KDB strengthened its support 
for investment restructuring of the heavy and chemical industries and supplied credit to 
the electronics, automobile, semiconductor, and parts and material industries. During the 
1990s, the focus was moved to the latest technology industry and Social Overhead 
Capital (SOC). As confidence in investment shrank due to the slump in exports, the KDB 
provided credits to facilitate exports and investment in equipment and increased its 
funding of overseas investment and of the latest technology industry. It also supported 
factory automation, energy-saving and the development of technology. After approval of 
the Act enabled private capital to fund SOC, the KDB also provided in the 1990s project 
financing for companies participating in SOC projects (Korea Development Bank 1997: 
28). Article 18 of the KDB act divided ‘important industries’ into two categories: 
necessary industries and basic industries. Changes in the designation of “important 
industries” are shown in Table 6.1.
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After the Korean 
War
Necessary industries for the stabilization of 
people’s livelihood: fertilizer, cement and plate 
glass industries







Extension of ‘basic industry’ concept: electronic 
power, coal, shipbuilding and steel industries. 
Export and import substitution industries.
1970s Heavy and chemical 
industry drive
Heavy and chemical industries: shipbuilding, 
steel, and machine industries.
Export industry for strengthening international 
competitiveness
1980s Economic stability 
and industrial 
adjustment
Industrial financing for industrial structural 
adjustment.
Electronics, car, semiconductor, and parts and 
material industries
1990s Encouragement of 
latest technology 





Funding for facilities, overseas investment, and 
latest technology.
In addition, factory automation, energy savings, 
and technology developments are particularly 
supported.
Project financing for companies participating in 
SOC
Source: Derived from the Korea Development Bank Act of 1953 and its Revisions.
Unlike those of the KDB, the areas focused on by the Ko-exim Bank were 
unchanged. According to a revision of the Act at the end of 1986, heavy industry goods 
were included in the deferred payment export scheme. Also, the revision enabled the 
Bank to support overseas investment by companies, in particular the locally-registered 
overseas affiliates of Korean companies.^ Beneficiaries of such revision were general 
trading companies which were the main affiliates of the chaebol.
In the wake of the crisis, as deposit money banks had difficulty in extending 
short-term trade credits to non-financial companies, the Ko-exim Bank started in 
September 1998 to transact short-term trade credit business. Before then, the bank did not
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6,3 Regulatory Policy Applied to Development Banks
From their inception, the KDB and the Ko-exim Bank were almost exempt from 
the application of the BoK Act and the General Banking Act; thus, it was not subject to 
the regulation of the Monetary Management Board of the BoK. The KDB Act and the 
Export-Import Bank of Korea Act stated that the BoK Act and the General Banking Act 
did not apply to these development banks unless there was a certain provision in the KDB 
Act and the EXIM Bank of Korea Act. For example. Article 53 of the KDB Act 
prescribed that some provisions of the BoK Act and the General Banking Act would 
apply to the development banks but in only very limited areas.
These limited areas related mostly to the deposit-taking business. In other words, 
in relation to just a few areas, the development banks were subject to the regulations of 
the Monetary Management Board of the Bank of Korea, such as regulations on the 
maximum interest rates on deposits and on the reserve requirement ratio on deposits. The 
KDB, however, could only take deposits from limited companies which were the 
recipients of KDB loans and from local governments. As the value of deposits compared 
to aggregate assets was quite small, the influence of the BoK over the KDB business was 
negligible. The same was true for the Ko-exim Bank.
transact any discount or lending business with a maturity of less than 6 months.
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In relation to prudential regulation/supervision, the regulation of an aggregate 
large exposure limit only applied to the development banks but in a very loose way. As 
already described, the limits to the KDB and Ko-exim Bank were 1500% and 1000% of 
the banks’ equity capital, respectively; these were much smaller than that applied to the 
DMBs, i.e. 500%.’
The reasons for the regulatory exemption of the development banks from the 
Monetary Management Board’s supervision were twofold. First, the development banks 
were non-monetary financial institutions in accordance with the standard of the IMF. 
Monetary institutions are defined as institutions whose major function is credit creation 
due to the bulk of the institutions’ liabilities being demand deposits.*® The second and 
more important reason was that the supervision of the Monetary Management Board over 
the development banks such as the KDB might disrupt the development banks’ functions 
as the government’s financial policy institutions (Korea Development Bank 1997: 30). In 
this regard, the development function took priority for the government over other policy 
objectives such as stabilization of the BoK.
Instead, development banks were under the supervision of the Finance Ministry 
and were controlled in accordance with the government’s industrial financial policy. The
® In the wake of the crisis, the BoK Act and the General Banking Act are still not 
applied to the KDB. However, according to Article 25 of the MOU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) between the IMF and Korean Finance Ministry on prudential regulation, 
the Finance Ministry, the supervisory authority over the KDB, promised to apply the 
same prudential standards imposed over the DMBs to the development banks.
'® As mentioned, the relative importance of KDB’s demand deposits compared to 
its total liabilities was negligible.
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KDB Act, until its ninth revision in January 1995, clearly stated its main objective in 
Article 1 of the Act as follows:
“In accordance with government policy, the KDB finance and manage funds for important 
industries in order to stabilize the national economy and to promote industrial reconstruction 
( ‘development’ since 1976 revision of the Act).”"
Although the KDB Act was revised twelve times before the crisis, provisions for 
the government’s supervision over the bank remained. These provisions are summarized 
as follows:
• Business plan of the bank is required to have the prior approval of the 
government (Article 20 of the KDB Act).
• The government can guarantee the repayment of Industrial Finance 
Bonds issued by the KDB (Article 28).
• Only the government is able to invest in the bank (Article 47).
• The government appoints and dismisses executives of the bank (Article 
48).
Among other provisions, however, the most important might be that the 
government would make good any losses of the KDB. Article 44 of the KDB Act, which 
is called the “full faith and credit” provision, reads as follows:
“Losses of the KDB are to be made good from reserves or by the government if  the reserves fall 
short of the losses.”
The phrase “In accordance with government policy” was dropped in 1995 
because it was thought it might violate the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rule of 
“prohibition of government subsidy to particular industries” and cause trade conflict with 
other countries.
‘Full Faith & Credit’ is a principle, recognized among states or between the 
Federal government and states in the United States on the basis of Article 4 of the US
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Moreover, the government established the Korea Asset Management 
Corporation in 1962 which was to buy and dispose of any bad assets of the KDB.
Regulatory policy which was applied to the KDB was also applied to the Ko- 
exim Bank. The Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act did not apply to the 
KDB (Article 2 of the EXIM Bank of Korea Act). The bank had to submit to the Finance 
Minister its budget and business plan at least one month before the date it started (Article 
32). The Bank was guaranteed by the ‘full faith and credit’ provision; losses would be 
made good from reserves and, if these were insufficient, the government would itself 
make good the deficit (Article 37). The Finance Ministry was required to supervise the 
business of the Ko-exim Bank (Article 39). Moreover, the Finance Minister could choose 
or dismiss the President and Directors of the Bank (Article 40).
Stable Funding Structure
As regards foreign currency funding by the development banks, the Finance
Ministry favoured the development banks over the DMBs. The Finance Ministry 
determined the limits on long-term foreign funding by financial institutions for each year 
and the regulations of the term and the amount of such funding. This was called “Traffic 
control.” During the period between 1992 and 1996, development banks were allocated 
as much as US$ 12.8 billion out of the total amount decided by the Ministry of US$ 25.2
Federal Act. Each state gives full faith and credit to legislation, documents and legal 
proceedings of other states and regards them as those of its own. The principle that the 
US Federal government is responsible for the liabilities of government institutions is 
accepted both by the US Federal government and other government institutions (Korea
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billion. The DMBs and non-bank financial institutions were allocated only US$ 7.6 
billion and US$ 4.7 billion respectively during the same period (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Long-term Foreign Funding Allocated by Finance Ministry
( US$ billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Development banks 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.1 4.1
Deposit money 
banks
0.5 0.2 0.9 2.5 3.5
Merchant banks and 
leasing companies
0.3 0.4 0.6 1.4 2.0*
Total 2.5 2.5 3.6 7.0 9.6
Funding by non- 
financial companies
2.1 4.0 3.5 4.1 n.a.
* Merchant banks and leasing companies in 1996 funded only US$ 1.6 billion in 
international markets though those banks were allocated a limit of US$ 2.0 billion by the 
Finance Ministry.
Source: International Department in the Bank of Korea (1996a), International 
Department in the Bank of Korea (1996c)
The authority to issue financial bonds was another area where the development 
banks were favoured. The KDB was allowed to issue Industrial Finance Bonds 
guaranteed by the government. This was the major source of funding of the Bank. It was 
unusual when compared with the funding methods of other countries’ development banks, 
the ratio of government funding in Korean development banks being relatively small.
Also, the ratio of short-term foreign currency bonds to long-term foreign currency bonds 
had never been much higher than 10% throughout the 1994-97 period (See Table 6.3).
Development Bank 1997: 181).
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Table 6.3 Liabilities and Equity Capital o f  the KDB (Banking Account only*)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Deposits 1446 1919 2091 2523
Deposits made by the BoK 6909 7366 6589 1389
Borrowing 6800 7772 9575 11969
Government 2752 2807 2757 1767
Special-purpose Funds 988 1068 1180 910
Foreign Capital Loan Funds 3060 3896 5638 9291
Industrial Finance Bonds 21567 26844 30865 28256
IFB in Won 14437 17025 18038 12964
IFB in Foreign Currencies (a) 6632 8326 10112 11613
Offshore Foreign Bonds 498 1493 2715 3678
IFB maturing within 1 year 6(976 9743 9744 7799
IFB in Won 6550 9271 3326 5721
IFB in Foreign Currencies(b) 305 323 595 1372
<b/a> <4.6> <3.9> <3.9> <77.3>
Offshore Foreign Bonds 20 149 329 706
Guarantees 2307 3751 6010 6342
Other Liabilities 2151 2845 3250 3448
Total Liabilities 41180 50476 58367 53918
Total Equity 2051 2242 2460 2061
Total 43231 52718 60827 55979
* Trust Accounts is not included. But, the value of trust accounts was small, 
approximately one sixth of that of banking account.
Source: Korea Development Bank, Annual Report o f the KDB, 1995, 1996, 1997.
The Ko-exim Bank also could issue long-term bonds, i.e. Export-Import 
Financing Debentures. The debentures and the BoK’s foreign currency deposits were the 
Ko-exim Bank’s major funding source. Full faith and credit-backing by the government 
was given to the debentures which were allowed to be issued in foreign as well as 
domestic currencies. The funding stmcture of the Ko-exim Bank was stable compared 
with that of the DMBs which relied on short-term bank loans by international banks. The 
banks hardly had any short-term borrowings until 1997 when the government asked the
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development banks to obtain all kinds of foreign currency funding, in order to increase 
capital inflows. Even in that year, the major source of foreign currency funding was long­
term. Although the Korean DMBs did not succeed in attracting virtually any long-term 
foreign funds, the Ko-exim Bank attracted almost US $ 5 billion in that year by issuing 
its debentures in international capital markets (see Table 6.4). Issuing bonds was the 
major funding source for the bank’s long-term assets while EXIM banks in other 
countries relied mainly on government funding (Table 6.5).
Table 6.4 Liabilities and Equity Capital o f the Ko-exim Bank by Category
(US$ million)
Liabilities and Equity Capital 1994 1995 1996 1997
Borrowings 299 2 3 9 1 0 4 4 8 6 3 9 5 2
Borrowings in local currency 3 3 4 520 66 6 4 0 5
Borrowings in foreign currencies 2658 3 3 9 0 3 8 1 9 3548
Bank of Korea (National 48 31 23 14
Investment Fund)
Bank of Korea Deposits 2 0 4 0 2 6 2 7 3 2 0 9 289
Syndicated Banks 5 2 0 512 179 88
Others 50 221 4 0 9 3157*3)
Call Money 90 188 2 7 0 1825
Export-Import Financing Debentures*!) 1471 1994 299 3 4 9 6 6
Other Liabilities*!) 190 1211 1507 3593
Equity Capital 1283 1306 1236 880
Total 8457 8 6 1 0 10492 15216
*1) All the Debentures were issued in foreign currencies.
*2) Proceeds from the Sale of Promissory Notes and Acceptances, Guarantees.
*3) Borrowings from international financial institutions such as World Bank, promissory 
notes sold, and other liabilities are included.
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 1995, 1996, 1997.
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Table 6.5 Ratio of Funding of Government Budget against Gross Funding in Exim 
Banks in Different Countries
1996 1997 1998
US Exim*l) 89.9 91.9 92.4
Japanese Exim*2) 89.7 86.7 84.7
Taiwanese Exim*3) 92.0 82.2 85.9
Korean Exim *4) 20.0 10.1 15.2
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (1999), Data for Members o f the Committee for 
Finance and Economy at National Assembly, October 1999.
Bank loans which were the main funding source of the deposit money banks 
were mainly supplied by international commercial banks, while bonds issued in 
international capital markets were bought not only by international commercial banks but 
also by investment banks and public and private funds. Thus, funding by way of issuing 
bonds could attract more foreign funds and had a longer-term maturity than that of bank 
loans. Moreover, international bond markets had secondary markets which had excellent 
liquidity. The issuing of bonds incurred lower costs than funding by bank loans.
Continued Capital Injections into Development Banks by the Government
Development banks have continuously mobilized resources from domestic and
international capital markets for industrial financing. From the KDB’s inception in
1954, most of its revisions of the KDB Act related to increases in the paid-in capital of
the Bank. In its first revision in 1961, an intermediate military government regime,
which had legislative power in the wake of the military coup d’etat, approved the
increase of the KDB’s paid-in capital from 40 million won to 20 billion won.*  ^ The
In terms of the then money measure, the original paid-in capital 0.4 billion 
whan (the Korean currency unit until 1962) was increased to 200 billion whan. As a result
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KDB was allowed by this revision to obtain foreign currency funding and it could also 
borrow from the BoK. In return, the limit for the issue by the KDB of industrial 
financing bonds was set at ten times its paid-up capital.
After the First Economic Development 5-Year Plan was successfully 
accomplished in 1968, the paid-up capital of the KDB was increased in order for the 
country to pursue continuous economic development in the new economic and 
financial climate. During the first half of the 1960s, new industrial financial institutions 
were established. Paid-up capital was increased to 70 billion won (a 3.5 times increase) 
and the increased capital was injected by the government. When the KDB attracted 
foreign funds, the government or the Korea Exchange Bank (then a special bank) could 
guarantee the repayment of the principal and interest on the borrowing. Moreover, the 
limit for the issue of industrial financing bonds was increased to ten times the paid-up 
capital and reserves.
In 1969 by its fourth revision, the government increased the KDB’s paid-up 
capital to 150 billion (over two times the previous total) in order to increase the amount 
of investment by the KDB. Thereafter, as the drive to expand the heavy and chemical 
industries proceeded, the government strengthened the KDB’s ability to borrow foreign 
funds by increasing its paid-up capital to 300 billion won (double the previous amount) 
in order to meet the increased demand for investment. The limit for the industrial 
financing bonds issue was increased again by disregarding the industrial financing
of currency reform on 10 June 1962, 10 whan became equivalent to 1 won.
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bonds guaranteed by the government. Then, by further revisions of the KDB Act, the 
paid up capital was increased in 1995 to 500 billion won, in 1977 to 600 billion won, in 
1981 to 1000 billion won, and in 1988 to 1500 billion won. In addition, by the revision 
of the Act in 1995, the limit for industrial financing bonds was increased to 30 times 
the paid-up capital plus reserves. In sum, the KDB’s paid-up capital increased from 20 
billion won in 1961 to 5000 billion in 1995, a 250 times increase. The limit for 
industrial financing bonds increased 750 times (250 x 3) on that in 1961. The balance 
sheet of the KDB greatly improved due to the increase in the amount of paid-up capital.
Revisions to the EXIM Bank of Korea Act were also aimed at enabling the Ko- 
exim Bank to increase its paid-up capital. This was initially Korean won 30 billion, all 
of which was injected by the Korean government. In the first revision of the Act at the 
end of 1974, the paid-up capital of the Bank was increased to Korean won 150 billion.
At the end of 1977, the Ko-exim Bank’s capital was further increased to Korean won 
500 billion by the second revision of the Act. The capital was then increased at the end 
of 1986 to Korean won 1000 billion in the Act’s third revision. At the beginning of 
1998, the capital was further increased to Korean won 2000 billion and it is now 
Korean won 4000 billion.
In sum, development banks had many regulatory concessions not available to the 
DMBs. The biggest portion of the annual limit within which Korean financial institutions 
could attract long-term foreign funds was given to the development banks. Also, the 
Finance Ministry gave the development banks the exclusive right to issue long-term
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bonds where the DMBs could not. In addition, it gave explicit guarantees to the 
development banks represented by the “full faith and credit” provisions of related acts. 
Moreover, the Korean government had continued to inject additional capital into the 
development banks from time to time. These measures made the balance sheets of the 
development banks sounder than those of the DMBs. Accordingly, international credit 
ratings agencies regarded the credit ratings of the development banks as the most 
important in Korea (see Table 6.6).
Table 6.6 Changes in Credit Ratings o f KDB and Ko-exim Bank by International Credit
M oody’s S&P
Date LT deposits* ST deposits** Date LT deposits ST deposits
1996 A1 P-1 1995 AA- A-1 +
5 Aug 1997 On Watch*** On Watch*** 6 Aug 1997 (negative)
28 Oct. 1997 Al(RPD)**** P-2 24 Oct. 1997 A+ (Neg.) A-1
28 Nov. 1997 A3(RPD) P-3 25 Nov. 1997 A- (Credit Watch, 
Negative)
A-2
10 Dec. 1997 Baa2(RPD) NP 10 Dec. 1997 BBB- (Credit 
Watch, Negative)
A-3
22 Dec. 1997 Bal(RPD) NP 22 Dec. 1997 B+ (Credit Watch, 
Negative)
C
* Long-term deposits ** Short-term deposits *** Possible downgrade announced. **** Review o f  
Possible Downgrade
Source: Moody’s, S&P, 2001; Korea Development Bank, 1999; Ko-exim Bank, 1999 
Table 6.7 Credit Rating Structure o f Credit Ratings Agencies
Grade Moody’s S&P Grade Moody’s S&P
Eligible to invest Not desirab e to invest (Junk)
1 Aaa AAA 11-13 Bal- Ba3 BB+- BB-
2-4 Aal- Aa3 AA+ - AA- 14-16 B1-B3 B+ - B-
5-7 A1-A3 A+ - A- 17 Caa ccc
8-10 Baal- BBB+ - 18 Ca cc
Baa3 BBB-
19 C c
Source: Moody’s, S&P, 2001.
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6,4 Conflict between Growth and Stabilization Objectives
The regulatory authorities in Korea restricted the annual amount of long-term 
foreign currency funding of financial institutions and the use of the proceeds. The 
restriction aimed at ensuring economic growth with macroeconomic stability. It should be 
noted, however, that there was significant variation between the authorities’ attitude 
towards the development banks and towards the DMBs.
Evidence shows that the government’s concern regarding economic growth (the 
Finance Ministry) took precedence over the monetary stability objective (the policy 
priority of the central bank) where they were in conflict. Above all, the KDB was allowed 
to borrow foreign currency in order to fund its lending in won currency though the central 
bank complained about it due to its threatening monetary stability.
The authorities restricted the use of the proceeds resulting from foreign currency 
funding. For example, there were restrictions on the use of the proceeds from issuing 
securities in overseas capital markets, such as foreign direct investment of Korean 
corporates. The rationale behind this was that those funds would quickly and heavily 
inflow unless restricted because there was a significant gap between the interest rates of 
the domestic and the international financial markets. Such flows into the economy were 
perceived to bring about a significant appreciation of the exchange rate of the won, the 
Korean currency, against foreign currencies. The appreciation of the foreign exchange
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rate for the won was then expected to reduce Korean exports and the inflows would cause 
a rapid increase in monetary growth thus undermining the stability of the economy.
However, the policy considerations for the stability of monetary growth as well 
as foreign exchange rates were not strictly applied to the funding of the development 
banks and the use of the proceeds. The KDB attracted foreign funds as a source for won 
(Korean currency) loans. After having financed foreign funds, for example by issuing 
industrial finance bonds abroad, the proceeds were sold on the Korean foreign exchange 
market. The won currency funds realised were used to fund won currency loans. Since 
funding costs in international capital markets were much lower than those in the domestic 
market, the KDB benefitted from a substantial profit compared to the DMBs, although 
interest rates on the KDB’s lending were lower than those of the DMBs.
The effect of this was the same as a big increase in commercial loans which had 
been strictly prevented until the beginning of 1997 for monetary growth and foreign 
exchange rate appreciation. The BoK calculated that the foreign funds sold in the foreign 
exchange market by the KDB to fund its won currency loans were between 12 and 49 per 
cent of the monetary increase from the foreign sector during 1992-95 periods and 21-59 
per cent of the monetary growth (M2). Also, the foreign currency inflow resulted in the 
appreciation of the foreign exchange rate. In the period 1992-95, the inflows were 
calculated to have caused a 0.45-1.24 per cent appreciation in the won (see Table 6.8) 
(International Department of the Bank of Korea 1996a).
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Table 6.8 Won Currency Lending Denominated in Foreign Currencies by the KDB and 
Monetary Growth
(US$ billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995
Foreign Funds Financed by the KDB 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.0
Increment in foreign currencies nominated Won 
currency loans
1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5
The ratio of foreign currencies nominated Won 
currency loans against Won currency financing (%)
52 54 49 60
Foreign currencies sold in foreign exchange market by 
the KDB (A)
0.6 1.3 1.6 1.7
Monetary growth caused by Foreign Sector (B) 5.2 6.7 3.3 3.6
Monetary Growth (M2) (C) 2.3 6.2 2.7 5.3
A/B (%) 11.5 19.4 48.5 47.2
A/C (%) 26.1 21.0 59.3 32.1
Source: International Department of the BoK (1996a)
The interest rate gap between the KDB’s borrowings and loans in won currency 
but denominated in foreign currencies was much higher than the interest gap between the 
DMBs deposits and loans. During 1992-95, the KDB’s margins were 1.6-2.8% for US 
dollar denominated loans and 1.9-4.4% for Japanese yen denominated loans while the 
DMBs margins were only 1.4-1.8%. Thus, the development banks made good profits 
from this business.
6,5 The BoK^s Foreign Currency Deposits with the Development Banks
Among the Korean financial institutions, the KDB and the Ko-exim Bank were 
the first and the second biggest recipients of the BoK’s foreign currency deposits 
(Table 6.9). The outstanding balance of the BoK’s foreign currency deposits with the 
KDB was US$ 4.5 billion as at the end of September 1996. It was 22 per cent of the
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BoK’s total foreign currency deposits with all Korean financial institutions and more 
than three times its average deposit with the six main DMBs (International Department 
in the Bank of Korea 1996b).























(l)D M B s 10.4 6.0 0.3 2.2 18.9 56.7
Korea Exchange Bank 1.6 0.5 0.3 1.0 3.3 9.9
Choheng 1.2 0.8 - 0.3 2.3 6.9
Commercial 1.4 0.2 - 0.4 2.0 6.0
Korea First Bank 1.5 0.8 - 0.2 2.5 7.5
Hanil 1.2 0.7 - 0.2 2.1 6.3
Seoul 0.8 0.5 - 0.2 1.5 4.5
Shinhan 1.1 0.3 - 0.2 1.6 4.8
(2) Dev. Banks 7.4 1.6 0.7 1.7 11.4 34.2
KDB 4.5 1.1 0.4 1.3 7.3 21.9
Ko-exim Bank 2.4 - 0.3 0.0 2.7 8.1
LTCB 0.5 0.5 - 0.4 1.4 4.2
(3) Regional banks 1.0 0.7 - 0.0 1.7 5.1
(4) Specialized banks 0.6 0.6 - 0.1 1.3 3.9
(5) Foreign banks - - - 0.03 0.03 0.1
Total((l)-(5)) 19.4 8.9 1.0 4.0 33.3 100.0
1) For the use o f the import for facility goods and for the automation o f SMEs (Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises).
2) No more deposits were to be made.
Source: Foreign Currency Planning Team of the International Department in the Bank of 
Korea (1996)
This was certainly good for the development banks and a result of regulatory 
favours by the Finance Ministry. The interest rates on the BoK’s deposits were lower 
than the development banks would have had to pay in international markets and the 
deposits were almost automatically renewable at least until the end of 1996. A BoK 
document indicates that the KDB could easily increase the BoK’s foreign currency 
deposits with the KDB by regular consultations with the MoFE. When the KDB was
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successful in persuading the Finance Ministry to authorise additional deposits from the 
BoK, the Finance Ministry ordered the BoK to make further deposits with the KDB 
(Foreign Currency Planning Team of the International Department in the Bank of 
Korea 1996).
For example, the Finance Ministry was interested in increasing the ability of 
domestic financial institutions to transact international business and thus it asked the 
BoK to deposit a portion of its foreign reserves with certain banks. The Development 
banks rather than the DMBs were chosen to be the recipients. After 1988 when the 
country had experienced a series of trade surpluses for the first time in its history, the 
BoK started to make foreign currency deposits to fund the foreign portfolio investments 
of Korean financial institutions. Only three banks, two of which were development 
banks and one a specialized bank, were the recipients of the funds: the KDB, the EXIM 
Bank of Korea, and the Korea Exchange Bank (KEB).*'  ^ In addition to the receipt of 
these funds, which eased the funding of overseas portfolio investments, the regulations 
in respect of such investments were relaxed.
The policy of providing funds to support overseas portfolio investment was 
criticized by the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) for violating the original spirit of 
the foreign currency deposit scheme.'^ Hence, the BAI asked the BoK either to
At that time, the KEB was owned by the Korean government. It was privatised 
at the end of 1989. Most countries did not then levy any tax on public institutions. Now, 
the exemption from taxation does not apply to public or private institutions except for the 
treasury securities of Japan.
' ^  The argument of the BAI was that as the international business of those three
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discontinue the deposit scheme for the three banks or to give the banks which had 
received the deposits a low priority for further funding (Foreign Currency Planning 
Team of the International Department in the Bank of Korea 1996). In April 1988 at the 
inception of the scheme whereby foreign currency deposits were made, US$ 0.2 billion 
was originally deposited with the KDB and the KEB. In September 1989, the amount 
increased to US$ 0.4 billion for the KDB and US$ 0.3 billion for the KEB. In August 
1990 the Ko-exim Bank joined the group of recipients of the funds and US$ 0.3 billion 
were deposited with that bank.
Interest rates for the deposits were London Inter-Bank Bid Rates (LIBID) and 
the maturity was one year. The funds had been almost always automatically renewed. 
The Finance Ministry requested the BoK in August 1988 to allocate funds to the 
selected banks within the limit of US$ 1 billion. Since 1994, the BoK was allowed to 
consider profitability when depositing its foreign currency assets and thus could exert 
partial autonomy in determining how much of its foreign currency assets it would 
allocate to the three banks for overseas portfolio investment. The allocation for the 
KEB increased while that for the other two development banks declined or was static 
(Table 6.10). The source of the funds was the foreign exchange equilibrium fund of the 
Finance Ministry.*^
banks had extended together with increased competition among domestic banks, such 
deposits with those banks would be against the principle of equity and would violate fair 
competition among banks (Foreign Currency Planning Team of the International 
Department in the Bank of Korea 1996).
In order to maintain stability in the foreign exchange rate, a fund called the 
‘foreign exchange equilibrium fund’ was established by the Finance Ministry. The fund 
was entrusted to the BoK which used it to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
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Table 6.10 Allocation o f Foreign Currency Assets for Overseas Portfolio Investment (a 




22"'' Apr. 1988 0.2 - 0.2 0.4
b''' Sep. 1989 0.4 - 0.3 0.7
9'" Aug. 1990 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0
28'" Apr. 1994 0.38 0.315 0.305 1.0
28'" Apr. 1995 0.38 0.315 0.305 1.0
27'" Apr. 1996 0.379 0.31 0.311 1.0
Source: International Department of the BoK (1996b)
6,6 Bad Loans, Crisis and Downgrade o f Credit Ratings
It is worth noting that the KDB was used as a means of temporarily averting 
the failure of some of the DMBs. The KDB repaid most of the BoK’s foreign currency 
deposits during 1997 and supplied foreign currency call loans to the DMBs. In order to 
fund these loans, the KDB vigorously borrowed substantial foreign funds in 
international capital markets-more funds than it actually needed. Following the 
repayment of foreign currency deposits by the KDB, the BoK was able during the first 
nine months of 1997 to support Korean financial institutions without using a substantial 
portion of its international reserves. During the course of 1997, the KDB and the Ko- 
exim Bank repaid part of the BoK’s foreign currency deposits held at the end of 1996,
Although the foreign currencies obtained as the result of the intervention were managed 
by BoK, the ultimate decision as to how to use the foreign currencies was taken by 
Finance Ministry.
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i.e. US$ 5.2 billion and US$ 2.9 billion, respectively.’^  However, there was an adverse 
effect resulting from the active role of the KDB in supporting other banks and repaying 
the BoK’s deposits; the repayment may partly have served to obscure the country’s 
vulnerable financial position in particular in relation to the level of international 
reserves.
When at the end of October 1997, Moody’s downgraded the credit rating of the 
KDB from A-1 to A-2 for long-term deposits and P-1 to P-2 for short-term deposits, the 
KDB could no longer borrow substantial foreign funds. The rating agency blamed the 
rapid growth of short-term external liabilities and the instability of the financial system 
on the collapse of a number of chaebol.
Chaebol- Oriented Business and Increase In Bad Loans
In fact, the large companies-oriented lending structure of the development
banks resulted in huge bad loans during the crisis period. As at the end of August 1997 
lending to the 30 biggest chaebol by the KDB was 15476 billion won, which shared 
30.2% of lending in total. Lending to SMEs was only 23.5%. The rest went to large 
companies which did not belong to the 30 biggest chaebol. Accordingly, loans to large 
companies including chaebol reached 77% as at the end of August 1997. This emphasis 
on large companies was inevitable because the KDB supplied large companies with 
funds for facilities investment and the ratio of SMEs among the aggregate facilities 
investment in Korea was under 5%. As a result of the bankruptcy of a couple of
In the case of Ko-exim Bank, however, it repaid US$ 2.2 billion on 23 
December 1997 after the Bank received loans from international financial institutions.
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chaebol in 1997, bad loans increased from 277 billion to 3027 billion won, which 
amounted to 5.9% of lending in total of the KDB (Minutes of the Committee of 
Finance and Economy at the National Assembly, 11 October 1997).
The KDB entrusted the function of loan screening to its subsidiary, Korea 
Management Consulting and Credit Rating (KMCC), which was one of three credit 
ratings agencies in Korea. However, the credit ratings of the KMCC were not credible. 
Commercial paper of 44 companies, which had credit ratings by the KMCC, were 
liquidated between 1993 and October 1997; none was rated as junk bond.
A representative example was the lending by the KDB to Hanbo Steel.
Although the debt against equity ratio of the company was 3200% in January 1997 
when it was liquidated, the KDB extended as much as 1245 billion won, which 
amounted to 8% of the total loans of the KDB and 23% of total borrowing of the 
Hanbo Steel from financial institutions. What was important is not only the amount of 
lending to such a bad company, but also the fact that the KDB started to fund Hanbo’s 
facility investment at the end of 1992 when the then presidential election resulted in the 
victory of Kim Young-Sam, the ruling party’s candidate. It was believed that the 
founder of Hanbo supplied Kim Young-Sam with a large number of donations during 
the election period (Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Crisis at the 
National Assembly, 21 January 1999). This shows that the govemment-wholly-owned 
bank was particularly volatile to special interest. After that, the KDB and the Korea
Only US$ 0.7 billion of this sum was funded from the bank’s own resources.
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First Bank provided funds for Hanbo Steel’s facility investment which resulted in bad 
debts after all.
Too much attention to the chaebol was also observed in the lending structure 
of the Ko-exim Bank. Lending to the 30 biggest chaebol was 9557 billion won, which 
comprised 73.6% of total lending of the Ko-exim Bank. Eighty-three per cent of this 
lending went to the five biggest chaebol as at the end of August 1997 (Minutes of the 
Committee of Finance and Economy at the National Assembly, 14 October 1997). 
However, in the case of the Ko-exim Bank, it did not suffer from the problem of bad 
loans during the crisis period for the authorities explicitly guaranteed the validity of the 
five biggest chaebol and supported them.
Downgrade o f Credit Ratings
It is now very clear that the downgrading by international credit ratings
agencies of credit ratings for the development banks as well as the sovereign rating in 
the fourth quarter of 1997 forced the authorities to prepare for doomsday. In particular, 
the downgrading in October 1997 was the first time since 1996 that the Korean 
sovereign rating and that of the development banks (ratings of these banks were the 
same as that of the sovereign rating) had been downgraded (see Table 6.6). The 
international rating agencies thus indicated their belief that, in view of the shrunken 
size in its international reserves and the large number of non-performing assets held by 
Korean banks, the liabilities of Korean financial institutions could not be met even with 
support from the Korean government.
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A series of downgradings followed thereafter which weakened the position of 
the Korean government in its negotiations with the IMF. To add to the problems of the 
Korean economy, the downgraded development banks could no longer fulfil their role 
after they had been downgraded. During the remainder of 1997, the Ko-exim Bank 
could not attract any additional long-term foreign funds. The KDB could still borrow 
foreign funds but the sums available were substantially lower than those in the previous 
period in 1997. Tlie KDB borrowed US$ 3.85 billion on a long-term basis during the 
course of 1997 of which US$ 3.33 billion was borrowed between January and 
September 1997.
Apart from credit ratings for long-term and short-term deposits which are well- 
known, there was another credit rating category set by Moody’s based on the ‘financial 
strength’ of financial institutions. Moody’s assigned the ratings o f ‘financial strength’ 
for the first time to four development banks in Asia, including the KDB.
The rating for ‘financial strength’ for the KDB was E+, an intermediate 
category between D and E, at the end of July 1997. E was the lowest grade for financial 
strength. In evaluating ‘financial strength’, Moody’s considered “bank-specific 
elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset 
diversification.” It also took into account “other risk factors in the bank’s operating 
environment, including the strength and prospective performance of the economy, as 
well as the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of
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banking regulation and supervision.”*^ The probability of external support and 
sovereign actions was excluded in assigning the rating of ‘financial strength,’ according 
to Moody’s.
However, Moody’s credit ratings continued to be high for long-term and short­
term deposits with development banks until the end of October 1997. International 
credit ratings agencies did not downgrade the credit ratings of the KDB and the Ko- 
exim Bank but Moody’s placed them only on a ‘Watch’ list. Prior to that the ratings for 
the development banks were A1 (for Long-term deposits) and PI (for Short-term 
deposits) for Moody’s, and AA- and A-1+ for S&P (Table 6.6). A1 was the fifth 
highest grade for long-term deposits and A1 was the highest for short-term ones (Table 
6.7). AA- was the fourth highest grade for long-term deposits by S&P. This implies 
that Moody’s was sending a mixed but rather positive signal to the market over the 
credibility of the KDB.
The reason for these high ratings for the development banks was the credibility 
of the Korean government. With reference to the bailout of Kia Motors in July,
Moody’s stated in August 1997 that “(it) expects Korea to put the right economic
Moody’s, Rating Definitions on Bank Financial Strength Ratings, 
http://www.moodvs.com. D is assigned to banks, which possess adequate financial 
strength, but may be limited by one or more of the following factors: a vulnerable or 
developing business franchise; weak financial fimdamentals; or an unstable operating 
environment. E is assigned to banks which possess very weak intrinsic financial strength, 
requiring periodic outside support or suggesting an eventual need for outside assistance. 
Such institutions may be limited by one or more of the following factors: a business 
franchise of questionable value; financial fundamentals that are seriously deficient in one 
or more respects; or a highly unstable operating environment.
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policies in palace to stem its debt buildup, based on the country’s past prudent 
economic management.”
On 25 August, the Korean government annoimced its ‘Comprehensive 
Measures for the Stability of the Financial Market’ contingency plan, which included a 
government guarantee of the liabilities of banks to foreigners and a guarantee by the 
KDB of the liabilities of finance companies to foreigners. The measures also included 
the provision of special liquidity to the KFB (Korea First Bank) whose difficulties were 
one of the main factors causing the instability of the financial system.
International investors appeared to react positively to the measures. The KDB 
was very successful in borrowing US$ 1.5 billion in international capital markets in mid- 
September 1997, two weeks after the measures came into effect. Experts in capital 
markets took the view that Korea had got over its liquidity problem when they saw the 
successful launch of Global Bonds by the KDB.^^
In sum, the downgrading of the development banks’ credit ratings arose from 
doubts as to the capability of the Korean government to honour the country’s gross 
external liabilities in view of the relatively small size of its international reserves.
Interview with Mr Won-Keun Kim at the KDB in January 2001. Mr. Kim has, 
since 1992, been in charge of issuing bonds of the Bank in international capital markets. 
He asserted, “when the KDB was successful in launching its global bonds, which was 
better than expected in terms of the amount and the term, experts in international capital 
markets came to think that Korea was getting out of the then difficult situation. But when 
another special bank. Industrial Bank of Korea went to the market to issue bonds at the 
end of September, the situation suddenly worsened.”
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6,7 Conclusion
The strong support of the development banks for industry, in particular industries 
dominated by the chaebol, implies the Finance Ministry’s proximity to industry. The 
regulatory authority favoured the development banks over other financial institutions. 
Some policies, such as the use of the proceeds of foreign currency fimding for won 
currency lending, obstructed the strict stabilization objective of the BoK. Such policies, 
along with a large portion of the BoK’s deposits with the development banks, enabled the 
development banks to supply large credits to industry.
The business of the development banks was closely related to the special 
interests of the chaebol. The vagueness of the definitions of important industries in the 
KDB Act may have facilitated the intrusion of political /special interests into the lending 
processes of the KDB, while the Ko-exim Bank consistently served the special interests 
of the five biggest chaebol, such as the shipbuilding industry. Due to their subordination 
to the Finance Ministry, the banks were particularly volatile to the special interests of the 
chaebol who were able to mobilize the support of politicians, as shown in the case of 
Hanbo Steel. In this regard, the development banks were located at the centre in the 
government-financial sector-industry triangle of the developmental state.
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Chapter 7 Regulatory Policy and the Merchant banks
7,1 Introduction
This chapter explains the political economy of the regulatory policy applied to the 
merchant banks in Korea before the 1997 crisis. The regulatory policy applied to the 
merchant banks has attracted much attention in the literature on the crisis. In particular, 
the literature indicating regulatory failure in the Korean financial system has focused on 
the regulatory policy imposed on merchant banks. Haggard (1999) argues that “The 
creation of new merchant banks and the liberalization of the CP (Commercial Paper) 
market was a major factor in the expansion of short-term financing; it is also a case study 
in how financial reforms can be captured not only in their implementation but in their 
basic design.” It is also claimed that “Leading this rapid build-up of short-term foreign 
debt were the inexperienced merchant banks (officially called ‘merchant banking 
corporations’), newly licensed by the Kim government in the name of financial 
liberalization -  nine of them in 1994, and fifteen in July 1996, in addition to the six that 
existed before the 1993 financial liberalization” (Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998: 738).
It should be noted, however, that as Table 5.7 shows in Chapter 5, the size of the 
external liabilities of the merchant banks was much smaller than those of the deposit 
money and development banks. This chapter argues that regulatory failure over the 
merchant banks occurred against the backdrop of the confluence of the developmental 
financial system during the 1960s and 1970s and the domestic financial liberalization
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during the 1980s, which allowed the setting up of a large number of Investment Finance 
Companies (IFCs). Against a backdrop of those factors, the relaxation of entry barriers to 
merchant banking business for the IFCs during the mid-1990s led to the merchant banks 
engaging in some risky business which ignited the instability of the foreign exchange 
market in 1997. Such relaxation of entry barriers goes back to the “New Economy Plan” 
in the new Kim Young-Sam government in 1993, which was clearly a growth-oriented 
policy, reflecting private sector interest.’
That is, this research confirms the argument that the regulatory failure was largely 
due to the strong influence of the special interests of chaebol and construction companies. 
This chapter differs from the existing literature by showing the way in which such failure 
occurred. Changes in micro-level institutional characteristics, such as change of 
ownership of the merchant banks, the central role of the Finance Ministry in the 
regulatory policy applied to this sector and the adverse effects of financial liberalization 
are important in understanding how such regulatory failure occurred.
Section 7.2 reviews the historical background of the IFCs established during the 
1970s and 1980s, after which some became deposit money banks (DMBs) and securities 
companies. On two occasions in 1994 and 1996, twenty-four remaining IFCs were 
transformed into merchant banks. Two related explanatory factors are emphasized for the 
emergence of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), in particular the IFCs and late­
comer merchant banks. The existence of a curb market, which was unavoidable under the
’ Reduction of entry barriers was included as a policy of the plan.
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repressed financial system of the developmental state, and the government’s endeavour to 
legalize the curb market, are described. Section 7.3 investigates the change in ownership 
of the merchant banks, from foreign investors to Korean chaebol and big companies and 
the preponderance of loans made by merchant banks to chaebol.
Section 7.4 describes and explains the regulatory policy imposed over the IFCs 
and merchant banks. Regulatory liberalization during the 1980s and 1990s provided the 
banks with serious competition, while the Finance Ministry did not try to impose any 
prudential regulation over the sector due to the close business-govemment relations. 
Section 7.5 compares the asset and liability structure of a group of merchant banks, which 
existed prior to 1994 (hereafter ‘group A’), with another group of merchant banks, which 
had been converted into merchant banks from IFCs in 1994 and 1996 (hereafter ‘group 
B’). While the merchant banks in group A were relatively stable during the crisis, the 
ones in group B, which were strongly influenced by the special interests of the chaebol 
and some construction companies, were de facto insolvent during that period. Section 7.6 
sets out the implications for this thesis.
7,2 Historical Background o f the IFCs and Merchant Banks
Repression of the financial system in the 1960s and 1970s brought about a dual 
structure in the Korean financial market which was divided into a regulated market and 
an unregulated one. The former was an institutionalized area, characterised by policy
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loans and low interest rates, while the latter was a curb market where relatively high 
interest rates, which were close to market interest rates, prevailed. The gap between the 
interest rates in each market gave investors the opportunity for interest arbitrage (Lee 
1985: 217).
The financial situation of non-fmancial corporations had deteriorated at the 
beginning of thel970s. Non-financial corporations, which observed rapid economic 
growth in late the 1960s, continued to attract substantial investments based on the 
assumption that economic growth and government support for the corporations would 
continue. The major source of the investments was loans from domestic banks and 
foreign currency loans from abroad. Insofar as the rate of inflation increased and the 
foreign exchange rate was relatively stable, real funding costs for investment would be 
relatively cheap. However, as the government depreciated the won (the Korean currency) 
by 18% in 1971 in order to boost its exports, large corporations experienced severe 
funding difficulties.^ Accordingly, the debt-to-equity ratios jumped and dependence on 
the curb market increased. Thus the curb market flourished and the funding costs of the 
corporations increased substantially due to the high interest rates of the curb market (Park 
1985: 189). In addition, the Korean government intended to transform its economy, from 
being labour-intensive light industry-oriented to heavy and chemical industry-oriented. 
Hence, the government wanted to provide active support to non-financial corporations.
 ^The trend of high growth in the late 1960s had slowed at the beginning of the 
1970s. The economic growth rate, which was 11.1% during the period of 1966-69, 
decreased to 8.2 % in 1970-71, while the consumers’ price index jumped from 11.3% 
during the period of 1966-69 to 14.7% in 1970 -71. The export growth rate slowed down 
and corporate balance sheets deteriorated greatly; for example, return on aggregate
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Against this background, the Korean government on 3 August 1972 introduced an 
emergency policy measure called the “Presidential Orders regarding Growth and Stability 
of the Economy” (hereafter ‘3 August Measure’). The main contents of the measure were 
as follows (Park 1985: 190):
• Private loans (as compared with loans made by financial institutions) had to be 
reported to the authorities by the corporate borrowers and the curb moneylenders; 
the loans should be either convertible into equities or repayable with a low 
monthly interest rate of 1.35%.^
• Korean won 200 billion of short-term loans from banks were converted into loans 
payable after five years with an 8% annual interest rate payable after a 3-year 
grace period.
• Annual interest rates payable by financial institutions were reduced: 12.6% from 
17.4% for long-term deposits and 15.5% from 19.0% for short-term loans.
• A “Short-term Financial Business Act” was enacted on 17 August 1972."^  Under 
the terms of this Act, IFCs could be incorporated.
Emergence o f Investment Finance Companies
IFCs were NBFIs transacting short-term financial business. In accordance with
capital decreased from 5.3% in 1968 to 2.5% in 1970.
 ^The monthly interest rate in the curb market was 3.25%, i.e. 40 % per annum.
 ^There were two more Acts, aimed at legalizing the curb market: the Mutual 
Savings and Finance Company Act and the Credit Union Act. Together with the Short­
term Financial Business Act, those three acts were called “Three Acts for Legalizing Curb 
Money.”
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the “Short-term Financial Business Act,” the government authorized the formation of 
IFCs “In order to channel curb loan funds to ordinary funds in the financial market, and 
to ease the circulation of short-term funds by way of the issuing or underwriting of 
commercial paper” (Article 1 of the “Short-term Financial Business Act” of 1972).
The model for the IFCs was the short-term finance companies in Thailand (Kang 
2000). The first IFC was the Korea Investment and Finance Co., founded with investment 
from the International Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of the IMF.^ Between 1972 and 
1974, six IFCs in Seoul and four IFCs in local areas were established. In order to support 
business in local areas, nine more IFCs were established outside Seoul between 1979 and 
1981. When financial scandals in relation to the curb market occurred in 1982, twelve 
additional IFCs were allowed to be established in order to absorb the curb market money 
within the institutionalized financial market in Korea. ^
Interest rates on commercial paper, such as unsecured promissory notes of 
corporations, were much closer to market interest rates, compared with those of loans and 
deposits at the DMBs. Also, the margin between interest on deposits and loans of the 
IFCs was much bigger than that of the DMBs. Moreover, in order to protect the IFCs 
from competition from other groups of financial institutions, such as the DMBs, short­
term financial business such as the issuing and underwriting of commercial paper was
 ^The Korea Investment and Finance Co. transformed into a DMB, the Hana 
Bank, in 1991.
 ^With the financial scandals, for example, a large-scale fraud by a woman 
peddling political connections, the government tried to restrain the curb market and to 
unify the nation’s financial market (Woo 1991: 192).
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restricted to IFCs and merchant banks. As a consequence, the size of the assets of non­
bank financial institutions compared to those of deposit money banks continuously 
increased during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the commercial paper market 
experienced rapid growth due to the emergence and the formation of more IFCs (Lee 
1985: 223-229).
However, the increase in the number of IFCs in 1982 started to reduce the 
profitability of those financial institutions. At the end of the 1980s, the government 
decided that the IFCs could be transformed into other forms of financial institutions, such 
as DMBs, securities companies or merchant banks. In fact, the profitability of short-term 
financing business decreased, since the merchant banks which had been established in 
1975 were the main players and had the edge on the newcomers. It became very difficult 
for the IFCs to survive in the 1990s from the profits of intermediating commercial paper. 
Due to the reduction in the gap between nominal and real interest rates as a consequence 
of interest rates liberalization, the non-bank financial institutions had little advantage to 
offer to their investors. Moreover, whenever banking scandals occurred, e.g. unwise 
lending, the amount of bad loans to be written off increased due to the characteristic 
nature of their business, i.e., uninsured short-term business.
Consequently, the government introduced the “Financial Institutions’ Merger and 
Transformation Act,” which was approved in the National Assembly in February 1991. 
Most groups of financial institutions, except for insurance companies, i.e., DMBs, 
securities companies, merchant banks as well as IFCs, were able to merge with other
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institutions in order to convert themselves into other forms of financial institution. 
However, the underlying intention of the law was to convert the IFCs into long-term 
financing institutions (Kang 2000). Soon after, eight Seoul-based IFCs transformed 
themselves into two DMBs and five securities companies.^ Twenty-four IFCs remained 
as at the end of 1993, consisting of eight in Seoul and sixteen in local areas (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Changes in the Number o f IFCs and Merchant Banks (end Period)
1981 1982 1991 1994 1996
Seoul Local Seoul Local Seoul Local Seoul Local
IFCs 20 16 16 8 16 8 7 - -
Merchant
banks
6 6 - 6 - 6 9 14 16
Total 26 38 30 30 30
*1991: 8 IFCs in Seoul transformed into Banks and Securities companies.
** 1994: 9 IFCs in local areas transformed into merchant banks.
*** 1996: The remaining fifteen IFCs (8 in Seoul and 7 in local areas) all transformed 
into merchant banks.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (1997)
Emergence o f Merchant Banks
The establishment of merchant banks in Korea goes back to the second half of the
1970s. The Korean government allowed the formation of these banks in order to
overcome the foreign exchange crisis during the mid-1970s, caused by the first oil shock,
and to supply non-financial corporations with mid- and long-term funds. Thus, the
‘Merchant Banking Act’ was approved at the end of 1975, and joint ventures with foreign
financial institutions could establish merchant banks in accordance with the Act. Six
merchant banks were allowed to be established between 1976 and 1979. While the IFCs
 ^The leader in this business, the Korea Investment Finance Co. was transformed 
into the Hana Bank. Two other IFCs integrated into the Boram Bank, while five other 
IFCs owned by DMBs and chaebol were transformed into securities companies.
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aimed at institutionalising the domestic curb market, the merchant banks aimed at 
attracting foreign funds. In spite of such different funding targets, both the merchant 
banks and IFCs were to mobilize funds for investment in the heavy and chemical 
industries in Korea during the second half of the 1970s.
The Merchant Banking Act aimed at “Improving foreign currency funding in 
international capital markets, promoting the domestic private long-term financial market 
by introducing advanced financial techniques from abroad, thus fulfilling financial 
demand from non-financial companies” (the Merchant Banking Act, 31 December 1975). 
The major business area of the merchant banks was clearly prescribed in the Act:
“business of intermediary of foreign funds and others.” The Act entrusted the Finance 
Ministry with the right of authorization for other businesses, apart from that of foreign 
currency intermediary. The other businesses were wide-ranging including investment and 
loans to non-financial corporations, discount, trade, and underwriting of commercial 
paper, underwriting and sale of securities and issuance of corporate bonds. In addition, 
merchant banks could manage leasing business, securities investment trust business and 
trust business other than trust money, provided that the bank was authorized by related 
legislation, such as the Leasing Business Act, the Securities Investment Trust Act and the 
Trust Business Act.
As Table 7.2 shows, foreign financial institutions which became large 
shareholders of the banks were Boston Overseas Financial Co., Chemical International 
Finance Ltd. (United States of America), Barclays and Robert Fleming (United Kingdom),
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Long-term Credit Bank and Yasuda Trust Bank (Japan), Société Generale (France) and 
Commerzbank (Germany). Foreign shareholders were the major funding sources for the 
newly-established merchant banks. The Korean partners of the foreign banks in the joint 
ventures were government-owned banks, such as Korea Development Bank (KDB) and 
Korea Exchange Bank (KEB), and chaebol, such as Daewoo, Hyundai, and Hanjin. The 
merchant banks were therefore the only financial sector which was owned and controlled 
by private investors, while the other financial sectors were largely controlled by the 
Korean government as described in Chapters 5 and 6. Those six merchant banks (Group 
A) grew with large profits (Ministry of Finance and Economy 1997) due to restrictions 
over additional entrants to the merchant banking business for the following fifteen years 
and the gap between international and domestic interest rates. The application of 
advanced financial techniques and the operation of various financial businesses allowed 
by the authorities were also beneficial to the merchant banks.
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Table 7.2 Large Shareholders o f  Merchant Banks (Group A) (As at end 1993)
Establishment Large Shareholders
Domestic Foreign
Korea April 1976 Daewoo etc. 40% 
Five DMBs 10%
Boston Overseas Financial 




Decemberl976 Hyundai group 
22.8%, KEB etc. 
48.12%
Kuwait Financial Centre etc. 
28.7%, Robert Fleming etc. 
0.38%




Finance Ltd. 20.1%, Long­
term Credit Bank of Japan 
etc. 14%
Han-Bool July 1977 Hanjin group 32.0%, 
KEB etc. 18.8%
Société Generale 49.2%
Asia February 1977 Taihan Textile 44%, 
KEB etc. 14%
Yasuda Trust Bank 35%, 
Denington 7%
Han-Oe May 1979 KEB 31.4%, KDB 
etc. 33.7%
HSBC 14.0%, Commerzbank 
20.9%
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993)
The business climate for the merchant banks was not as good in the 1990s as they 
had been in the 1970s and 1980s. This was because non-financial big companies were 
able to obtain foreign funds direct and foreign financial institutions came into the Korean 
market to transact foreign currency business. The competition was not only between the 
merchant banks but also with other groups of financial institutions, in particular the 
DMBs and securities companies. The government allowed the DMBs to accept Money 
Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA), which are short-term financial instruments with high 
interest rates, and also permitted the securities companies to trade large amounts of CP 
(Ministry of Finance and Economy 1997).
Investment and trust companies (which were different from the IFCs) provided 
asset management services. Moreover, short-term financing business by the merchant
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banks was already being carried out by the IFCs. The only other business available to the 
merchant banks was therefore the leasing business, which was funded from foreign 
currency short-tenn borrowings on which the interest payable was much lower than that 
earned on long-term leasing. From this business, however, the merchant banks were still 
able to enjoy an over 10% return on equity, which was higher than that enjoyed by any 
other group of financial institutions. However, this return decreased as new merchant 
banks entered the business during the mid-1990s.
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Table 7.3 List o f  Merchant Banks (As at end Sep. 1998)
Name of the banks Establishment Transformed from 
IFCs










LG May 1973 28 Jun. 1994
Samyang Dec. 1977 30 Aug. 1994 15 Apr. 1998
Keumho Jul. 1974 28 Sep. 1994
Hansol Oct. 1974 28 Sep. 1994 16 Mar. 1998
Han-Gil Dec. 1979 28 Sep. 1994 12 Aug. 1998
Kyungsoo Nov. 1981 28 Sep. 1994
Korea Jul. 1983 28 Sep. 1994 17 Feb. 1998
Kyungnam Nov. 1979 28 Sep. 1994 17 Feb. 1998
Youngnam Jun. 1973 27 Oct. 1994
Dae-Han Jul. 1973 1 Jul. 1996
Dong-Yang Jul. 1973 1 Jul. 1996
Joong-Ang Jul. 1973 1 Jul. 1996
Je-Il Jul. 1977 1 Jul. 1996 18 May 1998
Tae-Gu Dec. 1979 1 Jul. 1996 1 Apr. 1998
Ssang-Ryong Jan. 1980 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Hang-Do Sep. 1980 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Chung-Sol Nov. 1980 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Ulsan Nov. 1981 1 Jul. 1996
Nara Nov. 1982 1 Jul. 1996
Shinhan Nov. 1982 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Samsam Dec. 1982 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Hanhwa Dec. 1982 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Shinseghe Jan. 1983 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Kyung-Il May 1983 1 Jul. 1996 17 Feb. 1998
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (1998: 496)
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7.5 Ownership and Merchant Banks-Chaebol Relations
There was a significant change in ownership of the merchant banks since the 
Korean government allowed the transformation of the IFCs in local areas into merchant 
banks in 1991. After that, foreign investors started to sell its shares and leave Korea, and 
the gap was filled with chaebol and large corporates in particular belonging to the 
construction industry. The transformation was originally to boost the business of Small- 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) according to the suggestion of a deliberation 
committee of the Finance Ministry, but the transformed merchant banks served the 
interest of chaebol and large companies after all.
The policy of the transformation goes back to the discussion on the development 
of merchant banking business in the “Deliberation Committee on the Development of 
Financial Sector” in 16 June 1992.  ^The Committee proposed that the Finance Ministry 
should establish new merchant banks as well as allow the IFCs to transform into 
merchant banks for the following three reasons: (I) in order to address the need for 
financial opening; (2) to supply SMEs with comprehensive financial services; and (3) to
Deliberation Committees can be divided into three categories by the level of the 
establishment regulations; constitution, law, ordinance or ministry regulation. The 
committees established on the basis of the first two types of regulations usually conduct 
decision-making, while the committees based on the third regulation only conduct 
consultation. The Deliberation Committee for the Development of the Financial Sector 
belonged to this third type. The committees usually consisted of academics in universities 
and research institutes (usually belonging to the government) and people from the public 
sector, and the policy of the relevant ministries was largely reflected in the proposals of 
the committees. In this regard, one of notable exceptions was the establishment of the 
Presidential Committee for Financial Reform at the beginning of 1997. Participation of 
the officials of the Finance Ministry was not permitted.
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strengthen the function o f international financing (Ministry o f Finance 1992).
Change in Ownership
In relation to the first aspect of financial opening, the Committee proposed that 
foreign investment to the merchant banking sector should be allowed earlier than that to 
other financial institutions, in particular DMBs because the merchant banks were 
relatively small in size and one of the major businesses of the banks was international 
financing. At the same time, the committee suggested that competition in the domestic 
market among the merchant banks should be intensified by allowing Korean companies 
to invest in the IFCs, to be transformed into merchant banks. Afterwards, however, 
foreign investment was not realized; rather, existing foreign investors started to sell their 
shares in the merchant banks. This was due to the prospect that the business situation of 
merchant banking would deteriorate because of new entrants to the business (Korean 
Economic Daily, 22 December 1994).
Kuwait Financial Centre, which was the major shareholder of the International 
Merchant Banking Corporation, sold its dominant status to Hyundai group (then the 
biggest chaebol in Korea), which renamed the Corporation to Hyundai Banking 
Corporation from June 1994. Not only did International Merchant Banking Corporation, 
but also did other major merchant banks experienced a change in their major shareholders. 
Boston Overseas Financial Co. was the controlling shareholder of Korea Merchant 
Banking Corporation, which was the biggest merchant bank, established for the first time 
in April 1976. Since 1995, however, its share as well as those of Barclays (then, the other 
foreign major shareholder) continuously decreased, while Daewoo group (then the third
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biggest chaebol in Korea) increased its shares by purchasing stocks from Korean 
shareholders such as Hyundai Motor Co. The Korea Banking Corporation became a 
disguised affiliate of Daewoo group in that year (Monthly Chosun 2001).^
Hanjin (then the fifth biggest chaebol in Korea) also tried to increase its share, 
though Société Generate maintained its dominant status. In addition, Chemical 
International Finance Ltd. which was the second biggest shareholder (possessing 20.11%) 
of Saehan Merchant Banking Corporation next to Korea Development Bank (possessing 
20.5%), decided to sell its shares. The Seoul branch of Chemical Bank, the mother 
company of Chemical International Finance Ltd., wanted to increase its paid-in capital 
from 3 billion won to 43 billion won in January 1995. The source of the capital increase 
was going to be the proceeds from its selling the shares of Saehan Merchant Banking 
Corporation (Korean Economic Daily, 12 January 1995). Other chaebol, such as the 
Samsung and Lotte group, wanted to enter into the merchant banking business by either 
purchasing the shares from foreign investors or participating in the process of increase in 
paid-in capital of the local IFCs.
In the end, five of the biggest chaebol (Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and 
Hanjin) became the first or second major shareholders of the merchant banks. Beyond 
Hyundai and Ulsan (by Hyundai group), Korea (by Daewoo group), and Han-Bool (by 
Hanjin group) Merchant Banking Corporation, the LG group had been the major
 ^Daewoo purchased the shares of the merchant bank possessed by Hyundai at 
great expense which was five times higher than that transacted in the stock market 
(Statement of former director of Daewoo Corp, Kim Woo-Il, appeared in Monthly
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shareholder of Busan Investment Finance Company (which was transformed into LG 
Merchant Banking Corporation in 1994) and the Samsung group became the major 
shareholder of Hanil Investment Finance Company in 1994 (which was renamed Sinsege 
Investment Finance Company and transformed into a merchant bank in 1996). Hyundai 
had been the major shareholder of Ulsan Investment Finance Company, which was 
transformed into a merchant bank in 1996. As a result, the Hyundai group owned two 
merchant banks before the crisis.
Due to the relatively small size in paid-in capital, the local IFCs and newly 
transformed merchant banks became a target of Merger and Acquisition (M&A) during 
the same period when those IFCs transformed into merchant banks in 1994 and 1996.
The major shareholders of the nine merchant banks changed from 1994 and four more 
merchant banks were targeted by hostile M&As. The new owners of the merchant banks 
were relatively small chaebol or construction companies. Small chaebol wanted to use 
the merchant banks for financing and fund management. Construction companies wanted 
to resolve terms of mismatch in funding, which was a kind of inherent characteristic of 
the construction industry (Ministry of Finance and Economy 1997: 6).
Preponderance o f Loans to Chaebol
During the 1970s and 1980s, the NBFIs including merchant banks in Korea 
rapidly grew and came to be a major funding source for corporates. As Table 7.4 shows, 
the ratio of loans by financial institutions among the total funding mobilized in the 
financial markets increased from 27.7% in 1970 to 53.8% in 1990 and this was largely
Chosun, November 2001).
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due to the increase in the credit by the NBFIs (Lee Y-H 1999a).
Table 7.4 Outstanding Balance o f Corporate Funding by Sources
























2.6 3.8 7.8 10.4 19.9
11.2 14.0 14.9 15.2 15.6
Bonds 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.5
Stocks 6.9 9.7 8.5 7.8 8.9
Money invested 3.4 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.3
CP 0.0 0.7 1.9 1.7 2.8
Foreign funds 21.6 26.2 22.5 14.6 5.6












Source: Cited from Lee Y-H (1999a: 404)
More than any other financial sector, the preponderance of loans to chaebol 
among total loans was high in the NBFIs, in particular the merchant banking sector. 
Table 7.5 shows that over 35% of total loans made by the NBFIs went to the thirty 
biggest chaebol throughout the period of 1991-1996, while the corresponding ratio of 
banks, i.e. DMBs, development banks and foreign banks’ branches in Korea, was under 
20%. Moreover, Table 7.6 shows that the merchant banking sector concentrated its loans 
on chaebol more than any segment of NBFIs. Almost half (48.1%) the total loans made 
by the merchant banks was to the thirty biggest chaebol as at end of June 1997, while the 
corresponding data for insurance and leasing companies were 37.3% and 39%,
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re spectively. This implies that the reason for the transformation of the IFCs into merchant 
banks suggested by the Deliberation Committee in 1992 was either disingenuous or 
distorted by the then growing influence of chaebol.




1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 Jul. 1997
Loans by banks (B) 137407 159787 180019 218699 253573 300912 325067
To 5 biggest chaebol (B5) 14341 16269 14033 15852 17490 23858 26939
B 5 /B 10.4 10.2 7.8 7.2 6.9 7.9 8.3
To 10 biggest chaebol (B 10) 19643 22499 21595 23308 25265 32973 38506
BIO/B 14.3 14.1 12.0 10.7 10.0 11.0 11.9
To 30 biggest chaebol (B30) 26788 30372 29938 32483 35293 NA NA
B30/B 19.5 19.0 16.6 14.9 13.9 NA NA
Loans by NBFIs (NB) 55496 73803 85934 102354 137210 NA NA
To 5 biggest chaebol (B5) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
N B 5/B NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
To 30 biggest chaebol (BIO) 20316 26547 31926 38128 52869 NA NA
NB30/NB 36.6 36.0 37.2 37.3 38.5 NA NA
Source: Extracted from Lee Y-H (1999b: 435, 446)
Table 7.6 Share o f Loans Made to Chaebol by NBFIs
1994 1995 1996 June 1997
Total loans by Merchant banks (MB) 48555.1 67244.6 89232.9 117046.4
to 30 biggest chaebol (MB30) 19983.0 31649.1 48162.0 53308.9
MB30/ MB (%) 41.2 47.1 54.0 48.1
Total loans by Insurance companies (1) 16012.4 16878.8 21724.9 21923.8
To 30 biggest chaebol (130) 6257.8 6355.7 7430.0 8227.6
130/1 (%) 39.1 37.7 34.2 37.5
Total loans by leasing companies (L) NA NA NA 30236.6
To 30 biggest chaebol (L30) 4777.1 8708.8 11404.9 11781.5
L30/L (%) NA NA NA 39.0
Total loans by NBFIs (T) NA NA NA 169206.8
To 30 biggest chaebol (T30) NA NA NA 73318.0
T30/T (%) NA NA NA 45.0
Source: Lee Y-H (1999b: 446)
It should be noted in Table 7.6 that the share of loans to the thirty biggest chaebol 
among total loans made by the merchant banks jumped from 41.2% as at the end of 1994 
to 54.0% as at the end of 1996. It decreased to 48.1% as at the end of June 1997,
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reflecting the withdrawal of the loans from chaebol after Hanbo, Sammi, and Jinro fell 
into de facto bankruptcies.
It is difficult to identify the difference between the businesses of the six merchant 
banks controlled by the five biggest chaebol and those of other merchant banks. In order 
not to be the subject to the Fair Trade Act, Korea Merchant Banking Corporation (owned 
by Daewoo) and Shinsege (owned by Samsung) were not in theory affiliates of those 
chaebol. Also, Han-Bool Merchant Banking Corporation was not an affiliate of the 
Hanjin group, which was the second biggest shareholder of the merchant bank. 
Accordingly, there was no specific data for those five merchant banks.
7,4 Explaining Regulatory Policy Applied to Merchant Banks
The DMBs were asked to conduct the role of inflation-controllers by the Bank of 
Korea (BoK) as they supplied funds and were rationed credits in accordance with the 
policy of the authorities at least until 1980s, while the NBFIs including the IFCs and
The governance structure and market share of those six merchant banks owned 
by the five biggest chaebol could be investigated by the Fair Trade Commission, which 
could only conduct an examination on the internal transactions among affiliates of the 
chaebol. Moreover, the Finance Ministry did never submit specific data on the merchant 
banks belonging to the chaebol before the crisis. According to a research (Lee Y-H 
1999a), however, the asset structure of Hyundai and LG Merchant Banking Corporation 
was different from that of other banks. The share of foreign currency loans (9.8%) and 
leases (35.3%) among the loans in total was much higher than average in the sector, 
which were 2.08% and 18.68%, respectively. It is therefore believed that the high share of 
leases contributed to the illiquidity of assets of those chaebol-o^nQd merchant banks.
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merchant banks were not subject to regulatory control by the authorities (Lee 1985: 213).
The regulatory policy applied to the merchant banks was looser than that applied 
to the DMBs. Given that the Finance Ministry supervised the business of the 
development banks, prudential supervision imposed over the merchant banks was even 
weaker than that over the development banks. In relation to the authorization of new 
entrants such as the merchant banks during the 1990s, which has been at issue in the 
existing literature, this chapter finds some evidence that the authorities tried to exert some 
control. Such control was not eventually realized due to opposition from other parts of 
the government, which reflected growing private influence on the government’s decisions. 
In addition, due to the lack of regulatory capacity of the Finance Ministry and 
inappropriate delegation of authority by the Finance Ministry to the Office of Bank 
Supervision (CBS), regulations imposed on the merchant banks were hardly implemented. 
The connection between the Finance Ministry and former officials of the Ministry 
lobbying for the merchant banking sector as well as the importance of the merchant banks 
as a major funding source for special interest groups, i.e. chaebol and big construction 
companies, can also partly explain the regulatory failure in the merchant banking sector.
Review on Prudential Measures Applied to the Merchant Banks
The NBFIs including the IFCs and merchant banks were established by special
Acts, distinct from the General Banking Act. This implied that from the beginning the
government intended to apply relaxed regulatory measures to those institutions, in
contrast with the relatively strict attitude of the BoK towards DMBs. The Korean
government wished to increase Korea’s non-monetary financial assets and to develop
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financial markets in various ways. The government believed relaxed regulations 
including liberalization of interest rates setting was necessary for non-bank financial 
institutions (Lee 1985: 222). This was to mobilize the curb market money.
The NBFIs were fundamentally different from the DMBs in the following two 
respects. First, NBFIs were not monetary financial institutions. Those institutions could 
only intermediate financial assets, rather than increase the money supply (by making 
credit available) which monetary financial institutions, such as the DMBs, can do.
Second, in order to absorb curb market funds, interest rates payable on the deposits with 
the NBFIs had to be higher than those payable by the DMBs. Therefoie, most of the 
prudential regulatory measures prescribed in the General Banking Act were not applied to 
the NBFIs including the merchant banks (Lee 1985: 222-23).
Capital adequacy requirements were not imposed over the merchant banks, 
though the Finance Ministry set a limit on the size of their liabilities, which was 2000 % 
of equity capital. There was no large exposure limit on the assets management of the 
merchant banks until the ministry set a single exposure limit, which was 150% of equity 
capital.' ' The restriction on connected lending to major shareholders was 100% of the 
merchant bank’s equity capital.'^ The regulatory authority over the merchant banks was 
the Finance Ministry, though the Ministry delegated its on-site examination authority to 
the OBS; but because the Ministry determined the scope of the on-site examination in
' ' In the wake of the crisis, the limit was reduced to 100%, and it is now the same 
as that for the DMBs, 25%.
The limit was reduced to 50% in the wake of the crisis, and it is now 15%.
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advance, the delegation was de facto nominal. It was revealed in the wake of the crisis 
that the Finance Ministry did not delegate the authority over leasing business to the OBS, 
which was the major business area of the merchant banks. As the larger part (60%) of the 
foreign currency assets of the merchant banks consisted of leases, the OBS could not 
review the soundness of the foreign currency asset management of the merchant banks 
(Testimony of Lee Hun-Jae, the OBS Governor).
Authorization o f the Merchant Banks
Literature on regulatory failure focuses on the authorization process in 1994 and
1996 for new entrants such as the merchant banks. As aheady mentioned, only six
merchant banks existed until 1994, when the government authorized another nine IFCs in
local areas to convert into merchant banks. Thereafter, in 1996, the remaining fifteen
IFCs were allowed to convert into merchant banks.
As regards the authorization of new entrants to the merchant banking industry. 
Haggard (2000) suggests that the transformation of the IFCs into merchant banks shows 
how financial reforms can be captured in their basic design.
“In the early 1980s, the government expanded the number o f investment and finance companies 
(IFCs) in an effort to bring informal financial market players under government regulation. In the 
1990s, the IFCs expressed a strong interest in transforming themselves into merchant banks 
because o f the number o f privileges those institutions enjoyed. The government licensed 24 IFCs 
as merchant banks... supposedly to contribute to a more market-based financial system. In fact,
Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency Crisis 
at the National Assembly, the Meeting in the 200^  ^Congress on 21 January 1999.
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the licensing process was the result o f intense lobbying efforts ... involved kickbacks from the 
new merchant banks to bureaucrats and politicians... According to an investigation... three o f  the 
IFCs licensed in 1996 were insolvent at the time o f they were licensed... o f the 16 merchant banks 
whose licenses were revoked by the government in 1998, 15 were new entrants in 1994-96. ” 
(Haggard 2000: 37)
The transformation of twenty-four IFCs into merchant banks was in accordance 
with the 1993 “Five Year Plan for New Economy” made by the then newly-incumbent 
government, which suggested the integration of the business areas of the IFCs and 
merchant ban k s.T h e  rationale for this integration was to accord with the trend of 
universal banking and to increase the competitiveness of the financial industry through 
promoting competition among financial institutions (Ministry of Finance and Economy 
1997).
The rationale for the authorizations of 1994 was slightly different from that of the 
1996 authorization. The former was to provide non-financial companies in local areas 
with one-stop comprehensive financial service, although those reasons were revealed as 
disingenuous. Only nine IFCs, which met certain conditions including the size of equity 
capital, were allowed to become merchant banks in 1994. However, the authorization for 
the 1996 conversion of IFCs into merchant banks was effected by the revision of the 
Merchant Banking Act at the end of 1995.
The completely revised version of the Merchant Banking Act at the end of 1995,
14 As described earlier, it was originally suggested by a deliberation committee in
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which affected the authorizations in 1996, resulted in the transformation of the then 
remaining fifteen IFCs into merchant banks. This is not well-known, but the Act of 1995 
included some aspect of prudential measures in order to maintain the soundness of the 
merchant banking sector, i.e.. Article 7 of the Act required that the Finance Ministry 
should maintain proper competition among the merchant banks. In other words, the 
Finance Ministry should ask the merchant banks to specialize in one of three major areas 
of merchant banking, i.e., short-term financing business, corporate financing and foreign 
exchange business. Despite this, comprehensive rules pursuant to the Article 7 of the Act 
were not issued, and even some rules which were issued were not strictly implemented. 
These merit close investigation.
As regards the failure to issue comprehensive rules pursuant to Article 7 of the 
Merchant Banking Act, a former Director of the Finance Ministry, Jin Young-Wook, who 
was in charge of supervision over the financial sector, stated that there was a regulatory 
clause on proper competition between merchant banks in the draft of the ‘Presidential 
Decree on Merchant Banking,’ which was intended to be included in the rules issued 
pursuant to the Merchant Banking Act of 1995. However, in the course of discussions 
within the government during January 1996, the Fair Trade Commission strongly 
opposed the introduction of such a clause requiring proper competition. The argument 
from the Commission was that this kind of regulation would cause inefficiency within the 
sector. Eventually, the clause requiring proper competition was dropped in the final draft 




There were still some prudential rules issued on the occasions of the authorization 
of merchant banks in 1994 and 1996. The authorities imposed a rule regarding foreign 
currency liquidity for new entrants. It was that the new entrants had to fund 70% of their 
long-term assets by long-term borrowings during the year following their transformation 
into merchant banks. Also, the proportion of leasing assets to gross assets was limited for 
the merchant banks authorized in 1994; to within 30% for the first year and then to 40% 
for the second year. Moreover, offshore business was not allowed for the first year. 
However, there was no serious investigation as to whether conditions laid down at the 
time of authorization were complied with because of the government’s lack of regulatory 
capacity and its bias towards deregulation and liberalization. Moreover, these two 
regulatory conditions on leasing and offshore business were not imposed on the merchant 
banks authorized in 1996.
Another Director in the Finance Ministry, Lee Jong-gap, revealed that his 
department had tried to impose a regulatory limit, of Korean won 100 million per year, 
on a single chaeboVs commercial paper, dealt with by a merchant bank. But, this 
proposal was strongly criticized by the “Regulatory Reform Commission” within the 
government, which was under the strong influence of the private sector and hence failed 
to be imposed. This failure contributed to the situation whereby 75% of commercial
' ^  Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency Crisis 
in the National Assembly, January 1999.
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paper was issued in the market by chaebol and mainly intermediated by the merchant 
banks (Testimony of Mr Yoon Jeng-Hyun, a former Director of the Finance Ministry)/^
Moreover, the reorganization of the government at the end of 1994, in 
consequence of the fervour for deregulation within the government, led to a significant 
reduction in the number of officials in the new Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy. The number of officials in the department of the Finance Ministry which 
was responsible for supervision over the financial sector, was reduced to 35 from 46, as a 
consequence of the amalgamation at the end of 1994 of the EPB and Finance Ministry 
into the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Thus, for example, only one official with his 
one assistant came to be in charge of supervision over the merchant banks. Such 
administrative capacity made the Finance Ministry’s supervision of the financial sector 
difficult. The former Director, Jin Young-Wook mentioned, “There was a perspective 
within the government that, in order to relax regulations, it would be the best to reduce 
the number of officials responsible for the area.” He recalled that the officials who were 
originally responsible for financial supervision were dissatisfied with that perspective. 
That perspective was, of course, what the EPB officials, who had actually initiated the 
reorganization of the EPB and the MoF, had strongly supported (Testimony of Mr Jin 
Young-Wook, a former Director of the Finance Ministry, before the Special Investigation 
Committee on the Foreign Currency Crisis in the National Assembly, January 1999).^^
Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency Crisis 
at the National Assembly, January 1999.
This was also confirmed in an interview with a core member of the team, who 
drafted the re-organisation at the end of 1994, Park Byung-Won. Mr Park was the chief 
secretary officer to the deputy premier, Kang Kyung-Sik, in 1997.
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The direction of the reorganization of the government was strongly influenced by private 
sector interest as described in Chapter 4. In the wake of the crisis, it is argued that at least 
fifty officials were required for supervision of the merchant banking sector (Testimony of 
Lee Heon-Jae, the Governor of Financial Supervisory Service, in 1999).
7.5 Assets and Liabilities Structure o f the Merchant Banks and the Crisis
Not all merchant banks were equally affected by the crisis. The financial 
situation of six merchant banks in the group A (the merchant banks in existence prior to 
1994) was much better than those in group B (the new entrants in 1994 and 96). They had 
different asset and liability structures. The merchant banks, which were ordered by the 
government in December 1997 to suspend banking operations, all belonged to group B 
and had unsound asset and liability structures. On the other hand, the asset and liability 
structure of the group A banks was relatively sound and they were relatively less 
damaged.
According to a BoK document at the end of August 1997, a major source of 
funds for the merchant banks in group A was foreign currency borrowing (47.0%) and 
the issuance of commercial paper (16.0%). They made profits from various sources: 
international business (32.1%), leasing (25.5%), and securities and investment trust 
business (23.0%). Profits from short-term finance business, which had been the main 
business area of the group B banks, were not substantial (19.4%). By contrast, the major 
business of the banks in group B was unchanged, despite their conversion into merchant
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banks. Short-term finance business, i.e., buying uninsured CP and selling it to investors, 
accounted for almost 60% of the profits of the banks in group B (the Fund Department of 
the Bank of Korea 1997).
In order to promote the sale of CP, the merchant banks in group B guaranteed 
uninsured commercial paper issued by corporations even though this was against to the 
rules. These guarantees caused major problems when many big companies and SMEs 
became insolvent after 1996, causing the banks’ level of bad debts to soar when their 
guarantees were called and they were obligated to repay the principal and interest of the 
CP (the Fund Department of the Bank of Korea 1997).^^
The BoK’s document confirmed that the rapid increase in bad debts of the 
merchant banks was due to the increase in their short-term finance business. For five 
years between 1992 and 1996, the value of CP discounted by the merchant banks 
increased by 31.7% per annum as a result of financial liberalization. Cho (1999) indicates, 
“the authorities continued their control of the bank interest rates and corporate bond 
yields even after formal deregulations while they had completely deregulate interest rates 
of short-term securities such as CP. This caused rapid expansion of the CP market 
starting in 1993” (P. 2).
' ^  This document was originally prepared for members of the Monetary 
Management Board of the BoK on 28 August 1997 and was collected at the end of the 
Board meeting. This document was submitted to the Special Investigation Committee in 
the National Assembly on the Currency Crisis in January 1999.
Bad debts consisted of the CP of failed companies and the CP of companies 
under Court protection whether or not that CP had matured, but only if the CP had been 
guaranteed by a merchant bank.
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The increase in CP discounted was far above the level of the increase in bank 
loans, which was 15.4% per annum. In 1996, the value of the discounted CP increased by 
37.2%, compared to the previous year’s level (see Table 7.7). At the end of July 1997, the 
bad debts of the merchant banks were over Korean won 1.5 trillion, which was an 
increase of 63.1% over the level as at the end of 1995.
There was, however, a big difference between the merchant banks. The group A 
banks only recorded a 3.1% ratio of bad debts to their equity capital, while it was 54.5 % 
for the banks in group B. Among the group B banks, the bad debt ratio of the merchant 
banks, which had been converted in 1996, was 171.8 %, a much worse ratio than that of 
the merchant banks, which had been converted in 1994 (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.7 Exposure to Corporations o f Merchant Banks and DMBs Compared
92 93 94 95 96 Average
CP discounted by 
merchant banks (A)
15.4 43.7 30.0 32.2 37.2 31.7
Lending of DMBs (B) 14.2 12.4 20.5 13.6 16.3 15.4
A - B 1.2 31.3 9.5 18.6 20.9 16.3
Source: Fund Department of the BoK (1997)
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Table 7.8 Ratio o f  Merchant Banks ’ Bad Debts to Equity Capital as at the end o f  June
1997








Equity Capital(a) 1279 2766 1706 742 318 4045
Capital (266) (828) (409) (245) (174)
Bad Debts (b) 40 1506 596 364 546 1546
b/a (%) 3.1 54.4 34.9 49.0 171.8 38.2
Source: Fund Department of the BoK (1997)
Moreover, if the assets, exposed to the three medium-sized chaebol, Jinro, 
Daenong, and Kia, which were de facto insolvent, amounting to KRW 5245 billion, were 
included in the bad debts, the ratio for the group B banks would have reached 228.0%; 
whereas that for group A would only have been 37.8%. Their assets were excluded since 
the three chaebol were theoretically solvent because they were the subject of a 
Bankruptcy Protection Agreement with their creditors. After the bankruptcy of Hanbo 
Steel, it became very difficult for companies to borrow money from Korean financial 
institutions.
The NBFIs including the merchant banks tended to distance themselves from 
companies with possible liquidity problems. As a result, many such companies went 
bankrupt although the NBFIs avoided exposing more of their assets to the companies. 
Even viable companies could have become insolvent in this scenario. The approach taken 
in London when faced with a similar problem was therefore considered in order to rescue 
such viable companies. The OBS drafted a Bankruptcy Protection Agreement following
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the model of that used in London and the association of DMBs approved the draft?^ The 
merchant banks soon decided to use the same agreement. Under the new Bankruptcy 
Protection Agreement scheme, the financial difficulties caused by the de facto failure of 
Kia the sixth biggest chaebol affected the merchant banks very badly as they had been 
heavily exposed to it (see Table 7.9).
Table 7.9 Exposure to Three Insolvent Chaebol as at the end o f June 1997
(KRW, billion)
Loans* Guarantees Total Exposure
JinRo 889 74 963
DaeNong 415 200 615
Kia 2529 1139 3668
Total (C) 3833 1412 5245
* including discounted CP, mid and long-term loans, and lease financing 
Source: Fund Department of the BoK (1997)
The merchant banks had difficulty in selling CP due to the increase in company 
insolvencies. This was mainly due to the doubtful creditworthiness of companies, issuing 
the CP and the lack of creditworthiness of the merchant banks themselves. The major 
purchasers of CP, intermediated by the merchant banks, had been the trust accounts of the 
DMBs. However, the level of CP discounted by the DMBs decreased after April 1997. It 
appeared to start to recover during the first half of July but again dropped when Kia came 
under a bankruptcy protection agreement in the middle of July. As the DMBs bought 
only the CP issued by a small number of sound companies or where repayment was 
secured, the merchant banks, particularly those in group B, had to hold the rest, i.e., CP 
with high credit risks and no security. The financial situation of the merchant banks, in
With reference to the details of the London Approach, see Brierley and Vlieghe 
(1999). The agreement was effective on 21 April 1997, 3 days after the 34 members of 
the association of banks had agreed it on 18 April 1997.
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particularly those in group B, therefore deteriorated. As only sound companies’ CP was 
able to be discounted, the short-term financial market got into serious difficulty.
Matters went from bad to worse. When the fourth stage measure for interest rates 
liberalization was implemented in July 1997, the DMBs and securities companies were 
allowed to sell liigh-yield financial instruments, such as Money Market Deposit Account 
(MMDA) for DMBs and high interest repurchase agreements (RP) for securities 
companies. This contributed to a rapid reduction of funding sources for the merchant 
banks. During the forty days between 11 July and 20 August 1997, the deposits held by 
the DMBs resulting from the sale of MMDA instruments increased by won 7,218 billion. 
Moreover, the merchant banks experienced an outflow of won 887 billion from their 
deposits. This contrasted with the increase of Won 2,716 billion in their deposits during 
the same period in the previous year. Money thus moved from the merchant banks to the 
DMBs, the major losers being, needless to say, the merchant banks in group B (see Cho 
1999).
Those assets exposed to chaebol were illiquid due to the Bankruptcy Protection 
Agreement, whereas the merchant banks had to pay investors the principal and interest on 
the guaranteed CP when it matured. This added to the difficulties experienced by the 
merchant banks in obtaining funding. Although according to the agreement, some of the 
discounted CP intermediated by the merchant banks and rediscounted by the trust 
accounts of DMBs could be renewed, the non-renewable exposures were still large with 
no yield. Furthermore, other financial institutions, such as the DMBs, avoided supplying
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call money to the merchant banks, particularly those in group B, and regulation also 
limited short-term borrowing to the merchant banks to a level of three-times their equity 
capital.
As regards the foreign exchange business of the merchant banks, foreign currency 
assets rapidly increased in 1995 and 1996, a 50% increase per annum, due to the newly- 
converted merchant banks starting to enter into foreign currency transactions (Table 7.9). 
Most of their foreign currency assets were foreign currency leases, foreign currency loans 
for facilities investment and foreign currency securities, which had medium- or long-term 
maturity. These amounted to 92.9 % of all their foreign currency assets. By contrast, only 
35.3 % of all foreign currency funding was long-term. Consequently, the term period 
mismatch between assets and liabilities was too great. The situation of the group B banks 
was again poorer than that of the banks in group A. The short-term obligations of the 
group B banks were 73% of all liabilities, 34% being borrowings with a maturity of less 
than a week (Table 7.10).
Table 7.10 Foreign Currency Assets in the Merchant Banks
(US$ billion)
1993 1994 1995 1996 10 Aug. 1997
4.6 5.6 8.9 13.3 14.6
<12.4%> <21.0> <59.9%> <48.9%> <9.4%>
( ) is the increased ratio of the assets against the previous year’s level 
Source: Fund Department of the BoK (1997)
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Table 7.11 Structure o f Merchant Banks ’ Foreign Currency Assets and Liabilities (as at 
10 August 1997)
(US$ hi]lion, %)
The Group A The Group B Total
Mid and long-term assets 
Foreign currency nominated loans 
Foreign currency leases 
Securities 
Short-term assets 









0.65 ( 9.5) 
3.36 (49.1) 
2.19(32.0) 








Total foreign currency assets 7.72 (100.0) 6.84(100.0) 14.56 (100.0)
Mid and long-term liabilities 
Bank loan
Issuance of foreign currency securities 





















Total foreign currency liabilities 7.72 (100.0) 6.69(100.0) 14.41 (100.0)
Source: the Fund Department of the Bank of Korea (1997)
Analysis of the foreign currency assets shows the vulnerability of the merchant 
banks to the reversal of capital flows. The assets such as leases and loans for facilities 
investment were difficult to liquidate. Moreover, as at the end of March 1997, overseas 
investment by the merchant banks totalled US$ 6.6 billion, 48% of which was in South 
East Asian countries. The merchant banks were the major investors in foreign currency 
securities. As a result, for example, when One Holding Company, a Thailand real estate 
company, failed in March 1997, US$ 28 million worth of bad debts resulted. The 
merchant banks had, by the end of June 1997, made loans of US$ 160 million to 58 Thai 
finance companies, which were suspended by the Thai authorities. There is no exact data, 
but most of the exposure to the South East Asian countries was made by the group B 
banks, which, unlike the group A banks, did not have any internal country-risk
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assessment system.
As a result of this scenario and in particular the increase in bad debts, the 
credibility of Korean financial institutions dropped in international financial markets and 
the merchant banks experienced difficulties in obtaining foreign funds. Roll-over rates for 
short-term foreign currency borrowings by the merchant banks was 84%, 79%, and 
65.5% in January, February and June 1997 respectively, much lower than the roll-over 
rates of the seven major DMBs during the same periods of 115%, 94% and 106% 
respectively (Minutes of the Special Investigation Committee on the Foreign Currency 
Crisis, 20 January 1999).
It should be noted that the KDB and some Korean DMBs supported the funding 
of the merchant banks by being lead or co-lead managers during the first half of 1997. In 
particular, group B merchant banks depended on the KDB and other Korean banks. Thus, 
when the KDB started to reduce its exposure to the group B merchant banks, those banks 
experienced difficulty. By contrast, the financial situation of group A banks was much 
sounder and they did not have to receive similar support from the KDB.
As at the end of July 1997, foreign currency borrowing by the merchant banks 
from domestic banks (domestic development banks, DMBs and foreign banks’ branches 
in Korea) was US$ 4.3 billion, which amounted to 67.4 % of all their foreign currency 
liabilities. The remainder of their overseas liabilities was also to the overseas branches of 
Korean financial institutions (Fund Department of the Bank of Korea 1997). As a result,
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most of the group B banks were having great difficulty in repaying their debts. When 
development banks started to withdraw part of their foreign currency lending to group B 
banks and foreign banks’ branches in Korea reduced their credit lines to those banks, 
some merchant banks in that group could not meet their liabilities without help from the 
Korean authorities. Table 7.12 shows that some of the group B banks were technically in 
default after 11 August 1997.
Table 7.12 Support in F ore i^  Funds o f the BoK and KDB for the Group B Banks 
_______________ (US $ million)




Hansol 20, Kyungnam 10 
Kyungnam 60, Hangil 58 




KDB N.Y. (0/N)* 
KDB N.Y. (0/N) 
International Reserve (Roll-
30'" Oct.
68, Keumho 22, Koryo 33, 
Kyungnam 89, LG 58 




Hangil 40, Daehan 45 
Kyungnam 54, Koryo 45, 125




Kyungnam 25, Koryo 22, 114.5 International Reserve (0/N)
O'" Nov.
Daehan 22, Samyang 37.5, 
Hangil 8
Kyungnam 25, Hangil 27, 56.5 International Reserve (0/N)
Kyungil 4.5
* Over-nig It loans
Source: Fund Department of the Bank of Korea (997)
As the financial situation got worse, the only option for most merchant banks 
was to raise money through asset-based financings. However, most of the proposed 
financing did not proceed. Amid the uncertainty in Asian markets and increasing concern 
over the exposure of the merchant banks to the most troubled chaebol, the lead managers 
for the financing adopted a wait-and-see attitude. In addition. Moody and S&P were also
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said to be deferring submission of their reports and delaying carrying out due diligence 
on the proposed assets to back the financing. In the event, the proposed asset-based 
financing did not proceed, as the government forced the most troubled merchant banks to 
merge with their sounder commercial counterparts and, on November 25 1997, ordered 
eight of them to transfer their foreign assets to certain commercial banks.
The proposed scheme for the issue by the merchants banks of Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS), which did not in the event proceed, may also have reflected the 
weakened regulatory capacity of the very department responsible for the merchant 
banking sector.
Liquidation o f Some Merchant Banks in the Wake o f the Crisis
During the course of 1997, the problems of the merchant banks were not the 
main concern of the authorities. In this regard, the merchant banks may not be the villains 
of the crisis. The merchant banks suffered from huge bad debts due to the introduction of 
the Bankruptcy Protection Agreement in April 1997. As DMBs were thereafter allowed to 
transact short-term finance business (including the taking of deposits) which was one of 
the major business areas of the merchant banks, the merchant banks, in particular those in 
the group B, were faced with a run on deposits placed with them, and therefore suffered a 
serious liquidity crisis in mid-1997.
When the authorities were considering the option of asking for support from the 
IMF, the BoK advised the Finance Ministry to suspend the business of many merchant 
banks and a few DMBs. A BoK document, including a table, stated that “insolvent
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merchant banks and certain deposit money banks, which were unlikely to become solvent, 
should be ordered to suspend their business and their liabilities should be frozen” 
(International Department of the BoK 1997i). The government did not allow any 
financial institutions to be liquidated until February 1998 when it ordered the repeal of 
the licenses of ten merchant banks belonging to group B. That is, the government only 
changed in the crisis period (see Olson 1982).
7,6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that, although the reduction of the barriers for new 
entrants to the merchant banks have resulted from the lobbying by the IFCs, as argued by 
the existing regulatory capture argument, there were some other factors exacerbating that 
regulatory failure.
First, the regulatory capacity of the Finance Ministry was constrained by the 
fervour for regulatory deregulation and liberalization within the government. Accordingly, 
the Ministry could not impose fit and proper regulation for new entrants to the merchant 
banking business.
Second, there was very close relations between the merchant banks and special 
interest groups, i.e. chaebol and construction companies, as a result of changes in 
ownership within the merchant banking sector. As a result, loans by the merchant banks
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to chaebol and construction companies increased.
In sum, by examining the way in which regulatory policies applied to the 
merchant banks, this research has shown that the regulatory failure in the sector was not 
simple. Ownership of the sector by cAae6o//construction companies, regulatory 
centralization within the Finance Ministry and the results of previous financial repression 
(in the 1970s) and liberalization (in the 1980s) all contributed to the regulatory failure in 
the merchant banks. Accordingly, more than any other types of financial sector, the 
extent of regulatory forbearance towards the merchant banking sector was significant.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
The main question raised in this thesis is “In the context of the developmental 
state, what explains Korea’s financial regulatory policy before the 1997 crisis?” Two 
explanations have been given in the literature.
The first explanation cites the exogenous breakdown of the developmental state. 
Wade (1998, 2000) argues that the Korean government was forced by the US government 
to remove controls on capital account transactions. He claims that such financial 
regulatory liberalization was not consistent with the developmental state model. The 
second explanation focuses on endogenous forces, especially “capture” and corruption, 
reflecting the growing influence of business over government (Haggard 2000). This 
thesis has shown that these endogenous forces did lead, as these authors suggest, to 
failures of financial regulatory policy.
However, where this thesis disagrees with the Haggard and Kang argument is in 
its emphasis upon the importance of regulatory centralization within the Finance Ministry, 
which had historical proximity to the private sector. The thesis has also investigated in 
much more detail the different regulatory outcomes applied to different financial sectors. 
The difference resulted from different business-govemment balance of power by sector. 
Chapter 8 elaborates on these three contributions.
First of all, the growing infiuence of private interests “captured” government
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decisions over financial regulatory outcomes leading to regulatory failure. Such 
regulatory capture largely explains both the selective financial sector liberalization, 
including the liberalization of capital account transactions and the weak prudential 
regulatory controls (Chapters 3 and 4).
With regard to capital account liberalization, Chapter 3 has investigated three 
issues on which external and internal forces were in conflict in order to achieve their 
goals; the US government pressure for the appreciation of won-dollar exchange rate and a 
more market-oriented foreign exchange rate system in the 1980s, the bilateral Financial 
Policy Talks between the US and Korean governments during the first half of 1990s and 
Korea’s multilateral negotiations with the OECD member countries on financial 
liberalization. Chapter 3 has shown that external pressure from the US and OECD 
countries on the Korean government was strong but unsuccessful in achieving their 
preferences. Appreciation of the Korean won against the dollar was limited. The external 
pressure failed to achieve the outcomes they wanted in the bilateral Financial Policy 
Talks between the US and Korean governments and the multilateral talks surrounding 
Korea’s entry to the OECD.
Hence, external pressure was basically irrelevant in explaining regulatory 
outcomes in Korea, contrary to the argument of Wade (1998, 2000) and others (e.g.
Chang 1998). The breakdown of the Korean developmental state was mostly endogenous 
as Haggard (2000) argues. Close business-govemment relations, which had previously 
been praised in the developmental state literature, became perverse as private influence
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grew. The developmental states in East Asia were highly commended for having 
developed good “institutional mechanisms” and “effective prudential regulation,” in the 
famous World Bank’s East Asian Miracle report (World Bank 1993: 6, 213). With 
hindsight, however, they got it wrong for financial repression was being exercised instead 
of effective prudential regulation. In this regard, the regulatory liberalization process was 
central to the undermining of the model.
Second, however, this thesis differs from the endogenous explanation, such as that 
given by Haggard (2000), in its focus on regulatory institutional features, i.e. its 
hierarchical structure with the centralization of authority in the Finance Ministry. The 
Ministry, with its historical proximity to the business sector, facilitated the regulatory 
capture while financial liberalization was occurring.
This thesis has set out such crucial aspects of the financial regulatory institutional 
framework in Korea prior to the crisis (Chapter 2). It has indicated that such regulatory 
structure started with an emphasis on the developmental objectives of the Korean 
government, which were consistent with those of business interests. The policy objectives 
of stabilization and prudential regulation of intermediate regulatory authorities i.e. the 
Bank of Korea (BoK) and the Office of Banking Supervision (CBS), over the deposit 
money banks (DMBs) was not implemented effectively due to the then regulatory feature 
(Chapter 5). The Finance Ministry established the development banks and non-bank 
financial institutions including merchant banks in order to support business interests 
(Chapters 6 and 7).
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As indicated in most of the developmental state literature, institutional 
centralization, along with close business-govemment relations, had been a principal 
requirement for the developmental state and such institutional characteristics were clearly 
observed in the financial regulatory area before the crisis. However, this thesis has argued 
that, contrary to the expectation of the developmental state literature, such centralization 
in the financial regulatory area proved to be a weakness rather than a strength in the 
period when financial liberalization was occurring. Accordingly, this argument is quite 
contrary to that of Haggard, Maxfield and Lee et al. (1993), who argued that the integrity 
and cohesion of the state apparatus itself allowed them to gain access to and to control the 
decision-making process of financial regulatory policy.
Combined with the historical proximity of the Finance Ministry to the business 
sector, institutional centralization enabled the Ministry to disregard the intermediate 
regulatory agencies’ concern with sound banking. In other words, prudential regulation 
was hardly regarded as the main policy objective of the regulatory authorities due to the 
fact that the BoK and the OBS were subordinated to the Finance Ministry. The result of 
such an institutional feature was seen to be particularly perverse, from the beginning of 
the 1990s, when the influence of business interests on the government’s decisions was 
great enough to suffocate the public interest.
Regulatory centralization is also central in explaining the moral hazard problem 
of Korean banks, particularly in relation to their foreign exchange businesses. With
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regard to the outbreak of the crisis, moral hazard literature (e.g. Corsetti et al. 1988) 
indicates that financial liberalization, together with the inherent moral hazard problem of 
financial institutions, brought about the financial crisis. This thesis has revealed that there 
were explicit guarantees provided by the government regarding the Korean banks’ foreign 
currency business, which went unnoticed in the moral hazard literature. Instead of 
restraining Korean financial institutions, the Korean government encouraged the financial 
institutions to take risks with the management of their foreign currency assets, creating 
moral hazard (mainly in Chapters 4 and 5).
From February 1992, the BoK made foreign currency deposits with the main 
offices of the Korean banks at interest rates lower than Libor (London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate). The value of the deposits was huge, more than US$ 30 billion by the end of 1996; 
and these deposits could not be used when they were needed. The deposits were not 
calculated as part of the country’s international reserves. The BoK wanted to reduce these 
deposits and to increase the amount of its international reserves, but the growth-oriented 
Finance Ministry, reflecting the strong influence of private interests, over-rode the 
concerns of the BoK. This resulted in the weakening of the country’s external position, i.e. 
a shortage of usable international reserves against immense short-term external liabilities.
Third, the thesis investigated in much more detail the various regulatory 
outcomes applied to different financial sectors. It argues that the difference resulted from 
different business-govemment balance of power by sector.
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Part II (Chapters 5 to 7) were case studies of various regulatory policies applied 
to different financial sectors. Different regulatory policies were imposed on the financial 
sectors, i.e. the DMBs, development banks, and merchant banks. In short, regulations 
were strict with regard to the DMBs and lax with regard to other sectors. As the 
regulatory authorities responsible for the financial sectors were different and the 
influence of the private sector differed in each sector, the extent of regulatory forbearance 
to different financial sectors also differed. More than regulatory policy applied to the 
DMBs, regulatory relaxation and failure in relation to the development banks and 
merchant banks were significant. This implies that the micro-level institutional 
explanation offered by this study, which differs from the prevalent macro-level 
institutional explanation, is better in understanding the variance of regulatory policy over 
different financial sectors.
Having indicated contributions to the literature, this research suggests that 
existing developmental state literature needs to incorporate Olson’s 1982 argument, 
which focused on the perverse influence of special interest groups on the economy. He 
argued that “The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of 
regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and change the 
direction of social evolution” (Olson 1982: 73). The demise of the developmental state 
model and the complexity of regulation on the eve of the crisis in Korea resulted from the 
growing influence of special interest groups (i.e. chaebol) on the government. This was 
the inherent flaw in the Korean developmental state.
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In addition, the fact that strict implementation of prudential regulation was 
successfully initiated in the wake of the crisis also seems to reinforce Olson’s argument. 
The emergence of a relatively independent regulatory authority (independent of the 
Finance Ministry, rather than the government) which introduced prudential measures, 
which were close to international standards, would not have been achieved without the 
outbreak of the crisis.
Whether the supposedly prudent regulatory institutions and regulatory measures 
set up in the wake of the crisis will survive is still an open question as the resumed strong 
influence of chaebol on the government has recently prevented the regulatory authority 
from making prudent decisions in some areas. ^
The regulatory capacity of the government strengthened in the wake of the crisis, 
enabling it to compel the second biggest chaebol, Daewoo, to undertake the workout 
(restructuring) process. The newly-established regulatory authority has forced corporates 
to reduce greatly their debt-equity ratios (BoK 2002c). As at the end of June 2002, the 
debt-equity ratio of Korea’s listed manufacturers is 135.6 per cent, which is much lower 
than the 396.3 per cent as at the end of 1997.  ^As some DMBs were liquidated or the
 ^As a major example, an introduction of regulation to prevent credit card 
companies from attracting new members in the street had been blocked by the regulatory 
reform committee, the majority of whose members came from the private sector in 2001. 
After that, competition among credit companies increased and the delinquent ratio of the 
credit companies has sky-rocketed by over 10 per cent since September 2002.
 ^This is lower than those in Japan and the US, which were 162.5 and 159.4 per 
cent respectively, as at the end of 2001 (BoK 2002c). However, other research of the BoK 
indicates that this was mainly due to the revaluation of corporates’ assets (in 1998 and 
99), a debt-equity swap by financial institutions, and one-off restructuring occasion 
(Daewoo). One of the effect of such assets revaluation and Daewoo’s restructuring is the
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profitability of financial institutions came to be much more important than ever before, 
the Korean financial sector has no longer been willing to extend chaebol too much credit. 
Accordingly, the amount of non-performing loans in the Korean financial sector is 
recognized as the lowest among other Asian countries including Japan (Berger et al. 
2002) /
However, the Korean government remains highly interventionist by comparison 
to much of the rest of Asia and is still influenced by special interests. There is evidence 
that even some in the Financial Supervision Service have accepted bribes, and there is 
also plenty of evidence of continued regulatory forbearance such as that shown towards 
Hyundai Construction Co. and Hynix.
anticipated 120 per cent improvement in the debt-equity ratio (BoK 2003).
 ^This is, of course, the result of an injection of public money into the banking 
sector to write-off the bad loans possessed by the sector. However, it should be noted that 
the banks which have received the public money had to restructure themselves, including 
lay-offs, changes in ownership and management and being a subject of M&A. Thus, 
banks are not willing to undertake risky asset management as opposed to what was 
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